Yes.
Evidence of meeting #130 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was economic.
A video is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #130 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was economic.
A video is available from Parliament.
4:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
Thank you for persisting.
Maybe we'll begin with Professor Donnelly, just to give you time to get yourself settled here. I know it was a rush.
Professor Donnelly, go ahead.
4:35 p.m.
Michael Donnelly Assistant Professor, Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Hello, and thank you to the committee for inviting me.
I'm a political scientist whose research and teaching focus on the relationship between public opinion and public policy, primarily in North America and western Europe, although I do occasionally look elsewhere.
As a beneficiary of Canada's generous immigration policy, I am quite grateful to the policy the way it exists, but I'm glad the committee is looking for ways to improve it and to respond to challenges that have arisen or are likely to arise in the future. In my comments today, I'm not going to offer any specific policy recommendations. I'll offer instead my thoughts on three big themes that I think are often underemphasized in debates and discussions around immigration policy in Canada.
The first theme I want to address is the extent to which the Canadian public is unusually tolerant of immigration or unusually enthusiastic about immigration relative to similar countries. In short, Canadians are people, and in any large group of people there will be a decent-sized chunk who are not very tolerant, not very excited about outsiders.
Canada is neither unusually tolerant nor unusually intolerant. Like many other countries, Canada is made up of some people who accept immigration, some people who are enthusiastic about it, and others who are not very enthusiastic. Measuring xenophobia and related attitudes is a notoriously difficult thing to do. We are not very good at it, but we try. I think a fair assessment of the evidence would suggest that Canada is somewhat more tolerant on average than typical wealthy countries, but only somewhat. It is by no means exceptional or an outlier.
One recent survey asked Canadians to evaluate the impact of immigration on the economy. Canadians were more enthusiastic, more positive than 18 European countries that were asked the same question. They were less enthusiastic than three. That same survey asked a question about whether we should accept more immigrants from poor countries. There, Canada was smack in the middle—more enthusiastic than 10 and less enthusiastic than 11. The majority of Canadians are satisfied with current levels of immigration, but a substantial group takes a dimmer view. About a third would be happy to see fewer immigrants arriving each year, and many Canadians, perhaps a quarter, would like to see a more racially or religiously discriminatory policy.
I'll turn now to the second theme I want to raise today: Policy matters for public attitudes, but only to a degree. Policy helps to improve acceptance of immigration, but only somewhat. Geography probably deserves more credit than institutional design for the relatively consensual immigration politics Canada has seen. Consider the attention that has arisen around the comparatively small number of asylum seekers crossing the border from the U.S. Those asylum seekers, plus all the refugees resettled under formal processes, amount to a very small per capita number when set against the large flows seen recently in countries like Germany or Greece, let alone countries like Lebanon or Turkey.
There are three big things that I think we know about how policy can shape public debates around immigration. First, events and particular policy failures matter. The most direct short-term and visible impacts of policy on public perceptions appear when something goes wrong. The public responds to perceived or real policy failures, to events that draw media attention and have clear narratives with villains, heroes and victims.
In the absence of such a key event, most people just don't think about immigration most of the time. Indeed, even major changes don't seem to move immigration attitudes in the aggregate or on average. Most events move some people one way and other people other ways. Neither the great recession of 2009-10 and the euro crisis nor the Syrian refugee crisis seems to have shifted the average immigration opinion in Europe in the places I study.
Instead, both of those big events changed the coalitions supporting immigration, changed which types of people supported immigration and moved political parties to more firmly tie their identity to their position on immigration, which has to some degree polarized or politicized the debate without changing attitudes on average.
A second big piece of the policy literature that I think is relevant here is that immigrant voices matter in Canada more than they do in most places. One form of what we call policy feedback is the long-term relationship between the citizenship or naturalization regime and the politics of immigration in the future. The comparatively generous naturalization policy here means that there are large communities of migrants whose voices and votes end up mattering in politics, and this makes it harder, though by no means impossible, for the ugliest forms of anti-immigrant arguments to rise to the top of the agenda. Since we know that public attitudes are profoundly shaped by the issues and arguments that political and media actors place on the agenda, this is an area where policy has undoubtedly contributed to reducing political conflict.
