Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Dec. 2nd, 2025

[Nicole Giles]

What was observed over the course of the election and the immediate period beforehand was really observed instances of foreign interference, such as transnational repression, inauthentic and coordinated amplification of online content, and online threats, such as scams and disinformation. We observed this very much at a small scale.

It is often very difficult to attribute certain activities to a specific foreign actor, but ultimately the conclusion was that this did not interfere with Canadians' ability to have a free and fair election.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

To be clear, the SITE task force's report specifically identified Beijing as being involved in transnational repression efforts, as well as disinformation campaigns using social media platforms to target certain candidates or to influence the election. That's fair, right? It's in the report.

[Nicole Giles]

The—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

This is an issue. These are activities that Beijing broadly was involved in.

[Nicole Giles]

The task force identified at the outset of the election what it was anticipating in terms of likely behaviour and what would likely continue. It also identified in the course of the election the two incidents that you're referring to, sir, as being elements and platforms based in China and linked to PRC actors.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you.

It's now well established that in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, accredited diplomats from Beijing, including diplomats operating out of Beijing's Vancouver consulate and Toronto consulate, engaged in interference activities. Can you provide assurance that no Beijing accredited diplomats engaged in such interference activities during the 2025 election?

[Nicole Giles]

The after-action report was a really great evolution in terms of being able to provide direct information to Canadians, including parliamentarians, about threats to the election that were observed. As mentioned, the threats that were observed were really small-scale. They were related to TNR. They were related to the online activities.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Respectfully, I would disagree with you. I don't think the activities in, for example, Don Valley North were small-scale. Is this your characterization of what happened in Don Valley North?

[Nicole Giles]

I'm referring to the size of the activities. The impact in Don Valley North, certainly on the constituents and on Mr. Tay specifically, was not small-scale at all. What was experienced was very significant to those individuals.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

This is precisely why I'm asking whether you can provide the assurance that no Beijing diplomats were involved in such interference activities.

[Nicole Giles]

I think the after-action report was very clear in terms of what was observed and what was reported by the task force. While the impact on the individuals in this particular riding was very significant, the overall activities of attempted interference or potential interference in the election did not have a large-scale impact on Canadians' ability to have a free and fair election.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

I'm not hearing an answer that, yes, you can provide assurance, so I take it you can't fully provide the assurance that Beijing diplomats were not involved. They may very well have been involved in such activities.

Hypothetically, if CSIS was aware that an accredited diplomat was involved in interference activities, would this information eventually be passed on to the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

[Nicole Giles]

I would just like to clarify that, as reported.... We reported the activities we observed. The activities we observed did not include any activities by accredited diplomats. I just want to clarify that, at this point, in terms of what the report referred to.

Certainly, if there were activities we had observed that did involve the behaviour of foreign accredited diplomats in Canada, this is exactly the type of information that would be provided to our Global Affairs colleagues, and of course through them to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

To be clear, in your answer, you referenced that CSIS did not observe activities by diplomats in respect of Don Valley North, correct? This was the answer you provided; it was not more broad than that.

[Nicole Giles]

During the 45th general election, per the after-action report, no activities of accredited diplomats engaging in potential or actual acts of foreign interference were reported.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

My question wasn't simply what was reported. My question was beyond what was reported.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

You're at six minutes, Mr. Cooper.

If you have a very quick answer, go ahead.

[Nicole Giles]

We reported what we saw. What was reported and what we saw were not the activities the member is referring to.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Madame Brière, you have six minutes, please.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us this morning.

We know that threats such as cyber-espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and online radicalization are evolving rapidly.

How does CSIS plan to adapt its priorities and resources in the short and medium term to remain effective?

[Nicole Giles]

Thank you very much for that very good question.

Whenever we see a threat, we pivot and redirect our resources.

One thing we are constantly doing, as different threats emerge and the threats evolve, is adjusting our investigations. We are adjusting our collection efforts. We are adjusting our response. This can include the redistribution of resources or moving them from one investigation or area of activity or assessment to another. Mr. Rogers, the director of CSIS, spoke about this in his annual speech, which was given a couple of weeks ago.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

On the same note, do you have to do anything specific to protect the Arctic and Canada's Far North?

[Nicole Giles]

Yes, of course. Protecting the Arctic is one of the issues of concern to us, as well as the government and many Canadians these days.

One thing we are ensuring is that we continue our collection. We're working with our partners up north, who, of course, are potential targets of economic security threats, espionage and other security threats, to ensure that they have the information they need to be resilient. Of course, we're working with our private sector partners, as well, to ensure that they have the information to protect themselves from potential threats up north.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Earlier, we talked about the Five Eyes group. What role do our closest allies play in helping us combat foreign interference? In your opinion, are there lessons to be learned from our Five Eyes partners that could improve our own methods of combatting foreign interference?

[Nicole Giles]

Another very good question.

One thing that is very relevant for Canada and its allies is that when we work in partnership within an alliance, we are all better equipped.

We're stronger partners when we work together in alliance. One thing distinguishing us from our adversaries is having enduring relationships of trust in which there are shared interests.

We are in a constant pattern of providing information and our experiences to our Five Eyes partners and our allies, as well as receiving from them the lessons learned. That's one thing we saw in the setting up of the registry: learning lessons from our international partners, for example.