Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Dec. 2nd, 2025

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Would you like to add anything on this question, Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

No. Ms. Giles has covered the subject well.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

More broadly, how important is it for all Canadians, particularly elected officials and university students, to be aware of and sensitized to the threat of foreign interference?

[Nicole Giles]

Again, that's a very good question.

One of our best defences is ensuring that we have an aware and well-educated public that can identify the threats in advance and take measures to protect themselves, to build their resiliency and to prevent the threats from materializing in the first place.

For that reason, one thing CSIS does is a campaign of resiliency disclosures to ensure that this information is provided. We put out a series of publications. This morning I shared with the chair and vice-chairs the very snappily named “Foreign Interference and You” publication, which helps people identify foreign interference.

Really critically, we work very closely with all our partners across Canada to ensure that they understand the threat. Critically, it's a two-way street. If they see something, if they observe a threat, they're able to share the information with CSIS so that it can also inform our investigations and our collection.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Can you give us a profile of someone who engages in foreign interference here in Canada? What are the different characteristics? What do you find in each case of foreign interference?

[Nicole Giles]

Many different methods and techniques are used by the many people who engage in these activities. Clandestine activities fall under the mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS.

When the activities are clandestine, deceptive and covert, they reach CSIS's threshold for investigation and for action. We tend to see attempts to obfuscate the role a particular foreign state may have or proxy actors may have. We see foreign states undertaking these activities to try to advance their strategic interests at the expense of Canada's interests.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Madam Normandin, you have three and a half minutes, please.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Giles, I would like to return to the issue of tracking. For example, we know that there is a bit of a revolving door at Global Affairs Canada. Civil servants can be transferred quite frequently.

In general, when there is sensitive information or reports to be transmitted, are the documents sent to a generic address or a specific addressee?

[Nicole Giles]

It is really up to Global Affairs to provide answers about its methods, its administration and the email addresses used.

When we send information over, there are follow-ups to ensure that the information is getting to the right people at the right time. There's also a series of different committees that assistant deputy ministers sit on, in which we discuss the intelligence that has been seen to ensure that there is awareness of the threat, so it can be acted upon.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Your question implies that information is primarily circulated via email, which is not the case. Classified information goes through a system where there is a designated person responsible for distributing and controlling the information. It is therefore not circulated by email without some sort of control. The information goes through a system. Every organization and every department has people responsible for controlling information.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

That opens the door to a follow-up question. One of the issues we looked at extensively in the Johnston report was whether information was getting to the right people, particularly the Prime Minister. Last time, that was an issue. It was all hearsay. Did the Prime Minister receive the information?

Should there be a formal obligation to forward certain information to the Prime Minister with the possibility of receiving an acknowledgement of receipt, whether electronically or otherwise? Would that prevent the kind of drama we experienced that led to the Johnston report?

[Nicole Giles]

It is really the Privy Council Office that is responsible for the information provided to the Prime Minister. Most of the time, CSIS does not deliver documents directly to the Prime Minister.

It's really the office of the national security adviser to the Prime Minister that ensures the information they deem relevant makes it to the Prime Minister. This was spoken to quite extensively in the Hogue commission, as well as in various committees.

From a CSIS perspective, if there is a critical piece of information, we work with our colleagues and partners to ensure that the right ministers and the Prime Minister have seen the information.

As well, there has been quite an extensive government structure set up by the national security and intelligence adviser, which includes a committee of deputy ministers who regularly meet and talk about the intelligence being seen, and then take decisions on what might need to be moved up the chain.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

There are three seconds left. I'll give them to you next time.

Mr. Van Popta, you have six minutes, please.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, witnesses, for being here.

Ms. Giles, I have a question for you. When Mr. Cooper was engaging in a conversation with you a little while ago, you said that, despite foreign interference in our last few elections, the interference did not amount to interfering with Canadians' ability to hold free and fair elections.

You're echoing what Madam Justice Hogue said in her report, that despite occurrences of foreign interference in 2019 and 2021, the election results at the national level were not affected. In other words, with or without foreign interference, the election results would have been the same—a minority Liberal government with Mr. Trudeau as the Prime Minister.

Can the same be said at the local level, though? I'm thinking of perhaps Don Valley North or, in the 2021 election, Richmond East—Steveston. Can you assure Canadians that the elections there were fair and free despite obvious foreign interference in those campaigns?

[Nicole Giles]

I think, as you mentioned, the report from Madam Hogue, the report from Mr. Johnston and the after-action report that emerged after GE45 from SITE, as well as from the panel of senior officials, were all very clear in terms of the ultimate impact on Canadians' ability to have a free and fair election, which is that there was none.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

What does “ultimate impact” mean? Does that mean at the national level, or does that also telescope down to specific ridings?

[Nicole Giles]

That means at the national level. I think as well that the reports did not go into every specific individual riding. I also just want to clarify—

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

Only two or three were important.

[Nicole Giles]

—the responsibility of CSIS. It would be inappropriate for an intelligence agency to be responsible for passing judgment on each and every individual riding; this is not the responsibility of the intelligence agency. We support those assessments by providing information and intelligence to those—to Elections Canada, to the commissioner of Canada elections—who make those decisions.

We saw in GE45, as mentioned, a couple of incidents related primarily to transnational repression, to the manipulation of information. The determination was that they did not ultimately impact the outcome of any of the races.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

The ultimate outcome is that there was a minority Liberal government, with the Conservatives' being in opposition again, but it does not telescope down to specific ridings. Some ridings may have gone the other way if it hadn't been for foreign interference. At least the possibility is open.

[Nicole Giles]

I don't want to be in a position in this committee to question the findings of previous reports, and I'm certainly not in a position to be able to do so. I think the government stands by the reports that have been previously issued.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

Ms. Giles, just to continue with you for a moment, you appeared before the ethics committee on May 21, 2024, and I'm reading from your testimony there: “CSIS has long-standing investigations into specific threat actors believed to be targeting Canada's democratic institutions through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means. This is foreign interference.”

How do you identify threat actors? Ms. Brière was asking you questions about that. At what point do you say, this is a threat actor that we need to follow?

[Nicole Giles]

That's a good question.

There are various ways threat actors will come to our attention. Certainly, we are constantly in a process of putting our resources towards the most significant threats to Canada. As part of that, certain thresholds have to be met in order for CSIS to instigate an investigation. There are thresholds that need to be met in terms of reasonable grounds to suspect, in terms of reasonable grounds to believe, when we use certain of our authorities.

There are various sets of information that come to us. Some of the information is information we have collected ourselves as an intelligence service. Sometimes there's information provided to us by partners that will help to inform our assessment of those threats. As mentioned by our colleagues, critically, there will often be information coming to us from foreign partners, which also helps to inform our decision on whether to put our attention towards a particular threat or a particular series of threats that are manifesting.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

At what point do you involve candidates and bring them into the discussion, informing them that perhaps they are being targeted by foreign interference players? I don't want to use myself as an example. I'm sure all of us have a situation where we have many citizens in our ridings who speak different languages that I don't speak, for example, Chinese or Korean. Most people get their information from social media nowadays. I can't read what they're reading. Is somebody tracking this, or am I vulnerable?