It appears on pages 60 and 96.
Right from the beginning, if we're talking about the philosophy of law, page 3 clearly states that Canada is a parliamentary democracy. We have a history of parliamentary life. It is upheld by a long tradition. With that in mind, I will occasionally provide arguments and make points to support my view.
That speaks to the very heart of why I object to this 30-day hoist motion. I think it's wrong. It think it gives rise to a permanent imbalance as far as our choices and options go. I will tell you what that imbalance is all about, from a philosophy of law standpoint.
Previously, I don't think anyone on this committee made any arguments about the philosophy of law underpinning this debate. If anyone can say that I am repeating myself, please tell me now. According to the information I was given, I don't think this approach has been used.
Obviously, this could become time-consuming. The argument I am going to make is largely supported by O'Brien and Bosc. This was supposed to be the subject of my cousin's Ph.D. thesis. I will try to keep it under 10 or 15 hours. We're talking about the philosophical debate discussed in an 800-page long Ph.D. thesis. That's not always easy.
You should understand that the devil is in the details when it comes to the philosophy of law. And the details abound. With that image in mind. I would point out that O'Brien and Bosc's publication looks more like a bible than a procedural authority. And for that reason, this could be a long debate. But so long as an attack on parliamentary life is at issue, in other words, the philosophy of law, this matter certainly warrants debate.
Although I may not have convinced all of my colleagues of the relevance of having this debate, I hope that I have at least convinced them of the newness of this approach before the entire committee.
Yes, there is a dichotomy. As the saying goes, vox populi, vox Dei. The people's voice is the voice of God. In the Middle Ages, that basically meant the people had to be listened to because they were the ultimate authority. Theirs was akin to the voice of God. That expression means that when the people speak, they must be given fundamental, lasting and painstaking respect. The expression changed over time, with “pro Dei”, or for God, being used. It is done for God.
Therefore, my commitment to the people is an act of God, an act of faith. The most beautiful expression of that concept, my favourite one, is found in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. He described democracy in less than 100 words, the most important of those being “the government of the people, by the people, for the people”.
I respectfully submit that, in no way, does Mr. Dykstra's motion reflect any of those elements. In fact, I would even say it negates them. That is why I'm telling you there is a violation. This fundamental principle has been attacked.
We are here for the people, the people we represent. We want the people to have clear legislation. O'Brien and Bosc even highlight that fundamental principle on page 3 of their publication. They say we are the people, the representatives of the people. The words “by the people” imply that the people must see their voices reflected in these laws and be comfortable with them. In that respect as well, a serious violation has certainly occurred.
I am not saying Mr. Dykstra did so intentionally. Indeed, the philosophy of our law holds that we assume people are acting in good faith, and that is the view I take with everyone. But I believe this motion gives rise to a violation. Can it be fixed? Yes. House of Commons Procedure and Practice clearly states that it can.
The Latin expression medice, cura te ipsum means “doctor, heal thyself”. It is possible for things to go amiss, as they say, resulting in a major mistake. People make mistakes, it happens. The procedures of our law provide for that eventuality. If, however, we consider the philosophical perspective and try to find the right balance—which is hard to do—the procedures cannot be used for flawed intentions. The administration of justice must not give rise to the demise of justice.
The late Justice Steinberg taught me that in a law class. The administration of justice and its procedures must not lead to its demise. I unfortunately get the sense that the motion on the 30 additional days does not in any way adhere to the philosophical rules of our parliamentary law. It is not viable. It goes against all of our procedures.
Did you want to say something, Mr. Chair?
