Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Dec. 2nd, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

We need a very quick answer, please.

[Nicole Giles]

One measure set up for GE45 was a mechanism for candidates to provide information to the Privy Council Office and, through them, to the SITE task force if there were concerns identified. There was also a very robust system of briefings set up for cleared members from all parties.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Mr. Wilkinson, you have six minutes, please.

[Jonathan Wilkinson, Liberal, North Vancouver—Capilano, BC]

Thank you to both witnesses for coming.

I'll maybe just ask you a question around one of the big changes we've obviously seen in the last few years, which is the rise of artificial intelligence. I'd be interested in both of you speaking to how big a threat it is from a foreign interference perspective and what we are doing in the context of trying to address the threat.

[Nicole Giles]

One challenge that we face as a country—and certainly, as an intelligence service—is an increasing velocity and volume of threats. This is being amplified by advances in technologies, including artificial interference. This is very much increasing the sophistication of foreign states and other actors as they seek to perpetrate those threats.

One thing we are doing, as Canada's intelligence service, is ensuring that we constantly challenge ourselves to adopt new technology and techniques, and then also work with our foreign partners to learn from them and to share information and techniques as we seek to counter those threats. It's certainly a challenge, but it's a challenge CSIS is up to tackling.

[Jonathan Wilkinson, Liberal, North Vancouver—Capilano, BC]

Mr. Aubertin-Giguère, did you want to add anything to that?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Artificial intelligence reduces the entry threshold for threat actors to conduct information operations. It also helps in the response, because you can leverage AI, so it's an arms race in many ways. However, the Government of Canada is well aware of this evolution, and we're constantly looking for options to make sure we are up to date in our capacity to monitor the threat landscape and to respond.

[Jonathan Wilkinson, Liberal, North Vancouver—Capilano, BC]

Let me ask you a similar question but with respect to social media. Certainly, social media manipulation is something people are increasingly concerned about. As Mr. Van Popta said, many people get their news these days through social media platforms. How are you folks engaging that, particularly as it relates to the election? What's the engagement with the social media platforms when we have concerns?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

The Privy Council Office maintained a table of engagement with social media platforms during the election period, raising issues and discussing specific files. The rapid response mechanism at Global Affairs Canada also engaged with platforms on specific cases in which problematic information was found online. These mechanisms already exist.

[Jonathan Wilkinson, Liberal, North Vancouver—Capilano, BC]

We talk a lot about this particular election and other federal elections. I'm curious as to what we do with respect to provincial elections or municipal elections, in which these issues can also come into play. How do we engage those levels of government, and how do we share information—which I know has been a challenge in the past?

[Nicole Giles]

One of the things that are most challenging in the evolution of the threat landscape is that the target of the threat activities is no longer simply the federal government. It is all levels of government—municipal, provincial, territorial and indigenous.

We engage with multiple levels of government to ensure that they're aware of threats and to provide information to help them better understand each threat and counter it when appropriate.

For example, in our regional offices across Canada, our regional officers engage and work closely with the provinces' and territories' elections commissions to ensure that they're receiving the information they require and that we're providing advice on how to identify and mitigate those threats.

We work closely with all levels of government, including indigenous partners.

[Jonathan Wilkinson, Liberal, North Vancouver—Capilano, BC]

Do I still have time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

You still have over a minute.

[Jonathan Wilkinson, Liberal, North Vancouver—Capilano, BC]

Great.

You referenced the speech your boss gave a month ago, and we touched on this a bit. In the speech, he stressed the importance of public resilience and informed citizens.

I hear you in terms of putting out publications, but if we really think that a better-informed citizenry is extremely important in the context of addressing this, what more do we need to do? It seems to me this is not nearly enough.

[Nicole Giles]

One challenge is that there is so much noise and information coming at Canadians constantly. I think it's a challenge we all share in terms of how we cut through the noise to ensure that it's really specific and focused information.

CSIS is part of the ecosystem, so we will put our information out. For those of you who don't know, we have a YouTube channel where we also put information. We are doing our best to engage with the multiple forms of media, as well as doing one-on-one engagement with communities in various parts of civil society and levels of government.

However, this is not a CSIS-only responsibility. It is a whole-of-society responsibility, and this includes members of the media, some of whom are in the room with us today. It also includes academics and politicians. We all need to work together to ensure that the information is provided to Canadians and that we are listening to Canadians and not just talking to them.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I'd like to thank our witnesses.

