Evidence of meeting #123 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 42nd Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was irb.
A video is available from Parliament.
NDP
Jenny Kwan NDP Vancouver East, BC
Okay, then let me ask you this question. In an ideal universe, how much resources would you request of the government to deal with the current situation that you're faced with today to ensure that the IRB and the integrity of the system are kept intact?
Chairperson, Immigration and Refugee Board
Again, Mr. Chair, it's a complicated question in the sense that it's not just how much resources would be ideal to bring down that significant backlog. I have to take into account the ramp-up capability of this organization. I have to take into account how many people we can recruit as a highly professional workforce, training, space. All these issues will inform the development of a financial budget ask.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
I'm afraid that's the end of your time, Ms. Kwan.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Whalen, you're next.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks for coming, Mr. Wex. It's a real privilege to have you here and to have an opportunity to ask you, as the new chair of the IRB, as if you hadn't really been hired, what your qualifications might be for this job.
If I can get to the point that Ms. Rempel and Ms. Kwan were getting at, maybe you could describe for us previous work experiences where you've had to manage a backlog, you've had to manage a situation in which there was an under-resourced or understaffed project or program, and in addition to having to solve the backlog, you also had to manage towards not creating additional costs of overcapacity.
I think that's really what we're worried about here. We want to make sure you're going to approach this in a responsible manner, but also in a manner which is empathetic to the plight of migrants.
Chairperson, Immigration and Refugee Board
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the question.
I think I spoke to my overall background, in terms of my legal background, my extensive executive leadership background, coupled with my more recent immigration and border security background that gives me the necessary understanding of the operating context.
In terms of backlogs per se, I have had experience working with backlogs in a number of different areas of responsibility. When I left the Department of Justice to take on the job as the first director general of the aquaculture division at Fisheries and Oceans, it was to establish an office in Ottawa as well as the regional offices; none had previously existed.
Aquaculture was a policy priority for the government of the day. There were significant backlogs, in terms of licensees seeking to get licence in the various ocean spaces, competing with other users of the ocean space. Significant backlogs existed there.
The problem there was different than the problem here. The problem there was a question of understanding the rules of the game. There was a lack of clarity, and so files didn't get processed. My job at that point was to bring clarity to the rules of the game by clarifying a policy framework, introducing the first-ever policy framework, clarifying the regulatory framework, and developing programming for the industry that allowed us to invest appropriately and eventually manage that backlog down. That was the diagnostic then.
When I was the leader of the habitat management program, which at the time was Canada's largest environmental regulatory program, we also faced, as a regulatory body, significant backlogs. That program was responsible for managing projects in and around waterways, high-risk projects, such as oil sands and diamond mines, and low-risk projects, such as docks. Again, there was a significant backlog within that regulatory program. The issue there was also in part clarifying the rules of the game.
At Immigration, for example, we also had backlogs across different business lines, as this committee is very well aware. The issue there was different. It wasn't an issue of clarity of the rules of the game, but it was a question of level space—which I don't need to explain to this committee; you understand it well—and capacity, in terms of HR capacity to process the various applications.
I guess what I'm saying is, number one, I do have experience with backlogs. Unfortunately, they're not uncommon. Number two, the key is to diagnose the problem appropriately before jumping ahead and trying to solve it. In my experience, spending time on the proper diagnoses will result in an appropriate solution set to move forward with. I intend to do that with the IRB.
I would note one last thing, Mr. Chair. The IRB has faced backlogs before. It faced backlogs in 2002. It faced backlogs in 2009. In both of those circumstances, over its 30 years, it has successfully addressed those backlogs.
This is not new to the IRB. It is more significant than in previous examples. That said, backlogs at those times were fairly significant, and the IRB was able to, with the appropriate conditions for success, bring down those backlogs.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Thank you.
You were about to answer Ms. Kwan's question earlier when she realized she was running out of time.
I'll ask you again to provide your high-level thoughts on what your four main takeaways were from the Yeates report, just to give us a sense of how you view it.
However, you only have about a minute, because I have some administrative business to take care of with my last minute.
Chairperson, Immigration and Refugee Board
Okay. Thank you.
Very quickly, the way I looked at it, despite it being a very long report with 65 recommendations, was that there were four significant buckets of recommendations.