Finally, we have something that's been discussed already today. The selective nature of Canada's immigration policy targeting economic benefits does seem to matter and does seem to increase public support for immigration, though it does so only within a fairly small group of the public. The limited impact is attributed to the fact that some people don't know about the selective nature of the system. Some people don't trust the system to work as it is designed. Others simply take their position on immigration based on factors other than what they perceive to be the economic benefits. The effect of policy design on the politics of immigration is an open question that many scholars are working on. I am cautiously optimistic that we can continue to find ways of designing policy that will reduce the conflict and increase support for immigration.
The final theme I want to raise steps back a bit from the realm of immigration policy and considers the broader context of the policy arena. Particularly, I think the committee would be well advised to consider many other forms of policy that directly impact policy debates around immigration. As I am sure other witnesses prior to me have emphasized, labour markets, educational systems and social assistance programs all interact with immigration policy in important ways.
To those sectors, I'll add the importance of considering how policies that impact political parties and civil society matter for immigration outcomes. Political parties, religious groups, non-profits and trade unions have all played a role in the past both in promoting immigrant integration and in channelling public anxiety about immigration toward productive engagement rather than destructive resistance. These kinds of organizations have all, to some degree or another, seen their influence on public opinion wane in the last few decades. Policy-makers considering how to regulate, support or restrict the activities of those groups should consider how those actions might influence the ability of such groups to promote successful integration and consensual immigration politics.
Thanks for your time. I'm happy to answer any questions.
4:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
Thank you very much.
We also have representatives from the Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic with us.
You are going to share your time. Ms. Go, I understand that you're going to begin. Go ahead.
4:45 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
My name is Avvy Go, and I'm the clinic director of the Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic. With me is Jin Chien, who is our staff lawyer. We will be co-presenting this afternoon.
We are a community-based organization that provides free legal services to low-income members of the Chinese and Southeast Asian communities in Ontario. We thank the committee for giving us the opportunity to talk about the issue of migration this afternoon. We will be focusing on three specific groups of migrants: refugees, migrant workers and family class immigrants.
Ms. Chien will talk about refugees and migrant workers, and I'll deal with the family class immigrants.
I'll begin our presentation with three general comments that sort of align with what Professor Donnelly has just said.
First of all, many so-called voluntary migrants are forced to leave their home countries due to reasons beyond their control. Climate change, economic and social disparities, and the absence of democracy and the rule of law are just some factors that contribute to the increase in global migration. From our point of view, the categorization of non-refugees as voluntary migrants can therefore be misleading.
Second, in the face of the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric in the U.S. and Canada, how we talk about migration matters. We should avoid using divisive language that creates false dichotomies between immigrants and refugees and perpetuates an unfounded sense of crisis, which in turn inflames anti-refugee sentiment and encourages discriminatory behaviour.
Accordingly, we are calling on the government, through this committee, to change the narrative on migration by highlighting the positive obligation of Canada towards refugees, the critical role migrants have played in building our nation and the value of their contributions in shaping our collective future.
Third, in recognition of the fact that persons of colour represent an increasingly large proportion of immigrants across all classes, we ask the government, through the committee, to adopt racial and gender-equity lenses to evaluate the impacts of all immigration laws and policies on racialized communities.
4:45 p.m.
Jin Chien Staff Lawyer, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
Turning now to the issues facing refugees, Canada has legal obligations, as we all know, towards this group under international law, particularly as a state party to the 1951 refugee convention. The government's policy in this regard must be guided by both treaty and domestic law, namely IRPA.
In response to the recent rise in the number of refugee claimants from the U.S., we call on Canada to rescind or suspend the safe third country agreement with the U.S. and to ensure that any reform to the refugee determination system continue to respect due process rights for all refugee claimants in a manner consistent with domestic and international human rights law.
On the issue of migrant workers, the Canadian immigration system heavily prioritizes economic migrants, as we've heard and as evidenced in the recent adjustments to immigration level targets for 2019 to 2021.
