Thank you, Mr. Dykstra, for raising that question, because it is probably the most important issue with respect to the notion of creating a so-called statutory body. If we were to create a statutory body and that body were to relive the same kind of problematic issues that CSIC has, there would be no ability for the government to de-recognize that body.
This is a sector that has clearly had some challenges. The previous government, I think in good faith, created the structure in 2003 for the minister to designate a body. Serious concerns have been raised.
The government, upon the advice of this committee, has been able to act on those serious concerns by opening up the process for designation. If it were a statutory body and there were to be problems in terms of accountability either to its members or the general public, guess what? We would be out of luck. The organization would just continue to churn away, run by its executive.
I think that because this is an industry that does not have anything like the capacity of the law society in terms of experience, of funding, it is very important that we ensure in the public interest that if things go off the rails, the government can intervene and de-designate the body. That's what the model we propose in Bill C-35 allows for. It is the emergency escape hatch.
If the organization becomes guilty of self-dealing, of a failure to properly prosecute immigration crimes committed by its members, if it becomes unaccountable and ineffective, we can pull the plug on it under Bill C-35. In fact, in the bill, there are enhanced or clarified powers to do so. That is a fundamental advantage we have in this model as opposed to the so-called statutory body.