Number one was to strengthen the management of the asylum determination system, but horizontally. I spoke to that earlier. It's very important for IRCC, IRB and CBSA to understand how the system functions as a whole from beginning to end and that we have common situational awareness of what is working well and what is not working so well, so that we can marshal our resources and our attention to those areas that actually require correction.
Number two, Mr. Yeates suggested that we explore machinery changes that would integrate some of the functions related to the asylum determination system into one separate new agency: some of the intake, first-level decision-making, pre-removal risk assessments, voluntary returns and, interestingly enough, some aspects related to international resettlement.
The third bucket that Mr. Yeates referred to is funding. We've talked about that and the significant need to secure funding for both the backlog and new intake, because the A-base the IRB has, our base funding, is at a certain level and the current intake is much higher than that.
Last is process improvements. Where can we find the noise in the system, the duplication and inefficiencies, and streamline it?
Those are the four buckets. In many of those areas, we're already advancing.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Thank you very much, Mr. Wex.
On that note, I would like to move, Mr. Chair, that the chair present a report to the House that the committee has examined the qualifications and competence of Richard Wex to the position of chairperson of the Immigration and Refugee Board and finds him competent to perform the duties of his position.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
That is indeed the customary motion for the end of our work.
Is there any discussion on the motion? I'm seeing none.
(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])
We're going to suspend for a moment.
Mr. Wex, thank you for your time with us today. Thank you for your public service and for continuing in that public service at the IRB.
Liberal
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
I'm going to call us back to order.
Mr. Saunders is getting set up, so we're going to begin with Ms. Bradley.
I'll remind the committee that we are continuing on in this new study on migration in the 21st century. In this study, we'll be bringing together thinkers, actors, doers, stakeholders and interested parties to help us as we prepare for a report on what is going on with respect to migration in the world and what Canada's response should be to it.
Ms. Bradley.
Megan Bradley Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University, As an Individual
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here.
I'm a professor at McGill University, where my work focuses on questions around refugees and forced migration. In this capacity, I very much appreciate the chance to share some reflections with you on how Canada can improve its performance and make a bigger difference in responding to displacement.
As we often hear, there are now more people forced from their homes than at any point since World War II. We tend to hear most about the very small minority who manage to make it to Europe or North America, but the vast majority of refugees, as I imagine you know, some 86%, remain in developing countries.
I am very happy to answer questions on refugees, but in the time I have, I'm going to focus on a group that we hear even less about, a group that I think should really be central in a conversation like this, and that is those who are displaced within the borders of their own countries. Internally displaced persons, or IDPs, make up the invisible majority of forced migrants worldwide. Because they remain within their own countries, they typically receive much less media attention and international support.
Improving international responses to internal displacement is, I'll argue, critical to effectively addressing the global refugee crisis, but this issue has been almost completely sidelined in the negotiation of the new global compacts on refugees and migration.
There are key, and as yet untapped, opportunities for Canada to improve its response to internal displacement. So I will address some of the key challenges facing IDPs and make some recommendations for moving forward.
Just by way of context, of the some 68.5 million people who are displaced worldwide by conflict and human rights violations, well over half, some 40 million, are displaced within their own countries. These are individuals who are in a situation that's often much like that of refugees in that they have lost their homes and livelihoods. Many have experienced extreme violence and have been separated from their families. But unlike refugees, they haven't crossed an international border.
As IDPs are citizens of the state in which they are displaced, in theory their own governments have primary responsibility for protecting and assisting them. But for many IDPs in countries like Syria and Myanmar, it's in fact their own government that is responsible for their predicament in the first place. In other cases, national and local governments lack the capacity to respond effectively.
In theory, this is where the international community would step in to help, but there is no high-level official or international agency with clear and reliable responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs. The UNHCR has a mandate to protect and assist refugees and stateless persons, but its involvement with IDPs is much more scattergun. In international debates on the global displacement crisis, there has been no clear flag-bearer for IDPs, and consequently this is a population that has typically been pushed to the sidelines.
In fact, 2018 marks the 20th anniversary of the UN guiding principles on internal displacement. This is the international framework that is the touchstone in efforts to protect and assist IDPs, so I think this is an opportune time to take stock and identify how best to move forward.
