Procedure and House Affairs Committee on April 21st, 2026

[David Salvo]

I agree with that wholeheartedly. Canada has been seen, over the last decade, as really being a leader in the field of countering foreign interference. On a government-to-government level, a lot of Canadian ideas—policies and measures to facilitate intergovernmental coordination and communication with the public on threats to Canadian elections, for example—are procedures and policies that have been adopted by other governments, including my own, based on the Canadian best practice.

I think that Canada is already perceived as being the right player to facilitate exactly the type of contact Ms. Lau is talking about.

I agree that on a level of civil society to civil society, there's very little, that I'm aware of, facilitating this knowledge sharing, because it's tough to fund, other than some ad hoc work being done through the EU, for example, on a transatlantic basis.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I'll have to cut you off there.

I'd like to thank all of our witnesses. We will suspend for a few minutes to prepare for the next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Welcome back, everyone. I would like to welcome our second panel.

We have Dr. Shelly Ghai Bajaj, assistant professor, Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College.

From Digital Public Square, we have Shlomit Broder, chief executive officer.

From Vote16 Canada, we have Sasha Banka, who is a volunteer.

Welcome.

We'll start with Ms. Banka for five minutes, please.

[Sasha Banka, Volunteer, Vote16 Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Sasha Banka, and I'm 16 years old. I am here on behalf of Vote16 Canada, where I work as a volunteer.

A new survey from GreenShield, conducted in partnership with Mental Health Research Canada, reveals that over 80% of Canadian youth are overwhelmed by stress and anxiety about their future. Economic pressures are key drivers of this stress, with even higher rates of mental health concerns among racialized and LGBTQ+ youth.

As a student, I hear these concerns on a daily basis. A lot of my peers look at the world and feel they have no power to change the things around them. While this committee has explored many potential solutions to these challenges, one of the most powerful tools has remained overlooked. It is expanding voting rights to 16- and 17-year-olds.

Seventeen countries, including Germany, Austria and Argentina, and 15 U.S. cities have extended the right to vote to citizens 16 and up. Just recently, the U.K. did the same. Giving young people the ability to participate in the democratic process validates their role as contributing members of society. Including them builds a sense of belonging, shows that institutions are listening to what they have to say, and ensures that youth stay engaged and informed, and feel invested in our democracy for decades to come.

The hesitation around adopting such a measure often stems from the idea that 16‑year‑olds aren't mature enough to vote. However, the science on cognitive development and international case studies show the opposite.

Neuroscientists distinguish between hot cognition—which refers to decision-making that is emotionally driven or influenced by peers—and cold cognition—which refers to thoughtful and informed decision-making. Voting relies on cold cognition. Like consenting to medical treatment, voting involves deliberation, and 16-year-olds already have that ability.

Research done in Austria, Belgium and Germany shows that 16- and 17-year-olds are equal to adults when it comes to the quality of their voting choices. In Scotland, 16- and 17-year-olds sought out more sources of political information than their peers who didn't have the right to vote elsewhere in the U.K., and more than 40% of them voted differently than their parents in the referendum on independence. This research shows that 16-year-olds make their voting decisions as effectively and competently as adults.

Canada's own experience shows how 16- and 17-year-olds can participate meaningfully in democratic life. When the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing studied this issue in 1991, they determined that, “in terms of political competence, 16 could be just as defensible an age as 18”.

Furthermore, Vote16 Canada has identified 22 first nation, Métis and Inuit organizations and governments across Canada that have either enshrined a minimum voting age of 16 in their legislation or successfully implemented it in recent elections. Specific examples include Haida Nation, which sets the eligibility age for council elections and referenda at 16, and the Nunatsiavut Government, which has a voting age for assembly and presidential elections of 16. As well, 16- and 17-year-olds have been able to vote in official participatory budgeting projects in such cities as Montreal, Hamilton and Toronto, effectively giving youth a greater say in the future of their cities. During Prince Edward Island's 2016 referendum on electoral reform, 16- and 17-year-olds were eligible to vote. In fact, they voted at a higher rate than all those aged 18 to 44.