We will suspend for five minutes while we change our panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I would like to welcome our second panel. We have Wesley Wark, a senior fellow from the Centre for International Governance Innovation; Joe Tay, a former Conservative candidate from Don Valley North, by Zoom; and, from DisinfoWatch, Marcus Kolga, founder and director.

We'll start with the individuals in the room for five minutes. We'll go to Mr. Wark.

[Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, As an Individual]

Chair and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear and speak to the issue of the implementation of the foreign influence transparency registry. I'll refer to it in these brief remarks as the FITR.

This will be my third kick at this particular can. I took part in stakeholder discussions on the FITR, which were run by Mr. Aubertin-Giguère, prior to the tabling of Bill C-70. I testified on C-70 during its very rapid passage through Parliament in June 2024, and here I am again.

I will begin with a point I'm sure we can all agree on: The government needs to get on with implementing FITR. I won't go into the details of what that requires. You've heard a bit about it already.

Now I'm going to make some observations that might find less agreement in this room.

The concept of the FITR is based on three broad principles: that it would serve as a deterrent, that it would be country-agnostic and that it would enhance transparency objectives. The rationale underlying these principles is easy to understand, including the desire to ensure that the FITR is not seen as a blacklist for diplomatic or societal purposes.

In designing the foreign influence transparency registry, government officials had access to the Australian experience, which dates back to 2018, and to the building of the U.K. foreign influence registration scheme, with its two-tier approach. In my view, the ineffectiveness of the Australian model and the changes of approach introduced by the U.K. were not sufficiently considered in the building of a Canadian scheme.

While it is valuable as a deterrent and transparency scheme, the FITR addresses political foreign influence and will have little impact on covert practices of foreign interference. There is a risk, in my view, of the FITR becoming a wasteful register of good guys—wasteful because of the country-agnostic approach and to the extent that it draws resources away from dedicated intelligence collection and analysis, as well as from law enforcement endeavours. It may prove ineffective, as—I would suggest—the Australian model has been. Certainly it should not be oversold as any kind of panacea. It will duplicate other efforts by the security and intelligence agencies at community engagement and even public education.

Part 4 of Bill C-70 is, of course, law. My point is not to suggest that it be undone, but I want to draw the committee's attention to two things by way of conclusion.

One is the importance of Parliament's continuing to scrutinize the effectiveness of the FITR regime once it's established over the long term. This could include future scrutiny by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

The other, more immediate, thing is to call your attention to subsection 31(1) of the legislation, which calls for “a comprehensive review of this Act and its operation" by a committee of Parliament “During the first year after a general election”. This time frame for a statutory review is highly unusual, as you will all know. In theory, that time is now—although it would be absurd to launch such a review before FITR has actually come into operation. This statutory requirement should be timed, in my view, to begin following the tabling in Parliament of the FITR commissioner's first annual report.

This would give Parliament the opportunity to seriously consider whether a country-agnostic approach is the correct one or whether the British approach might be better suited to our needs, as well as to gauge whether the adoption of something like the British two-tier approach, including the capacity of a minister to designate countries with a special national security concern, would be more appropriate to the Canadian situation. It would also give Parliament an early chance to weigh in on the designs for public guidance that will be crucial to the operations of the FITR.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

We'll now turn to Mr. Kolga for five minutes, please.

[Marcus Kolga, Founder and Director, DisinfoWatch]

Thank you, Chair, and honourable members of this committee. It is an honour to appear before you today.

I've also been asked to comment on FITR's implementation.

For nearly 15 years, I've worked to document and expose foreign interference targeting Canada, whether orchestrated from the Kremlin, Beijing, Tehran or Minsk. Since 2020, much of this work has been carried out through DisinfoWatch, the organization I founded to monitor and counter these threats.

In parallel, I've spent just as long advocating for human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists—those struggling for freedom inside authoritarian states and those in exile who continue their work while facing harassment, intimidation and transnational repression from the regimes they oppose. For that work, I am one of three Canadians named to both the Chinese and Russian sanctions lists, along with my colleagues Charles Burton and Sarah Teich.

