Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good morning to you and to the members of the committee.
As mentioned, my name is Vanessa Lloyd, and I am the deputy director of operations at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I'm appearing this morning in my capacity as the CSIS chair of the security and intelligence threats to elections task force, the SITE task force, during last year's 45th general election.
I'm joined this morning by my colleagues from three other member organizations of the SITE task force, Bridget Walshe, who is the associate head of the Canadian centre for cybersecurity, part of the Communications Security Establishment Canada; Greg O'Hayon, director general of federal policing; and Saliou Babou, the executive director of rapid response mechanism Canada at Global Affairs Canada.
Members of the committee may recognize Ms. Walshe, Mr. O'Hayon and me from our participation in the weekly media technical briefings during the election period, where we were also joined by the assistant secretary to cabinet, communications, Laurie-Anne Kempton; assistant secretary to cabinet, Allen Sutherland; associate assistant deputy minister of Global Affairs, Larisa Galadza; and my colleague, Anam Alvi, the executive lead for operations at CSIS.
Mr. Babou also had the pleasure to appear before you last week.
I would also like to take a moment to highlight the involvement of other partners at Public Safety Canada, including the foreign interference coordinator at the integrated threat assessment centre, or ITAC, and at the office of the commissioner of elections, as well as Elections Canada, who contributed to, supported or considered the work of the SITE task force during the election, for example, during daily meetings of the assistant deputy ministers' electoral security coordinating committee, or ADMESCC, which was co-chaired by the Privy Council Office.
Each of these representatives and their teams were proud to have had a role in protecting the integrity of the last general election from foreign information manipulation and interference, transnational repression, cyber-threats and violent extremism. It's our privilege to represent a part of that work by appearing before this committee today.
I will start with the reminder to members that, while the SITE task force was stood up to provide enhanced monitoring of threats to general election 45 from March 24 to May 5, 2025, the ongoing work of its member departments, agencies and partners continues year-round under our respective mandates and as a strong national security community.
This collective expertise and co-operation ensure that SITE's reporting and assessments included information, intelligence and insights from all member organizations to form a comprehensive understanding of a range of threat actor capabilities, intentions and potential actions before and during the electoral process.
Those assessments were leveraged in the government's preparation for general election 45. For example, there were the periodic briefings to the critical election incident public protocol panel, or the panel, and the election security coordinating committee; the task force's inclusion in pre-election training sessions for key stakeholders; and the task force's participation in engagement efforts, for example, with the House of Commons and the leaders' debates commission.
Similarly, once the election was called, SITE delivered classified briefings to security-cleared representatives of political parties on possible threats to GE45, providing them with non-partisan insights and information to help protect their campaigns.
The task force also developed and contributed information on tactics used by threat actors as well as personal and cybersecurity advice, which was sent to all confirmed candidates by the Privy Council Office along with instructions on how to report incidents of potential foreign interference, cyber or violent extremist threats to SITE.
During the monitoring period, SITE produced daily situational reports based on reporting from the task force members. We met weekly and supported the daily ADM election security coordinating committee meetings.
The ADM election security coordinating committee reviewed SITE reporting and provided recommendations to the panel via weekly briefings by the director of CSIS as the chair of SITE on behalf of the SITE task force.
Any perceived threat can erode public confidence and trust in the integrity of Canada's democratic processes and institutions. Enabling an informed and resilient public is the best way to counter foreign interference. As such, the SITE task force members participated in the government's weekly media technical briefings on five occasions during the writ period, increasing transparency by sharing information about the threats that Canada faces and measures put in place to detect and counter those threats.
These technical briefings helped to inform Canadians of observed incidents and the evolving threat environment as a whole, as well as to provide reminders and best practice recommendations for the public in navigating the online ecosystem pre election day. Tools and resources published by the government and by individual SITE members prior to and during the election period were highlighted, as was the ongoing work taking place to safeguard the election.
This included providing an outline of the threat landscape during the first technical briefing and sharing information about the threat posed by detected instances of digital transnational repression and online information operations, as well as an overview of CSE's fifth report on cyber-threats to Canada's democratic processes during subsequent briefings.
The technical briefings ultimately informed the media and the public that SITE had not observed incidents determined by the panel to have impacted Canada's ability to have a free and fair election. This assurance was provided in advance of Canadians casting their votes.
Following the election, SITE published an after-action report, which detailed SITE's assessments in advance of the election and observed instances of foreign interference during the election. The report affirms that during the election period, SITE observed instances of foreign interference, such as digital transnational repression, inauthentic and coordinated amplification of online content and online threats such as scams and disinformation. These activities were observed at a small scale and remain difficult to attribute to a foreign actor.
Two of these instances were discussed openly during the weekly technical briefings. The report emphasizes that it is essential to remain vigilant against foreign interference, which can take the form of information manipulation and transnational repression.
Citizens who are informed about the threats to democracy are better equipped to critically evaluate information and resist manipulation, helping them to confidently cast their votes and engage in ongoing democratic processes at all levels of government.
Building this resilience involves making sure Canadians have access to reliable and factual information, which is precisely why the SITE task force engaged in such proactive communications. SITE hopes that the after-action report is helpful to citizens and to this committee in this regard.
The SITE task force will continue to share information publicly about the threats Canada faces during future democratic processes, as well as about the measures being put in place to detect and counter them. Individual task force members will also continue investigative efforts under their department's or agency's mandate and communicate with the public when possible.
Mr. Chair, thank you again for the opportunity to do that today and to be a part of the committee's study. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer questions from members.