Mr. Chair, I think it is important to share with the committee how the SITE task force has evolved its practices since the various studies on foreign interference, for example, by the experience of the public inquiry into foreign interference, as well as reports done by NSICOP on foreign interference.
What was different about this election, in addition to the ongoing collaboration between the operational members who you see appearing before you today, is we were much more transparent about reporting to Canadians incidents as we saw them. That was part of the direction given to the panel that was executed by the SITE members on the clerk's direction and guidance, which I believe the committee heard about in the testimony last week.
One of the things we need to keep in mind is that as threat actors evolve their tactics, the government must do so as well. Part of the mechanism for countering foreign interference was to ensure that every candidate, campaign and clear representatives of each party understood what it is to recognize foreign interference now.
Part of the effort that the SITE members made was to ensure that every confirmed candidate received an email from the SITE task force, which included information about how to detect foreign interference, made specifications about the difference between acceptable diplomatic behaviour and that which was beyond diplomatic engagements and provided them information on how to protect their social and digital selves, as well as how to report to CSIS and the RCMP threats of physical intimidation or violence.