Canada is a long-time supporter of the guiding principles, but our rhetorical support hasn't typically translated into an explicit and practical strategy for improving responses to IDPs. So, a strengthened Canadian strategy for addressing internal displacement should respond, I think, to three key challenges pertaining to resources, the resolution of displacement situations and international leadership.
First, in terms of resources, there is a need for increased but also more strategic and equitable deployment of resources in support of forced migrants. This is, of course, a time when humanitarian budgets are already stretched tight, and so it's hard to hear or argue that more funding is needed. However, the reality is that IDP situations are chronically underfunded, with dramatically lower amounts spent in support of IDPs compared to refugees facing similar situations.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre in Geneva, donor states such as Canada spend far more on refugee status determination and refugee resettlement processes, which are accessed by less than 1% of refugees worldwide, than they do on support for the millions who remain in developing countries. This lack of support means that many forced migrants who would in fact prefer to remain closer to home have little option but to make dangerous and often very difficult journeys to seek shelter abroad.
Of course there is no substitute for refugees' right to seek asylum. Increasing support for IDPs certainly doesn't mean that refugees can be turned back. Rather, this is a matter of recognizing the complexity of motivations, capacities and preferences in massive displacement situations.
Some people will need to flee across international borders as refugees, but many simply lack the resources to be able to make it across an international border in the first place or are unable to do so for health or security reasons. Protection and assistance need to be available on a more equitable basis for those who remain within their own countries. I would argue that Canada should review its support for IDPs and publicly release the findings alongside a plan for more systematic, equitable and strategic support for IDPs.
Second, in terms of durable solutions, worldwide both refugees' and IDPs' situations are becoming increasingly protracted. These are individuals who are unable to access a solution to their displacement, whether through returning to their homes, locally integrating where they've sought shelter or resettling or relocating elsewhere.
Because IDPs are usually not as visible a population as refugees, there's been massive underinvestment in support of durable solutions for IDPs and neglect of the connections between the search for solutions for refugees and IDPs. In 2016, for example, some 6.5 million IDPs returned to their homes, many in fragile circumstances, in countries like Iraq, Syria and South Sudan. UNHCR in fact supported less than half of these returnees, which dramatically undercut their sustainability.
Too often we see that efforts to support solutions for refugees focus only on refugees themselves and ignore the connections between other groups involved in this process, like IDPs. This is an approach that's just divorced from reality. These groups aren't sealed off from one another, but they're connected by family ties, political dynamics and socio-economic concerns. Many refugees themselves risk becoming internally displaced when they return to their home countries, and this is another reason that we need to think more holistically about the connections between these groups.
More concerted political and development support is needed to increase access to durable solutions for both refugees and IDPs. I would argue that Canada should co-operate with key actors, including UNHCR, other donors and states that face internal displacement situations, to ensure that durable solution strategies are holistic and that they are appropriately resourced. Canada should insist that UNHCR explicitly address related internal displacement issues in its efforts to advance solutions for refugees.
Last, in terms of international leadership, as it stands in the UN system there's no high-level prominent flag-bearer for IDPs, who can hold states, UN agencies and other actors accountable for their efforts, or lack thereof, in support of IDPs. There's also a lack of states that are willing to stand up as champions for the IDP issue. At present, we have a special rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs. This is an important role, but it's a voluntary role and an unpaid one, and it lacks the influence and resources commensurate with the scale of the problem.
To address these concerns, Canada should make improved protection and assistance to IDPs an explicit priority in its interventions in the humanitarian system. As a key pillar in this strategy, Canada should push for the prompt appointment of a new special representative of the UN Secretary-General, with a specific mandate for IDPs. This official could advance co-operation and promote accountability towards IDPs at national and international levels, and Canada, I would argue, should ensure that this new office is appropriately resourced and review the mechanism to ensure that it is effective.
To conclude, Canada, through its support for refugee resettlement, has demonstrated, I think in a very concrete way, an ability to make effective and innovative contributions to protecting and assisting forced migrants. By more strategically and concertedly standing up in support of those who are displaced within their own countries, who often remain invisible, Canada can build on this track record and make a bigger, stronger contribution to strengthening responses to the millions of refugees and IDPs who will never manage to make it to the shores of a wealthy western state like Canada.
