Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the invitation to appear before the committee as it studies foreign election interference.
I will briefly discuss our preparation for the 45th general election, what we experienced with respect to electoral operations, as well as our efforts to address inaccurate information about the electoral process.
Protecting elections against foreign interference requires a whole-of-society approach. At Elections Canada, our role in the delivery and protection of a federal election includes ensuring physical and personal security, the cybersecurity of our infrastructure and the security of the information regarding the electoral process. Our focus is on improving our resilience against attempts at election interference, whether they be foreign or domestic.
In the lead-up to and during the 45th general election, we continued to work closely with our security partners to understand potential threats and to secure our IT systems and the overall electoral process. And, as I told the committee when I appeared in October, Elections Canada did not experience any breaches to its IT infrastructure or interference with its electoral operations during the election.
However, as recognized by the Foreign Interference Commission, the biggest threat to our democracy comes from information manipulation, particularly through social media platforms. The role of Elections Canada in combatting disinformation and misinformation is very specific but critical to the security of our electoral process and the trust of Canadians. During and between elections, Elections Canada is focused on providing Canadians with accurate information about the federal electoral process, not only so that they may exercise their right to vote but also to inform them of the procedures and safeguards in place to ensure the integrity of the process.
In preparation for the election and to counter information manipulation, we've developed a range of information products as part of our voter information campaign. These include products available in 50 languages as well as detailed content on electoral integrity. We also published a media guide for speakers of Mandarin, Cantonese and Punjabi, the three most spoken languages in Canada besides English and French, with information on subjects beyond what we typically include in our information products, such as electoral security, the national register of electors and political financing safeguards.
Based on testimonies heard before the Foreign Interference Commission, and to prevent electors from being intimidated or influenced to vote in a certain way or not vote at all, we added new accessible web content about safeguards in the electoral process, including messages emphasizing the secrecy of the vote. These messages were shared widely through a range of communication channels during the 45th general election.
In the lead-up to, as well as during the election, we monitored the public information environment to observe inaccurate narratives about the electoral process. In addition to monitoring traditional media, Elections Canada monitors 60 different platforms, news websites, blogs and online forums in 22 different languages. I would note that Elections Canada is not equipped to determine whether the source of inaccurate information about federal elections is domestic or foreign. Instead it focuses on the impact that inaccurate information might have on Canadians' ability to register and vote or on their trust in the electoral process. Though we did observe an increase in inaccurate narratives compared to previous elections, we were able to provide Canadians with easy access to information about the electoral process. We promptly corrected this information and misinformation through our various channels such as a repository of official communications and our social media posts. We did interact with social media platforms when appropriate regarding specific messages that we saw that were concerning.
However, during the 45th general election, we noticed a shift in the digital information environment. The emergence of new elements, such as artificial intelligence and influencers, is changing the way in which Canadians have access to information about the electoral process and amplifies the manipulation and circulation of inaccurate information, whether domestic or foreign. This shift, in addition to the presence of other existing factors, such as polarization and the interconnectivity of the Canadian and American information environments, may lead to a situation where the information circulating online has long-lasting consequences on Canadians’ trust in the electoral process.
Prior to the election, in November 2024, I presented to Parliament and to the Foreign Interference Commission a series of recommendations to better protect elections against threats, including from foreign actors.
A key recommendation I made was to prohibit false information about the electoral process that is knowingly and deliberately being spread in order to interfere with the ability of Canadians to exercise their right to vote or to undermine trust in an election or its result.
My other recommendations dealt with the use of deep fakes, the funding of third parties and the protection of nomination and leadership contests.
The Foreign Interference Commission endorsed most of my recommendations, including the ones I have mentioned here.
Mr. Chair, I would encourage the committee to consider these recommendations in its study of foreign interference. I would be happy to make my officials available to the committee should it wish to study those.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer members’ questions.