That's a great question.
What I've seen in the past few years, which is some good news for the committee, is further engagement with particular countries in the Indo-Pacific on the topic of disinformation, misinformation and FIMI.
I really think this committee should also consider how countries that are under significant stress from FIMI, such as Taiwan, and from domestic disinformation, such as the Philippines, are responding to the current threats and how they're moving in lockstep with these threats. Currently, Taiwan is thinking a lot about how to address AI, FIMI and such things.
I've seen more peer-to-peer relations, whether that's through engaging with community civil society actors.... However, what I've seen in my own experience is that it's from government to civil society actors. I'd like to see more civil society actors doing exchanges and having this facilitated more in thinking about how we can counter FIMI to share ideas and best practices.
In my organization, Doublethink Lab, every fall we have a conference called the IO, or Information Operations Roundtable, where we bring together actors from the Indo-Pacific to present on what they see in their countries and how they're trying to counter it.
We heard quite a bit from the Philippines as well in regard to how they're dealing with domestic disinformation there. This is where I learned the strategy of prebunking, which is a bit more novel to me.
Prebunking, for the committee, very quickly, is anticipating what types of disinformation and misinformation will happen in particularly sensitive times like elections. For example, I'm from Alberta. The Alberta referendum is coming up—or potentially coming up—so when you think about that....
What I mean is that I would not have been introduced to this idea if we hadn't brought those organizations in. I would like to suggest to the committee that peer-to-peer relationships are important. Relations from civil society to civil society are important as well.