This group is comprised primarily of well-resourced, so-called high-skilled and highly educated workers. Those considered low-skilled, including caregivers and seasonal agricultural workers, come to Canada under the temporary foreign worker program and generally have no right to stay permanently. Their immigration status is often tied to time-constrained and employer-specific jobs, which makes them exceptionally susceptible and vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. What's more, many of these so-called temporary jobs are more long-term in nature, and they're left vacant due to low domestic worker retention rates.
We submit to the committee that Canada should provide permanent residence to all migrant workers upon arrival in Canada and adopt the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, as well as the ILO Convention 189, concerning decent work for domestic workers.
We also call on the government to develop and implement a comprehensive, transparent, inclusive and ongoing regularization program for all persons living with precarious status in Canada.
4:50 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
Family reunification is the pillar of our immigration policy and serves to make Canada a competitive destination for high-skilled immigrants. However, family class intake levels have been shrinking over the last two decades. Changes in the laws have also made family reunification much longer and more difficult for many Canadians.
The restrictions currently imposed on the sponsorship of parents and grandparents in particular have a disproportionate impact on racialized communities, which are more likely than others to embrace an extended family structure. They are also more overrepresented among the low-income households, and are therefore less likely to meet the minimum necessary income requirement for their sponsorship.
We are asking the committee to recommend lifting the quota on the parents and grandparents sponsorship, repealing the MNI requirement, scaling back the sponsorship period to 10 years and increasing the overall level of family class immigrants to 50% of the overall immigration intake. Given the importance of extended families, we also ask the committee to ask the government to redesign the family class program to allow for the sponsorship of siblings and other relatives to Canada.
In conclusion, Canada is regarded as a model for the world in regard to its immigration and refugee policy. Immigration is central to Canada's long-term economic strategy and growth. We welcome the very modest increase in the resettlement of refugees as well as family class members in the proposed 2019-21 immigration plan. However, these increases are far from adequate, in our respectful submission.
Canada can best sustain its leadership role by adopting immigration and citizenship policies that prioritize permanent immigration over temporary migration, remove barriers to citizenship and facilitate equitable access to the labour market for all racialized and other marginalized groups. As well, Canada should continue to demonstrate respect for human rights by accepting more refugees, ending indefinite immigration detention, and adopting concrete measures to address racism and other forms of discrimination against all people living in Canada, regardless of their immigration status.
Thank you.
November 1st, 2018 / 4:50 p.m.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you all for coming.
In preparation for today, I had an opportunity to see what Twitter was saying about the levels plan. I notice that Goldy Hyder, the president and CEO of the Business Council of Canada, tweeted this:
Canada to increase annual immigration admissions to 350,000 by 2021. Talent is Canada's key strategic resource. Businesses know we have the talent & if not we can get it. Key consideration for investing in Canada.
I ask you both, in the context of levels and what can be absorbed in society, whether or not this target of around 1% is right.
In the case of Mr. Donnelly, how will Canadians or the public see a 1% target generally? Are they supportive or not, and should it be higher or lower? In the case of Ms. Go and Ms. Chien, you're asking for much more than that, so what target are you suggesting?
4:50 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
On the first question, whether this is the right target, I don't have an opinion about any particular target.
On the question of whether Canadians will accept this, I think they will. I think it can be sold in a way that is convincing. I think that it could be rejected, and it would be rejected, if it were presented as some unreasonably large thing by political elites.
What we know about the way the public reads numbers is that nobody understands what these numbers mean unless you're in this field and this is what you do day to day. In terms of what they can be told in advance of the arrival of migrants, I don't think the numbers matter. I think the framing and the discussion of this—how it will benefit Canada and how it will benefit immigrants and natives alike—are more important.
Once they arrive, they will be accepted, to the extent to which they integrate in labour markets and to the extent to which they are able to not be segregated from society in a way that would frustrate many natives. I think there's always the danger of demagogues picking on particular cases and highlighting that and turning Canadians against immigration. I think a numeric target has very little to do with whether that happens or not.
4:55 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
We don't usually take a position on the actual percentage or number. However, I know that organizations such as the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants have been pushing for the 1%. That seems to be sort of a consensus among many groups.