Thank you.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
Thank you very much.
Mr. Saunders, thank you. We'll get a chance to ask a journalist/writer questions eventually. I'm looking forward to watching this.
Doug Saunders Writer, International Affairs, The Globe and Mail, As an Individual
That's right. It'll all be deep background, of course.
Thank you, Chair.
I'm pleased to see that this committee is engaged in this important examination of migration studies and opportunities, and especially its focus on the causes of forced and voluntary migration, which is what I was invited to speak on.
I'm here to speak specifically about the challenge of irregular border crossings, drawing on my experience over the last 15 years in Europe. I believe the problem in Canada today, in this area, is similar in some important ways to the irregular-crossing problems that the European Union has faced on and off for the last 15 years. The scale is not at all similar, of course, but the migrant populations and their reasons for attempting irregular crossings are similar, and I'd argue that the solutions that have proven most successful in Europe have a lot of relevance to Canada.
As I said, I've had 15 years of experience examining this problem. Since 2003-04, I've interviewed migrants preparing to board boats and rafts in Tunisia, in Egypt and in Libya. I've spoken to them upon arrival in Spain, Greece, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and I've spent a lot of time with policy-makers, immigration officials and scholars working on these questions.
I'd like to address the following questions: What sort of people are likely to become irregular migrants? What causes people to choose irregular pathways and entry points despite the far greater risk and expense? What policies have been successful in ending or reducing irregular migration? I have five observations.
The first is that irregular migrants, whether claiming asylum or otherwise, tend to be people with resources and information who are making a high-risk investment with high stakes for their families and communities. They do not come from the poorest countries, and they don't come from the poorest communities in the countries that they come from. Irregular crossings are expensive, upwards of 2,000 euros per person to get on one of those rafts, and we have anecdotal evidence that Canada and U.S. crossings involve fairly large payments to smugglers and other agents. Many migrants have borrowed heavily to make the trip. At a minimum, they hope for a return on this investment. Understanding this can help shape policies of return and deterrence.
Irregular migrants have been informed through text messages and social media links that they have a good chance of supporting their families and returning that investment. Sometimes this information is accurate economic and labour market information. Migrants tend to go to the places that have labour shortages. They tend to avoid the countries with weak economies. Sometimes it's mythological. Sometimes it speaks to weaknesses in the system. The idea that was discussed earlier in this meeting, that known delay times in processing can be drivers of demand, seems to have a lot of basis in the information that drives migrants themselves. Certainly, anecdotally, I've heard that, and there's scholarship to support it.
Second, people generally choose irregular migration because legal, generally short-term pathways have been closed. The entire European migration crisis began in the early 2000s, because the EU, after the Schengen agreement, eliminated short-term agricultural labour visas for Africans. Suddenly, a legal, temporary migration regime was transformed into an illegal, long-term smuggling industry to replace that demand. Rather than paying $150 for an airplane ticket and having to repay that through one season of work, people were paying 2,000 or 3,000 euros for a crossing and having to stay longer to repay that. That industry took on a life of its own. One recent data analysis by scholars from Oxford University found that every 10% increase in short-stay visa rejection leads to a 4% to 7% increase in irregular border entries. There's a direct link between tightening temporary entry and the increase in demand for irregular crossings.
Third, increasing border security does not reduce irregular entry, and in some cases it increases it. This effect has been observed repeatedly in Europe and the United States. Now, there may be reasons to increase border security, but reducing irregular crossings is almost never a result of doing that, by any significant degree. According to Oxford University scholar Hein de Haas, border restrictions tend to interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement, often into more irregular routes, further criminalizing the process.
Fourth, creating legal pathways, even very limited and restricted ones, has been shown to reduce irregular entry, often dramatically. The most studied example of that was Spain after its crisis of 2004 to 2006, when there were many tens of thousands of people crossing the Mediterranean into Spain. It introduced a set of policies that reduced those numbers to very little at all. Chief among them was a legal pathway. Not great in number, but along with co-operation with both sending countries, intermediary countries and normalization programs.