By enfranchising youth earlier, we catch them when they are most supported, helping them build a lifelong habit of participation. As the chief electoral officer of the Northwest Territories noted in a report, 16- and 17-year-olds not only vote at a “higher rate than 18- to 24-year-olds...but they're also more likely to vote in the next election, and the one after that”. These precedents are significant, because they provide real-world, international and domestic evidence that expanding the voting age is not a radical experiment but a functional and proven model for enhancing civic engagement.

Nelson Mandela is famously credited with saying, in 1990, “The youth of today are the leaders of tomorrow.” While it is a beautiful sentiment, I believe it is time we updated it.

Not only are young people the leaders of tomorrow, but they are also the leaders of today.

Elected officials' support for lowering the voting age to 16 would send a strong message: they trust today's young people, they value our perspective and they recognize our right to shape the Canada we will inherit.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Though I usually don't editorialize after a witness's opening remarks, that was excellent work. Thank you for appearing with us today.

Ms. Broder, you have five minutes, please.

[Shlomit Broder, Chief Executive Officer, Digital Public Square]

Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I'm very grateful for the opportunity to be here today.

My name is Shlomit Broder. I'm the CEO of Digital Public Square, a Canadian not-for-profit that, throughout the last decade, has worked to bolster civic resilience in Canada and abroad by creating digital spaces that allow for greater participation, encourage critical thinking and invite more voices to be shared and heard in a productive and respectful manner.

Today I will speak to two areas—the state of polarization in Canada and the role digital spaces can play in strengthening civic resilience.

Across the world, we are seeing deepening polarization, growing information manipulation threats and declining trust in institutions. Canada is not immune to these challenges. It is a critical moment to take a thoughtful and proactive approach to safeguarding and strengthening our civic resilience.

Our nationally representative surveys show that Canadians perceive the country to be far more polarized than it actually is. Many believe that those with opposing political views are more extreme than they truly are and underestimate how much common ground exists in our shared priorities and values.

In our July 2025 survey, 30% of Canadians said the country is highly polarized, and 62% stated they are concerned that the political left and political right can't speak to each other about political and social issues. However, when we look at how Canadians identify politically, the picture is quite different and more nuanced. Most Canadians self-identify as ideologically centrist. Within our survey, 66% of Canadians placed themselves in the three middle pillars on a seven-point scale between political left and right. Only a small minority identified at the ideological extremes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I'm going to interrupt you for a second.

The microphone is very sensitive. When putting the paper against it, there's some background noise. I apologize. It's something I'm guilty of too.

Please continue.

[Shlomit Broder]

Should I repeat the last part?

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Yes, go back to the last part.

[Shlomit Broder]

In our July 2025 survey, 30% of Canadians said the country is highly polarized, and 62% stated that they are concerned the political left and political right can't speak to each other about political and social issues. However, when we look at how Canadians actually identify politically, the picture is quite nuanced. Most Canadians are ideologically centrist. Within our survey, 66% of Canadians placed themselves in the three middle pillars on a seven-point scale between political left and political right, and only a small minority self-identified at the extremes.

This gap between perception and reality matters. Canadians who perceive high levels of polarization tend to have lower trust in institutions; they are less satisfied with democracy and more likely to feel the country is heading in the wrong direction. Our research also shows that as individuals identify more strongly with the political left or the political right, the further extreme they become, the more they tend to view their own group increasingly positively and the opposing group increasingly negatively. At the extremes, they question the other side's morality.

Disagreement itself is not the problem, nor are strong political viewpoints. We invite differences of opinion in this country. The risk arises when difference turns into division and people begin to see those on the other side of an issue not simply as wrong but as illegitimate or even dangerous.

What is driving this perception of polarization? In our survey, we asked this question.

Politicians and political parties were the most cited cause of polarization by all Canadians. Those on the right were also more likely than other Canadians to point to the political system and the country's diverse makeup as additional causes of polarization, whereas those on the left were more likely to cite social media platforms and online influencers.

