Absolutely. We're doing a joint presentation, so that works well. Of course, thank you for inviting us to be witnesses here today.
Our research in the area of social finance really focuses in on social impact bonds, or SIBs, which are a financial product or policy tool used to pool private sector investment to support social service projects with the attendant promise of a profit if the project meets pre-arranged outcome targets. I don't know if you've covered this already, but I'll briefly talk about how SIBs work.
Basically it begins with government identifying a social policy field where it would like to pay for particular outcomes. Internationally, SIBs have been popular in a variety of social policy domains. We've seen them in housing, employment, criminal justice, education, child care, and health care. Government then would typically contract an intermediary organization who manages the SIB project and actually prepares the bond instrument. It prepares the desired project results, the costs, the savings, as well as the rate of return to investors should the social project achieve those pre-arranged outcome targets. The intermediary would then issue the bond to private investors, who provide the upfront or the immediate project capital. This is where the social finance element, the impact investing element, comes in.
This capital would then be used by the intermediary to contract with social service agencies, who are then provided with that money up front to deliver a social service project over a relatively long timeframe, let's say three to seven years. If this service project meets the result target—if it's successful—government then pays the intermediary, who repays the bond to investors with the agreed rate of return. That's essentially how they work.
The first SIB project was implemented in the U.K. in 2010 in the area of criminal justice. This was called the Peterborough prison project. You may have heard of it. SIBs are now spreading very quickly across the globe. We're concerned that this is occurring in the absence of any real systematic evidence that SIBs actually save money, encourage socially innovative social projects, as well as enhance the quality of life for vulnerable individuals.
Our research thus far has really focused on or documented several reasons why we do need to be cautious about implementing SIBs or shifting to a wide-scale SIB model. What we'll do here today is just highlight what government should think about and be cautious about. There's more in our paper.
Primarily, and number one, SIBs are actually unlikely to reduce government administration and budgets even though they're claimed to do this. Government will have to pay for short-term overhead costs. That would include retraining for bureaucrats to gain new skills in market definition, program evaluation, partnership building, and payment-by-result or outcome contracting.
SIBs will also require the services of lawyers, accountants, as well as evaluators through project development, implementation, and payout. If not retained in-house, all of these components would be contracted off at an additional cost. There are democratic accountability implications there, as policy knowledge, expertise, and oversight are shifted away from the public sector. There are also concerns that details and cost information about services could be kept secret on the grounds of commercial interest. That's another concern. Governments, of course, are also going to have to pay in the long term for results, should they be achieved, but potentially at higher private sector interest rates than government would normally pay for its own financing. That's also another issue, that with SIBs, government will have to pay for more than just outcomes.
The second challenge is that to cover these extensive costs, financial experts have advised that a SIB contract would have to be worth about $20 million to $40 million to cover the costs. However, a study by Deloitte and MaRS has indicated that private investors in Canada are only willing to invest a total sum of $30 million to $40 million for SIB development, and would prefer a market rate of return between 5% and 15% on their investment. This sort of questions whether the private sector is willing to take on some of these risky socially innovative projects. It also merits further discussion on whether the expectation of a market rate of return should qualify as social finance.
Financial experts have also advised that governments will likely have to offer tax credits and capital guarantees to encourage more private sector investment. I think this is being looked at in the U.K. right now. Again, government will have to take on more risk, or share more risk with the private sector, with this SIB model.
A third challenge is that, given the financial risk associated with the SIB model, there is an incentive to focus on those service types and population groups most likely to succeed, which might not be the more complex cases. So there's a risk that with SIBs we might be ignoring the most vulnerable population groups, which also challenges the assumption that SIBs are about preventing complex kind of wicked policy problems.
A fourth challenge is that SIBs will likely require a new infrastructure of extensive government regulation. So SIBs do open up potential for collusive behaviour between project intermediaries, investors, and service providers. The Economist magazine, in an article in 2012 entitled “Playing with Fire”, claims that SIBs are not really all that different from the risky financial tools that precipitated the 2008 financial crisis. There are similar risks to private investors selling on their investments and sort of repackaging these assets. So we have to watch out for sort of overexposure, risk manufacturing, convolution, and a delay in government regulation and oversight.
These are all challenges, and John's going to continue with a few more.