It was found that people wishing to migrate, even if they thought there was a one in 20 chance of making it through a legal process, if that legal process existed, that one in 20 chance was better than spending 3,000 euros, and having a high chance of dying across the Mediterranean. Spain remains not a major destination partly because of this set of policies. It's worth examining. It's worth noting that the global compact on refugees also contains language to create shifting irregular claimants into legal pathways.
Fifth, speeding up the process can reduce demand, not just determination and appeal systems. As we discussed, one of the things that migrants discuss in these text messages and so on is the fact that if a country is known to take three years to complete a refugee determination system, then an appeal, that could be enough time to make enough of a living to repay your investment and so on. That is known.
The return system is also important to consider. Paying unqualified irregular entrants to return to their home country is something that European countries have begun to embrace. It seems to go against intuition. It's seems to be politically risky. In the Canadian example, an irregular entrant who has applied for asylum, has been rejected, has appealed and lost the appeal, and has gone through the whole process is eventually handcuffed to an RCMP officer on an airplane. You may have spent $100,000 on that person. Giving them $3,000 or something and an agreement with the sending country to receive them, assuming that you don't place them in greater danger, can be much quicker. Germany has had some reasonable success with those return programs since the 2015-16 crisis. It's worth examining those.
In summary, we need to realize that irregular migration is a market decision made by the people making the crossing. There are legitimate refugees in the mix. The number in Europe seems to have been 40% to 50% during the peak of its crisis. It seems to be the proportion in Canada as well.
It's unfair to the legitimate refugees to have a system that forces them to make irregular crossings. That places them in physical danger and puts a strain on the system. Of course, it's dangerous for the public support of the system. As well, it drives up demand among people who are not legitimate refugees who may not know about legal pathways that exist, who may try to take advantage of legal pathways if they do exist, and who may be legitimate economic immigrants otherwise.
The overwhelming lesson from the 15 years of European experience is that it is possible to reduce irregular volumes by creating legal pathways, and changing the market incentives for migration.
Thank you, Chair, and I welcome questions.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
I actually want more from both of you. It's always interesting from my perspective. I get to watch the committee members listening to witnesses. They actually listened to both of you. That's quite a treat for me.
Now we begin the hard part.
Mr. Ayoub, you have seven minutes.
Liberal
Ramez Ayoub Liberal Thérèse-De Blainville, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the witnesses for being here.
Both parts of your testimony were very interesting and we might ask you to come back to our committee, but I will try to make the best possible use of the seven minutes that I have.
Mr. Saunders, you just said that there is a significant economic impact that ends up having an influence on a country's policies and the way it manages legal and illegal migration, or irregular migration if that's what you want to call it.
We can certainly look at what's happening in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, but I'm more interested in what's happening in Canada. It seems like Canada chooses its immigrants, although that appears to be less the case lately. Canada is bordered by three oceans and one large country, the United States. There have been recent changes to immigration policy. There is irregular migration. In any case, it does not seem to be regular at this time.
According to the articles you cited, we should be accepting even more. Without rehashing the whole thing, this started in 2017. What is being done to manage this migration? What can the government learn from past experience? You gave the example of Spain. That's fine, but I get the impression that when a measure is taken, it is followed by a counter measure and everything is always in flux. People adapt and that's normal.
What would you suggest? What advice would you give to the Canadian government?
Writer, International Affairs, The Globe and Mail, As an Individual
That's the key question here.
We need to understand that the irregular crossing problem in Canada, between official crossing points in the Canada-U.S. border, much like the European-Mediterranean problems, is not some floodgate that's opened up that's going to overwhelm the system. It may feel like that now because the volumes in 2017 were high. We had not really seen it before, and it is alarming to Canadians.
We need to recognize that policies work. The European-Mediterranean crisis, which became most famous during its sudden spike in 2015 and 2016, has not been a continuous problem. As I said, it began around 2003 and 2004, when certain visas became unavailable and the market was created. Then it stopped after about 2006 for a number of years, because policies working with sending and intermediary countries had succeeded in stopping the flow and then shifting the demand to more regular and legal pathways.
It picked up again around 2011 during the Arab Spring uprisings, when those agreements fell apart because the governments they'd negotiated with were in some cases being overthrown and there was a bit of a spike. Then it went back down to negligible levels.
