I often refer to the information space as being asymmetrical in nature in terms of information threats by foreign adversaries. The asymmetry arrives from a kind of authoritarian advantage that our adversaries often have, in the sense that they often have barriers—whether it's the great firewall in China or closed access and Internet restrictions in countries such as Iran and Russia. They create these physical barriers.
In comparison, the information environments of Liberal democracies are open. By virtue of our existence, we believe in freedom of expression, the right to information and the free flow and exchange of information. This is part of democratic discourse. It also creates a vulnerability for us.
This is also why, if we only chase technological solutions or legal regulatory frameworks, we will always be a step behind the threat. It is why, in our work, we often argue that the best defence is a strong offence. It is why I introduced the idea of civil society and civic resilience as a force multiplier. Because our societies are open, and because they are diverse, we almost have to create multi-level stopgaps for these information threats.
At the strongest level is the civic resilience. This is the most durable. This makes it harder for poor information, influence campaigns and FIMI activities to stick and gain traction in our democratic societies.