Thank you.
I would like to begin by thanking the committee for taking so seriously an issue that has simply not had a public place to be voiced.
I come to this panel as an academic. I'm a medical anthropologist with 15 years of experience researching socio-cultural issues in death, dying and bereavement. As an anthropologist, I can contribute to these issues through a social and cultural lens and offer my reflections.
I will start with a small point for consideration, and this has to do with the language of loss that is in the motion and also in the language that we use for talking about death.
Euphemisms for difficult topics are common, given our discomfort with difficult issues. However, a deceased person is not really lost. While they are no longer physically present, they remain present in their loved ones' lives in new, transformed ways, even after the death.
We have heard in prior testimony about the relationship that bereaved parents have with their deceased children. They strive to keep their children present through legacy projects, through scholarships, through saying the child's name out loud. One witness mentioned that this was how she continued to parent her deceased child. I worry that the language of loss misrepresents these parenting efforts.
My second point is also a concern about clarity. In the original version I received about this motion, the focus seemed to be on infant death. In listening to the testimony, it seems that this has shifted to child death more broadly, and I certainly support that broadening scope. My concern, however, is how discourses on grief, both in the academic and in the public realm, can produce what Professor Cadell has called a hierarchy of grief. From my knowledge of the scientific literature, these hierarchies are much more political than they are supported by science.
We are compelled to be concerned about some kinds of death, such as infant death, in ways that other kinds of grief seem to not merit—a hospice death of an elderly spouse or death by suicide. I am concerned that the motion may contribute unwittingly to reproducing such a hierarchy by focusing first on the death of an infant child compared to other children, including adult children, and second by focusing on parents as compared to other kinds of grievers, such as grandparents.
Of course, parents whose infant child has died need more support than our context currently affords; however, so do all grieving parents, and indeed all grieving people. My concern is that such distinctions may actually do harm to the other grievers by excluding them and thereby reinforcing the isolation in which they are already living.
If the concern is really to attend to the issues of grieving an infant child, then I wonder why we should consider infant death differently from other kinds of parental grief. While the death of an infant child will certainly produce unique experiences and sequelae, I'm not aware of definitive literature that suggests infant loss merits extra special treatment when compared to other kinds of grief. In contrast, I think that the literature shows that age is a very complex variable when it comes to understanding grieving the death of a child, and we need to be careful about our assumptions. Older couples who experience the death of an adult child can be catastrophically impacted as well.
If the concern is to attend to the issues of grief more generally, then I wonder why we would consider parental grief differently from other kinds of grief. The overall intent of the committee is to imagine ways to ensure that grieving parents do not suffer any undue financial and emotional hardship; I would put forth a plea that simply no grieving person should suffer such hardship. I am concerned that we might be creating new kinds of vulnerability by unwittingly reinforcing the idea that some kinds of grief do not matter as much.
My third point has to do with normative social values. As Karima just mentioned, we did a review of bereavement accommodations in labour standards, first focusing on Canada and then internationally. A surprising homogeneity emerged in this review. Every document we analyzed categorically contradicted what the empirical research says about grief.
The empirical literature pulls together a phenomenology of grief that describes it as individual, as isolating, as painful, as a process, as something that challenges and changes a person's identity and sense of self. It can manifest as a debilitating illness without a predictable presentation or course, with long-term sequelae and repercussions.
The labour standards, in contrast, provide simple, managerial responses to accommodate a worker who needs to go to or plan a funeral, usually one to seven days with or without pay, depending on the jurisdiction.
Grief is cast as a generic, time-limited process involving instrumental tasks that are resolved within a discrete time frame—planning and attending a funeral. The value of employee loyalty is also demonstrated in some programs through which an employee can access more generous leave based upon their years of service—not based upon the kind of death, as if you can actually earn the right to grieve.
Upon closer examination of the language in the reports, we found a remarkable similarity in the values undergirding the documents. Birth, family life, caregiving, and religious practices are clearly celebrated through policies such as maternity and family leave, compassionate care benefits, and the allowance of time for funeral preparations. Workplace efficiency and economic salience were also primary concerns. What was entirely missing across all the documents was any kind of compassionate attention to caring for those workers who experience any kind of death.
These findings were unfortunately not surprising. They corroborated our prior reflections on how society views and deals with grief. While we hear the phrase that we live in a death-denying society, it is actually our grief taboo that needs serious social attention.
My final point has to do with responding to grief with sick leave. In our scan, we found that the only way to get extended leave is by drawing on sick leave policies, thereby turning grief into a medical category. We have heard similar comments in the evidence in these proceedings, and I have two concerns about this medicalization of grief.
First, most physicians have very little training in any kind of grief support, and they seem to turn to pharmaceutical solutions quite quickly. Many bereaved parents with whom I have spoken are not comfortable with this approach and are seeking a kind of support that GPs simply do not have the training to offer.
Second, and more fundamentally, treating grief as a sickness is perhaps exactly what we should not be doing. While of course some grief reactions need medical support, the research in public health suggests that the majority of grievers do not need specialized medical care. Instead, the literature suggests that efforts to normalize grief as a human experience will be much more successful in supporting the bereaved. Working to create a compassionate society that understands and supports grief will benefit all Canadians.
Thank you.