I guess from our perspective, it's more about the mix as opposed to the number. We are hoping to see a different mix from what we have right now. For instance, I'm old enough to remember that before the 1990s, we had a much higher level of family class immigrants. With the evaluation by CIC in 2015, looking at the family class program, they found that 43% of the economic immigrants coming to Canada chose Canada because they could sponsor their families later.
I'm more interested in the—
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Let's just pause there for a second.
On the one hand, in some of the recommendations provided, you've been suggesting to rescind the safe third country agreement, which would allow people to come to the border and, as the Conservatives would argue, jump the queue. We only have so many settlement services available for people. We're trying to scale up to 1%.
How can you rationalize allowing people to come to the border and take settlement services in a finite resource environment and then also ask for more family class? You don't leave any room for any other type of economic migration, which Mr. Donnelly suggests is what supports public confidence in our system.
4:55 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
First of all, we think the refugee policy is distinct and separate from the immigration policy. I think—
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
4:55 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
I'm saying that the rationale for refugee policy is different from that for immigration policy. We accept refugees not because.... Refugees do have economic contributions to Canada, but we do not accept them on that basis; we accept refugees because we have an international obligation to do so.
People are coming through the border regardless. I have clients who may not be necessarily coming directly from the United States, but somehow they will have to go through the United States to come to Canada because of the journey they take. Many of them are going through other ways, irregular ways, to come to Canada. They are not in the news because they are not coming in the same way that we're seeing in the news.
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Sure.
On a related topic then, Mr. Donnelly, have you tested how important fairness is to public confidence in the immigration system? You talked a little about whether political leaders are suggesting that it's good, attainable and doable, or whether political leaders are suggesting that it's not.
Is there a public perception about making sure that the system is fair and equitable? With thoughts around fairness and equity, such as saying that queue-jumping is something that would upset people, or taking resources away from local people or not integrating well, whereas integrating well, contributing to resources that everyone gets to enjoy together, and following the rules-based order...are two sides of three of the same issue.
How do those narratives affect public support for the higher levels of immigration that we're trying to get to?
4:55 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
On the question of fairness, I'm not aware of any attempt to measure the relationship between perceptions of fairness and attitudes directly. I do know that confidence in institutions—trust that the government knows what it's doing, trust that the bureaucracy works—is generally associated with a belief that immigrants will come and integrate well. To the extent that this is a measure of fairness—that we think the government is doing its job and processing people smoothly—that would address your question.
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
That's good.
Ms. Go, on a counterpoint to that, if you believe we should greatly increase the amount of immigration to the country, you also believe that the system is working and it's integrating people well.
4:55 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
I don't think the system is working as well as it could.
One of the barriers to integration—
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
Nick Whalen Liberal St. John's East, NL
Then why are you asking for us now to add more people from various classes if you don't believe that the system works?
4:55 p.m.
Clinic Director, Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic
Once again, I'm not talking about the number. In fact, if you read our submission, you'll see that we actually do not talk about the number. We're just talking about the mix. We don't have a position on the overall number. We're just talking about the mix within the overall number.
One of the key reasons why people are not integrating well is the equity barrier to the labour market. Many studies have shown, for instance, that if you're a newcomer or from a racialized group, you are more likely to earn less money and not be able to get the job that you were trained to do. Those issues are something that the government can work with. I know that various types of government, various parties, have tried to work on it, but it is something that we can do better. If people are integrated better, they will also be seen as contributing better to the economy, which will, I think, in turn make Canadians more accepting of more immigrants to Canada because, after all, we need immigrants to drive our economic engine.
5 p.m.
Liberal
5 p.m.
Conservative
David Tilson Conservative Dufferin—Caledon, ON
I have one question for Mr. Donnelly, and then Mr. Maguire will take over.
It's a question that I asked Mr. Antunes of the Conference Board of Canada, which was about how in recent years Canada's immigration policy has focused on economic migration. Although we do have family reunification and humanitarian streams, it seems that the reason why most Canadians support the levels of migration is that we have structured it to benefit the economy. That seems to be the case. Some say that if we move away from that, public support will drop significantly.
Most of your presentation was that you study public opinion. Do you agree or disagree with what I just said?
5 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
It would certainly cost support to move away from an emphasis on—