Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Chair and members of Parliament, thank you for the invitation to speak to you this afternoon. It's my distinct pleasure to speak to you about the security situation in Northern Iraq. I'm also glad to be sitting next to my esteemed colleagues, who will be able to provide different perspectives on the region.
Before I talk about the security situation in northern Iraq, I'd like to provide some background briefly on the role of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command.
The command's role consists of supporting the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces in making sound decisions in the exercise of their duties. Whether conducting operations in the Arctic, providing support for events such as the 2010 Olympic Games or the G8 summit, or carrying out overseas operations, the Canadian Armed Forces need the most accurate and up-to-date intelligence in order to achieve their military objectives and ensure the security and protection of their personnel.
I am assistant chief of defence intelligence, and my organization is responsible to provide timely, reliable, relevant, all-source analysis of defence intelligence issues to the department, the armed forces, and interdepartmental clients. We provide strategic warning and threat assessments to the department and to the CAF. Another important part of my mandate is to contribute to intelligence-sharing relationships with allied partners and countries.
Defence intelligence is also a key element in the ability of the government to make informed decisions on defence issues, national security, and foreign affairs. I can say with pride that our intelligence capability is world class and offers the necessary tools 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, to give our leaders an information advantage in making those decisions. Intelligence is a leading factor in operational success.
I would also note that we benefit from productive relationships with our government partners, working closely with the Privy Council Office, the RCMP, CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and Global Affairs, to name a few. You and the Canadians you represent may be certain that your intelligence organizations are promoting the interests of this country in the areas of defence and security.
The Canadian Forces Intelligence Command focuses the vast majority of its energy on foreign military threats and support to Canadian Forces operations abroad.
Turning now to the subject at hand, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the volatile security situation in northern Iraq.
Northern Iraq is characterized by an intersection of conflicts among local, sub-state, and regional actors. Daesh currently provides a unifying enemy for these actors, but as Daesh weakens, we expect that they will all increasingly act in their own self-interest, often at each other's expense. Therefore, as the fight to dislodge Daesh from the city of Mosul progresses, the security situation in northern Iraq will become more fluid and unpredictable from the geopolitical standpoint.
We believe that as Daesh elements are defeated, the group will revert to acting as an insurgency and will increasingly pose an asymmetric threat rather than a conventional military one. Though Daesh is currently on the decline in Iraq, it still poses a significant threat to traditional state armed forces. As it loses territory, it will increase its use of terrorist attacks to distract the Iraqi security forces and the anti-Daesh coalition, as well as to foment sectarian tensions.
As such, we assess that even after the fall of Mosul, Daesh will retain the capability to target civilian populations and official Iraqi or Kurdish institutions throughout Iraq, including in what is considered to be cleared territory.
Regional and sub-state actors will almost certainly vie for influence in a post-Daesh northern Iraq, complicating an already difficult security situation. Sub-state actors, principally the Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG, and Shia militias, are aggressively posturing to be the dominant actors in several localities within northern Iraq. KRG forces and Shia militias have clashed with each other on several occasions and display deep mistrust and antipathy towards each other, raising the potential for localized conflicts across northern Iraq.
Regional actors, principally Iran and Turkey, are also seeking increased influence in Syria and Iraq. Both countries have increased their military presence in northern Iraq and are actively supporting proxy forces that serve their respective national interests.
Finally, I would like to note that as the conflict in northern Iraq has evolved over the last several years, we have seen population displacement used as a tool to achieve the political and security goals of various actors. Allegations of forced population displacement have been levelled at all sides in the Iraqi conflict—principally at Daesh, but also in some areas at Iraqi security forces, Shia militias, and Kurdish security forces.
While some Shias and Kurds have been affected, the majority of the displaced have been members of the Sunni community or various minority groups. The international community's resettlement efforts, while assisting the plight of refugees and other displaced persons, may also be used by various actors in northern Iraq to achieve their own political objectives.
Mr. Chair, this concludes my presentation. Thank you for listening to me. I look forward to answering the questions of committee members.