Polarization is not a new phenomenon, yet Canadians perceive it and experience it to be increasing. Within this context, unsurprisingly, we should acknowledge the role of social media platforms that are designed to amplify the most extreme and emotionally charged content. They often expose users to the worst representations of opposing views, distorting our perception of the public square and reinforcing an “us versus them” dynamic.

What do I propose we do?

I propose we make Canada's civic resilience a national priority, strengthening civic engagement, rebuilding trust and fostering greater social cohesion. This is not a small task. Achieving this requires a deliberate, non-partisan framework that brings together government, civil society, researchers and the private sector. There are many important efforts already under way across the country, and there have been for years. The opportunity now is to better align them and invest in sustained, long-term initiatives so that, collectively, they deliver a more meaningful and measurable impact for Canadians.

With respect to digital spaces, on which much of my work is focused, we should not limit ourselves to thinking only of reducing online harms. We should also seize the opportunity to actively use these spaces to engage Canadians and strengthen civic resilience. Our work has shown that when people are encouraged to engage thoughtfully with complex and often contentious issues in a respectful, judgment-free digital environment, they become more resilient to polarizing narratives. When individuals feel that their concerns are heard and taken seriously, they are more open to nuanced information and more willing to engage across differences.

Importantly, these kinds of digital interventions allow us to reach Canadians who may not participate in the more traditional forms of civic engagement, broadening both access and impact.

Thank you.

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

We'll go online to Dr. Bajaj for five minutes, please.

[Shelly Ghai Bajaj, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the members of the committee for the invitation to appear today. I would also like to take a moment to thank the interpreters and the technical support team.

I'm an assistant professor at the department of defence studies at the Canadian Forces College, but I appear today in my individual capacity and the views I offer are my own.

Over the past four years, my research has focused on threats in the digital information environment, particularly on how these threats impact several of Canada's ethnocultural diaspora communities. My own thinking around these topics has shifted over time, from how we can counter disinformation to how we can build and sustain trust. This reframes matters because it conceptualizes trust as both an input into democratic governance and an outcome of it.

My remarks today address three dimensions of this challenge.

First, there is the threat landscape. Canada is not immune to the geopolitical and technological pressures affecting liberal democracies more broadly. Internationally, this is unfolding alongside prolonged democratic backsliding, creeping authoritarianism and increasing strain on the rules-based international order, multilateral co-operation and the post-war international security system.

Threats are increasingly hybrid, spanning digital, cyber, social, economic and physical domains, with technologies advancing at a rapid pace. The low barrier to entry means that a wider range of adversarial state and non-state actors operate persistently below the threshold that would trigger a conventional state response. These activities are persistent, cumulative and corrosive.

The second dimension I'd like to emphasize is the impacts of these threats and how they are unevenly distributed.

Ethnocultural diaspora communities live in layered, complex and transnational information environments. They use private and encrypted chat and direct messaging applications at rates exceeding Canadian averages. More than 80% of our survey respondents belong to at least one internationally scoped chat group. For these communities, disinformation is often shaped by home country political dynamics, the ebb and flow of information across platforms and foreign-driven narratives.

Moreover, there is also an added layer of harms for these communities. Members of these communities reported being the targets of xenophobic and discriminatory disinformation circulating within Canada. In our own survey, 44% of respondents reported emotional harms. At the group level, 46% reported experiencing hate because of disinformation on social media, while 51% reported feeling marginalized. These communities often experience fear, intimidation, information overload, self-censorship and even threats to their physical safety and security. All of this can impact civic engagement.

This leads to the question of what we can do and why we should do it.

To enhance and deepen civic resilience in Canada, we need to bring civil society back in and to resource it properly. Civil society organizations operate as trusted intermediaries in the digital spaces in which these communities engage and share information. They are also often the first to understand how information threats manifest on the ground. Microgrants tied to measurable outcomes, longer horizon funding for established organizations and genuine co-design of resilience programming are strategic investments.

Civil society can also function as a force multiplier in this rapidly shifting threat environment. It extends the reach, legitimacy, cultural fluency and local knowledge of a durable and resonant resilience strategy that cannot be easily replicated. For below-threshold threats, civil society organizations can help detect emerging harms, prebunk harmful narratives, build community awareness, strengthen information literacy and reinforce democratic participation.