Suddenly, in 2015 and 2016, during the Syrian war but also as a consequence of other things on the other side of the Mediterranean, there was a very large spike. Again in 2017 it was down, and now it's back down to regular levels.
It's still a level of movement we find unsustainable in Canada, but we need to recognize that there is a policy record of successfully reducing movement by creating different incentives, by negotiating with sending countries and so on. This is not something that countries can't deal with, compensate for or control.
Liberal
Ramez Ayoub Liberal Thérèse-De Blainville, QC
You said that was done. So those policies worked.
Let's come back to Canada. Historically, it has been our policy to welcome people in the right way. We know that Canada is a country of immigrants and we want to welcome immigrants in the right way.
What is the current immigration situation? What should we change?
Ms. Bradley, you can answer that as well.
What are the biggest changes to be made to ensure that we comply with our UN agreements, those related to refugees and on the humanitarian side of things? Canada is a developed country. We want it to stay that way and to show some humanity. What can we do to reconcile that with keeping the economy sustainable?
Writer, International Affairs, The Globe and Mail, As an Individual
I'll let Dr. Bradley respond first and see if I have something to add.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University, As an Individual
Thank you very much for the question.
In a broad conversation like this we need to be aware of the way in which we can implicitly assume that the goal should be to reduce the number of people who arrive. I would argue that the goal should be to make sure that people who need protection as refugees can access that protection in a safe and reliable way without needing to put themselves and their families at risk. Of course, we have a shared interest in regularity in arrivals and in making sure that the process is well managed, but so often we slip into this kind of thinking where low numbers mean we're doing our jobs right. When we look more broadly at what's going on in the world, I think we need to be suspicious about that kind of thinking. Instead, we need to look at the kind of factors that are driving people to come and make sure that we can give their claims the consideration that they merit.
If we think about the IRB determinations of the claims of people who have been entering irregularly from the United States, of course a significant number have been recognized as refugees. I think this attests to the system working well in some ways, in that people have the opportunity to make a claim, to be heard and to be granted protection as refugees in Canada.
I would just echo Doug's comment that we are not in a crisis situation in Canada, nor are we in a crisis situation in Europe. These are countries that are well equipped to deal with arrivals on the scale that we're experiencing lately. It's important to look at what's going on in countries like Lebanon, for example, where one in four people right now is a Syrian refugee. It's important to recognize that is a whole different scale and take the conversation in that direction so we can think about how we can support countries on the front lines that are really struggling.
Writer, International Affairs, The Globe and Mail, As an Individual
Let me elaborate.
I think the concern of the Canadian public is not the numbers of people. It's the way they enter, and secondarily, the extent to which the system processes them slowly. I think if the same number of asylum claimants were presenting themselves at an official crossing or at an airport or something, and if the IRB and CBSA systems were working more quickly and efficiently, there would be no controversy to this. It would be part of the background noise of varying opinions about immigration, which are generally supportive.
The fact that people are forced, through a circumstance or through what they see as circumstance, to present themselves at crossing points between official crossings is something that the Canadian public does not endure. There's a long history that the Canadian public is quite tolerant of our UN obligations on asylum, regardless of the numbers year to year, within reason. However, whenever there's an irregular entry, whenever a boat shows up in British Columbia or whenever people walk across the border in more than negligible numbers, it becomes a political crisis that hurts support for the system. Rather than trying to reassure people on that, I think there are ways to shift that to more regular processes and to quicker processes.
Conservative
David Tilson Conservative Dufferin—Caledon, ON
Most of your presentation, Mr. Saunders, was spent on Europe. I had an opportunity to go to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg a number of times and there's no question that topic of migration is always there. People would ask us...and Canada, as my friend over here said, we have oceans. Well, now we're having a problem. It's true that we had problems with boats coming to the Pacific coast before that, but now we're having the immediate problems coming across.... You used the word “irregular” and I use the word “illegal”. We won't get into that. Now we're having a whole bunch of people coming across the Quebec border, which would then disperse to Quebec, Montreal, and Toronto. It's been clear that much of the congestion at the IRB is because of these illegal entries.
We haven't heard any comment from the government or the IRB as to how that congestion can be solved. I'm sure you've had an opportunity to philosophize on that. One way is spending money. Have you any other ideas or recommendations as to how that two-year wait period can be relieved?