Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Dec. 2nd, 2025

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

I'm sorry...?

[Arielle Kayabaga, Liberal, London West, ON]

Is this an important technological tool that you think would be helpful in addressing foreign interference in Canada?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Yes, absolutely. This is on top of any enforcement of Canadian legislation in general.

[Arielle Kayabaga, Liberal, London West, ON]

Would you mind describing the measures and mechanisms that the security and intelligence community currently has in place to counter foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

The federal government has many tools to monitor, counter and disrupt foreign interference. I would say that when it comes to transnational repression itself, at the federal level, we've collectively prioritized making sure that individuals who are either victims or potentially at risk of transnational repression have the right knowledge to better protect themselves.

We've been doing workshops across Canada to engage directly with communities at risk and teach them, essentially, what laws protect them, how to engage with the police and how to tell their story so that police of jurisdiction, when they first encounter these cases, know what to do with the information.

We also teach them the basics of digital security and personal security, as well as what to do when they travel, at least on a personal level. We also make sure they are introduced to local police of jurisdiction and federal law enforcement. At the very least, they know we're there to protect them and they have the right knowledge to protect themselves, and then we establish this relationship.

It's one of many tools we have in place, but we've been prioritizing this approach.

[Arielle Kayabaga, Liberal, London West, ON]

What do you see as the role of provincial and territorial governments, as well as of the different bodies that are partners in addressing this issue? What do you think their role is in all of this?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Foreign interference affects all levels of government. It is the role of all levels of government to be vigilant and aware.

My colleagues from the service are part of this exercise. We are engaging quite often and regularly with our provincial and municipal colleagues to discuss the threat and what we can do in terms of response.

When it comes to transnational repression itself, I think awareness is the first step—making sure they understand the threat landscape. We have briefed provincial officials, at their request, to give them a perspective on the transnational repression threat landscape in their provinces, and we've discussed response options.

[Arielle Kayabaga, Liberal, London West, ON]

Obviously, we've seen diaspora communities often being targets of foreign intimidation or even targets.... They go through the diaspora communities. Could you maybe, Madame Giles, mention a couple of mechanisms that we may have in place to protect and counter the tools used in diaspora communities to intimidate them? Sometimes it's intimidation through repercussions for family members who are still back in their countries. What tools are we offering our diaspora communities to feel safe enough to call this out and to make sure they stay safe from foreign interference?

[Nicole Giles]

This is one of the most significant issues that is targeting Canadians directly, so it's obviously an area of significant concern for CSIS and for the activities we undertake. We find that transnational repression really does disproportionately target human rights and political activists, journalists and others in cultural, ethnic and religious groups. We've observed that, in Canada, it's very often in the form of surveillance; spreading false and discrediting information; extortion; threatening loved ones abroad, as you mentioned; or of course, in the most extreme format, threats to safety and to life. We see the full range of activities.

We're carrying out the activities that we have within our mandate to investigate, to collect intelligence and to advise, and under the authorities that Parliament gave us as part of Bill C-70, to build the resiliency of the groups most targeted.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

I'll turn to the Bloc.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Giles, in the Johnston report on foreign interference, one of the flaws identified was the lack of tracking when a document containing sensitive information was sent to certain departments, such as Global Affairs Canada, for example. People receive an email and can forward it on, but no one knows who is on the receiving end.

Is CSIS still aware of this flaw? If so, how do we prevent sensitive information from falling into the wrong hands if it is not being tracked?

[Nicole Giles]

That's a very good question, and it's one of the issues we dealt with very deftly after the investigation.

We've taken several measures to ensure there is very clear tracking of documents that have been sent to ministries, so we understand who it's gone to and we can provide direction on those individuals who might require the information and intelligence to inform their actions and decisions. We've also put in place various measures so that we're able to help ensure the advice is provided, along with that information, to help inform decision-makers. There are improved systems of tracking the documentation and of proactive provision of intelligence so that it gets to the right hands at the right time.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I would like to ask you another question along the same lines. We know that Canada is part of the Five Eyes, a group that exchanges sensitive information. In your opinion, has our lack of tracking in the past been an obstacle to receiving information from abroad? Could other members of the Five Eyes have withheld information, knowing that it might not be adequately protected once it arrived here?

[Nicole Giles]

That's another very good question

Within the Five Eyes alliance for sharing of information—it's us, the U.K., the U.S., Australia and New Zealand—we work together very closely to ensure we're sharing information that's appropriate with each other so that the appropriate actions can be taken. We also work very carefully to ensure that a strong element of trust exists within the alliance.

As with all strong alliances and relationships, we're able to share the information and work through whatever issues might emerge. At this point we are not concerned about the information sharing: It is flowing as it should between members of the Five Eyes alliance. We're also very confident that we're receiving the information that we require to execute our mandate for Canadians.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

I will now turn to you, Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère.

My Conservative colleagues have spoken about appointing a commissioner. You mentioned two other points: regulations and establishing a computer system for the registry. I am hoping you can talk about regulation. The enabling legislation has been in place for a year and a half now. Regulations are generally put in place more quickly, since they are enacted by order in council.

Why haven't they been put in place yet? What relevant or essential regulatory elements are missing that would allow us to move forward with establishing a registry?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

In general, it takes between 18 months and two years for the government to complete a regulatory process. It depends on certain factors. In this case, the process is progressing very well. There are no obstacles. We are very close to the finish line.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Can you give us an idea of what is still missing and what regulatory elements are needed in order to have an effective register?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Several elements must be defined in the regulations under the act, including the information that must be submitted to the commissioner, how the commissioner must dispose of this information, the information that may be included in the registry and information-sharing agreements with partners.

There are others, but those are the main elements.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

What about the IT side of the registry? Unfortunately, as we have seen in the past, involving the government in IT isn't always a success. I would like to know where we stand.

Are we aiming to create our own system or partner with a private company to set up an electronic registry?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

There are two elements. First, there will be a website allowing the public to submit information to the commissioner, as well as a public registry. This solution will be in place when the law comes into force. However, we are working on a longer-term solution, and a procurement process will be put in place shortly to enable us to work with an external partner, most likely. The longer-term solution depends on the outcome of the procurement process.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I don't have much time left.

I understand that the goal is for the registry to be public, but will the information collected also include sensitive information about people who register, for example?

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Give a very quick answer, please.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Essentially, without going too far into the regulations, I can tell you that there will not be a big difference between the information provided by members of the public who are required to register and the information that will be published in the registry. Obviously, information such as people's home addresses will not be published, but no information will be collected beyond what is absolutely necessary for the registry.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you very much.

We'll move to our next round. I'll let everyone know that, given the time, I'll add one minute to everyone's time coming up.

Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes, please.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Giles, to follow up from where I left off, you concluded by referencing the SITE task force report in respect of two incidents made public by the critical election incident public protocol panel. My question was more general. Simply put, were there interference-related activities identified in respect of accredited diplomats in Canada in the lead-up to or during the 2025 election?