Civil society also serves as an added benefit as a critical feedback mechanism for government by identifying how institutional arrangements, policies and interventions are being experienced on the ground in ways that can help inform policy-making.

Civic resilience is a relationship that must be continually renewed and nurtured. The government's role is not to manage the relationship from above but to create the conditions for it to flourish from below. That means centering trust, investing in our most vulnerable communities and treating civic engagement as a democratic value to be protected.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

We will now go to questions by the members.

We'll start with Mr. Cooper for six minutes, please.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Broder, can you speak to the report from your organization entitled “PRC Foreign Interference and Transnational Repression in Canada”?

[Shlomit Broder]

To some degree, I can.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Okay. Very good.

We know that CSIS, NSICOP and Madam Justice Hogue, who of course was the commissioner of the inquiry into foreign interference, identified the Beijing-based Communist regime as the biggest foreign interference actor in Canada. Indeed, the Prime Minister only a year ago quite appropriately characterized Beijing as Canada's biggest security threat.

A major component of Beijing's interference activities in Canada involves transnational repression involving efforts to surveil, harass, coerce and intimidate members of diaspora and other targeted communities. To be specific, prioritized target groups by Beijing include Uyghurs, Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, pro-democracy activists and Hong Kong and Taiwan independence advocates, which President Xi has characterized as the “five poisons”.

Is this a fair summation?

[Shlomit Broder]

I believe so.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you.

Now, in preparing the report, interviews and surveys with 25 Chinese, Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Tibetan, Uyghur and Falun Gong community leaders and activists were conducted. Page 15 of the report notes the following: “Almost all of the respondents to our survey reported experiencing or observing harassment or intimidation connected to PRC transnational repression objectives.”

Let's look at those numbers. For harassment, it's 19 out of 25 leaders; 18 leaders identify intimidation as occurring in their experience; for surveillance, it's 12 out of 25; and for online threats, it's 10 out of 25 cases of community leaders. It would seem to me that these results reinforce what we've heard from CSIS, law enforcement and national security experts—namely, that Beijing's transnational repression activities are pervasive, coordinated and widespread. Targeted communities are experiencing what is a serious threat on a regular basis.

Can you speak to this?

[Shlomit Broder]

As part of our project, we did two things. We conducted a survey in Canada, trying to access members of the community. We also spoke with 25 individuals who are affiliated with the diaspora groups you mentioned, although “diaspora” is not the right name for some of those groups—or at least it is not how they like to be identified. However, those were the experiences they attested to.

I want to note that this project was looking specifically at PRC transnational repression. We are very much aware that there are other groups in Canada affected by other foreign state actors.

In this context, yes, those were the group members who shared those experiences.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

How were the community leaders selected?

[Shlomit Broder]

It was mostly through existing networks of activists and community groups.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

The report further notes that among the PRC bodies involved in foreign interference operations in Canada, including transnational repression, was Beijing's Ministry of Public Security, which of course was involved in setting up and operating police stations, some of which have not been closed down.

Is this correct?

[Shlomit Broder]

I believe so.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

With that in mind, having regard for combatting transnational repression and more broadly building civil resilience, would it come as a surprise to you that this government, when the Prime Minister went to Beijing, signed a law enforcement co-operation agreement with none other than Beijing's Ministry of Public Security? This is the very ministry that is actively involved in serious transnational repression activities in Canada, including operating illegal police stations that are putting the safety and security of Canadians at risk every day.

[Shlomit Broder]

With respect, it was very important to me to channel the voices of diaspora communities and pro-democracy activists in this country. I'm not sure I'm in a position to comment on the acts of the government in this context.

As a Canadian citizen, by the way, I want to say that I think it's an interesting moment with our current government, in which Canadians—and this is part of civic resilience—need to contend with Canadian values. How does this connect with things we talk about, such as transnational repression and foreign interference?

It's a very important point that you make, but I don't feel I'm in a position to comment on the broader government activity.