The efforts of foreign authoritarian governments to undermine the integrity of our democracy, pollute our information space with falsehoods, erode social cohesion and silence critics constitute a direct threat to Canada's democratic and cognitive sovereignty. Democratic sovereignty is our ability to govern ourselves without external coercion; cognitive sovereignty is our ability to form opinions and participate in our democracy based on facts, not narratives engineered abroad to distort our understanding of events. Today, hostile authoritarian states are attacking both.

They do not need tanks or missiles. Instead, they use covert influence networks, disinformation, intimidation of diaspora communities and the deliberate exploitation of our democratic openness. Their aim is clear: to weaken trust, polarize society, manipulate our policy debates to serve their own interests and silence those who challenge them. We've already seen these violations here in Canada.

Threats from the Chinese government against activists who stand for office, such as Joe Tay, represent a direct assault on our democratic sovereignty. Members of Parliament Jenny Kwan and Kenny Chiu have also been targeted by coordinated disinformation campaigns designed to intimidate voters and punish critics of the Chinese Communist Party. Members of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project and Canada Tibet Committee have been sanctioned by Beijing without any meaningful Canadian response.

Russia's disinformation and foreign influence operations are equally aggressive and extensively documented. Ukrainian and Baltic communities in Canada have long been targeted by Kremlin narratives designed to dehumanize them, falsely branding them as fascists and enemies of Canada, just as Russia has attempted to smear Ukraine's democratically elected Jewish president with the same slur. These narratives are a form of incitement to hate that has fuelled real-world harassment and vandalism in Canada.

Much of the danger comes from the use of local Canadian proxies, some knowingly and others drawn in by pressure or ideology, as well as profit. Moscow has relied on recruiting susceptible Canadians for nearly a century, a pattern revealed in the 1945 Gouzenko affair.

Without credible deterrence—meaning transparency, accountability and consequences—our adversaries will continue to exploit these blind spots. Deterrence means holding accountable those who carry out these operations and, where appropriate, using sanctions laws to impose meaningful costs.

In June 2024, thanks in large part to the advocacy of vulnerable communities, including the Canadian coalition for a foreign influence transparency registry, led by Gloria Fung, Parliament passed the FITA Act. Passing the act was an important step towards transparency, but legislation alone does not defend us; implementation does. With repeated delays in operationalizing the registry, we risk sending conflicting signals about Canada's commitment to confronting foreign interference.

At the same time, it is essential that public servants developing the regulations are given the time and resources to get them right, ensuring the registry's purpose is clear, its infrastructure is easy to navigate and it is enforceable in a consistent and meaningful way. We will not get a second chance at implementation. Delays beyond spring 2026 would considerably erode the trust of the communities most vulnerable to foreign intimidation and cast doubt on Canada's determination to defend its democratic sovereignty.

Finally, the commissioner appointed to oversee the registry must have a deep and comprehensive understanding of the full spectrum of foreign influence threats—those posed not only by the Chinese Communist Party but also by Russia, Iran and other authoritarian actors. Anything less risks creating more blind spots, which our adversaries will definitely exploit.

Thank you again for asking me to appear. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Mr. Tay, go ahead, please, for five minutes.

[Joe Tay, Former Federal Conservative Candidate, Don Valley North, As an Individual]

Okay. Thank you.

Chair and honourable members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Joe Tay. I'm a Canadian citizen, a former singer-actor in Hong Kong and the federal Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North in the last election. I'm here to give first-hand evidence of foreign election interference.

Presently, there are 300,000 Canadians who, like myself, have chosen to build their careers between Canada and Hong Kong. Transnational repression is real, highly sophisticated, coordinated and totally destructive; it aims to silence voices, end careers and erase people from their public lives.

For over 30 years in media, I was blessed to be a household name worldwide in my community. In 2019, I openly supported the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, and my career was abruptly terminated. I was told to stop speaking out or I would never work again. Days before the national security law of Hong Kong came into effect, I returned to Canada, yet the repression followed me and my family here.

During my 2024 campaign, I faced non-stop foreign election interference.

First, there was coordinated disinformation during the election. Canada's security and intelligence threats to elections task force identified a coordinated foreign operation targeting Don Valley North across Chinese social media platforms and Facebook. It aimed to curb any positive coverage and amplified made-up negative news about me, painting me as a fugitive to voters.

Second, there were summons by the Chinese consulate. During my nomination, a venue owner hosted a birthday party I was invited to—among many guests. After the party, the owner was summoned twice by the Chinese consulate for allowing me on the premises. Complaints were made to the consulate, sadly, by two or three local city councillors whom the owner was too afraid to name.

Third, a bounty on me was encouraged by a sitting MP. The most dangerous incident of all was when Mr. Paul Chiang, a then Liberal MP and someone sworn to protect Canadians, openly ignored Canada's clear position and condemnation statement by Global Affairs Canada, which was issued within 24 hours of my bounty.

Allow me to cite part of the statement: “This attempt by Hong Kong authorities to conduct transnational repression abroad, including by issuing threats, intimidation or coercion against Canadians or those in Canada, will not be tolerated.”

Mr. Paul Chiang knowingly went on to organize a selective press conference, attended mainly by Chinese consulate-friendly reporters, suggesting that anyone who handed me to a Chinese consulate could claim the $1-million bounty. He expected the press to make it more public. This put me and my family in harm's way, and Paul made himself an instrument of CCP interference in the election. To me, what's worse is that the leader of the party then, now our Prime Minister, defended him and made excuses for Paul's CCP position statement.

Fourth, there was harassment of my extended family. Hong Kong authorities interrogated and pressured my extended family in Hong Kong, attempting to make me a burden to my own relatives.

Fifth, there was administrative tools manipulation. HSBC and the government tax agency of Hong Kong were used as extended arms and tools to freeze our accounts. False accusations of made-up tax evasion claims were an attempt to administratively criminalize me in the U.S. and Canada. My wife, Angie, an insurance agent, is required to renew her licence every two years. Any financial criminal offence worldwide will lead to a licence suspension.

Sixth, there was surveillance and intimidation during the campaign. Volunteers and I were followed and photographed, and our home was monitored by strange vehicles. These things were all reported instantly to the local police and the RCMP.

Seventh, there were violent threats to one of our supporters. A female supporter who simply met me for a chat over coffee received a parcel containing a dress splattered with red paint—simulating blood—and stabbed through the chest with a knife. It was a graphic warning not to support me.

Eighth, seniors were targeted. People were sent door to door to seniors' apartments within our riding, spreading the same social media message within the Chinese community: that if they voted for Joe Tay, the Chinese consulate would know, and they would lose their visa to visit China. Targeting our senior voters through direct intimidation, surveillance, travel restrictions and fear of retaliation suppressed their democratic rights. We know for a fact that many were too afraid to vote.

Finally, the RCMP made an unscheduled visit to my house to inform me that they had intercepted a credible source of a threat to harm me during the election. This resulted in all my campaign activities being suspended, depending on day-to-day safety warnings, until the end of the election. My campaign became the quietest.

Chair and honourable members, this CCP-initiated foreign interference is evidence of intent to harm. These are well-organized, evil schemes that target Canadians and our electoral institution, turning parliamentarians and councillors into bad actors—or at least being used to erode trust in our institutions.

On behalf of my family and myself, I am here with the hope that by speaking up, every Canadian and our democracy, for which so many have laid down their lives, will be protected.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

We'll now turn to questions.

We'll go to Mr. Cooper for six minutes, please.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Tay, you referenced that Paul Chiang, the then Liberal MP for Markham—Unionville, convened a press conference with Chinese-language media, at which he specifically raised the bounty against you and encouraged community members to turn you in to Beijing's Toronto consulate. At the time, you were seeking the Conservative nomination in his riding of Markham—Unionville.

You characterized the press conference as “selective”. By that, what do you mean?

Would it be fair to say that MP Chiang organized the press conference for the purpose of publicizing the bounty against you and smearing your reputation within the Chinese diaspora communities in Markham—Unionville and throughout the GTA?

[Joe Tay]

I sent the committee clerk a list of the reports and the video, but there wasn't enough time to translate them.

I stressed that it was selective because among those at the press conference, as shown in the video, there were many invited and only one that reported to the media, which was mainland Chinese community-focused, Mandarin-speaking media, aiming to target only the Chinese crowd. Selective means that within the crowd, there were many reporters within the venue, but only one media reported the case. That was mingshengbao.com, which is a subsidiary of Ming Pao Daily in Canada.

By selective, I mean they selected the platform to publicize this public bounty. Those people who read the news were prone, whether because their ideology was with China or because of economic bad times...to want to harm me because of the money involved.