Evidence of meeting #22 for Industry, Science and Technology in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was investments.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Charles Burton  Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual
Patrick Leblond  Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Daniel Schwanen  Vice-President, Research, C.D. Howe Institute
Willie Gagnon  Director, Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Good morning, everyone. I now call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 22 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, June 1, 2020, the committee is meeting to study the Investment Canada Act.

Today's meeting is taking place by video conference, and the proceedings will be made available via the House of Commons website.

I would like to remind members and witnesses that, before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. When you are ready to speak, please unmute your microphone and then return to mute when you are finished speaking. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly so that the translators can do their work.

As is my normal practice, I will hold up a yellow card when you have 30 seconds left in your intervention, and I will hold up a red card when your time for questions has expired.

I would like to now welcome our witnesses.

With us today we have Mr. Charles Burton, senior fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Mr. Patrick Leblond is associate professor, public and international affairs, faculty of social sciences at the University of Ottawa.

From the C.D. Howe Institute, we have Mr. Daniel Schwanen, vice-president, research.

Mr. Willie Gagnon is the director of Mouvement d'éducation et de défense des actionnaires.

Each witness will present for eight minutes followed by rounds of questions.

We will start with Mr. Burton.

You have the floor for eight minutes.

11:05 a.m.

Dr. Charles Burton Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual

Thank you, Chair.

Good morning, everybody.

I'd like to speak on the aspect of your study of the Investment Canada Act that is to determine whether Canada should place a temporary moratorium on acquisitions from state-owned enterprises of authoritarian countries, and I am happy to speak this morning—

11:05 a.m.

Bloc

Sébastien Lemire Bloc Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC

Madam Chair, I don't think the interpretation is working.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Thank you very much, Mr. Lemire.

Mr. Burton, I will pause your testimony for the moment, and we will just check with interpretation.

Are you on English or on the channel for interpretation?

11:05 a.m.

Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual

Dr. Charles Burton

Yes, I am on English.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Perfect. Thank you.

We're going to try that again. Would you say a few words, and we'll see if the translation is working.

11:05 a.m.

Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual

Dr. Charles Burton

Okay.

The committee has been asked to conduct a study of the Investment Canada Act to determine whether Canada should place a temporary moratorium on acquisitions from state-owned enterprises of authoritarian countries.

Is that good?

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

I'm not getting any translation at all. I'm just going to have the clerk verify with IT. There is absolutely no translation into French at the moment.

Just to let you know, they're trying to fix it in the room. If you could hold for one moment, we want to make sure that everyone can participate fully.

I believe we are now good to go. We will try that again.

Mr. Burton, could I ask you to start again. Thank you.

11:10 a.m.

Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual

Dr. Charles Burton

I would like to speak to the aspect of your study on determining whether Canada should place a temporary moratorium on acquisitions from state-owned enterprises of authoritarian countries. My area of expertise is China, so I'll talk about Chinese state-owned enterprises in this regard.

I had a look at the Investment Canada Act, and I see that the definition of “state-owned enterprise” is “an entity that is controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly, by a government or agency” or by “an individual who is acting under the direction of a government or agency” or “who is acting under the influence, directly or indirectly, of such a government or agency”.

In this regard I would point out that pursuant to the requirements of the company law of the People's Republic of China, a Chinese Communist Party committee led by its party secretary is required to be at the top of the management pyramid of People's Republic of China enterprises. According to our definition, while, for example, the firm Huawei does not self-identify as a People's Republic of China state enterprise, it is without question ultimately directed by Huawei’s Chinese Communist Party branch general secretary, Zhou Daiqi, who is required under party discipline to comply with direction from Beijing. This discipline would apply to all the party members of Huawei, including the CEO, Ren Zhengfei. I would say that Huawei and indeed all enterprises from China meet the Canadian definition of state-owned enterprise for the purposes of the Investment Canada Act.

Just to supplement that, I would point out that the career paths of leaders in major Chinese state enterprises are determined by the Chinese Communist Party central committee's organization department. Typically a leader in a state enterprise may be transferred by the party to work as a governor or party secretary of a province, and then back to a senior role in another PRC state business entity.

I would very much agree with the government’s recent policy statement on foreign investment review and COVID-19 that “Some investments into Canada by state-owned enterprises may be motivated by non-commercial imperatives that could harm Canada's economic or national security interests, a risk that is amplified in the current context.”

I think it's clear that there is a strong integration of Chinese state enterprises into the political and strategic goals of China’s Communist Party state. I note that Prime Minister Trudeau’s former senior policy adviser for global affairs and defence, Roland Paris, indicated in an article last week that the PRC “uses state-directed firms and targeted economic rewards and punishments to gain political leverage over other countries.” This seems to be a generally accepted view.

We have seen this applied with regard to China’s arbitrary violation of canola seed contracts with Canadian enterprises. There are many other examples that I would be happy to outline in the question period if asked.

Furthermore, looking at this aspect of the enterprises not being like corporate entities in democratic countries, if you look at the PRC's much touted belt and road initiative to restructure global infrastructure in China’s favour, many of the belt and road projects funded by China are in fact money losers, but serve the People's Republic of China's geostrategic interests all the same, and we see this phenomenon of “debt trap diplomacy” in which China has acquired ports in repayment for high levels of debt incurred by these money-losing unfeasible projects.

This is going on not just in the development world. PRC-associated companies’ acquisition of Chinese-language news media here in Canada and PRC-controlled social media applications such as WeChat actually enforce the People's Republic of China Communist Party’s propaganda department censorship norms over communications taking place on the soil of Canada. WeChat is censored out of Beijing even though the communications may occur entirely in Canada, say, between an MP and constituents via this app. I find this highly disturbing and a threat to our democracy.

Ultimately, I believe we should apply the principle of reciprocity in our assessment of Chinese state investment in Canada. For example, the Government of China forbids foreign firms from acquiring Chinese mines and other natural resources, under the Chinese constitution, on Chinese national security grounds. The same would apply for high-tech acquisitions in telecommunications. This is not reciprocal here in Canada. They're able to acquire things in Canada that we would not be able to acquire in China.

Let me conclude by suggesting that the principles of reciprocity and fairness are what our trade and investment policies should reflect. We need to stand up for the international rules-based order by our actions and not just by our rhetoric.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions and challenges later on in this event.

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.

Our next witness is Professor Leblond.

You have the floor for eight minutes.

11:15 a.m.

Patrick Leblond Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to thank you, committee members, for inviting me here today. I'd like to discuss three topics related to today's meeting. The first has to do with the stability of the Investment Canada Act. The second topic is the definition of a strategic Canadian industry. What does “strategic” mean? The third topic has to do with takeovers by state-owned enterprises of authoritarian countries.

I'd like to start by talking about the stability of the Investment Canada Act. In principle, the act should not be amended in response to a pandemic, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, or any other one-time event. In principle, the act should be robust and stand the test of time. It should be amended only in response to structural changes, over the medium and long term, within the Canadian and global economies.

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Leblond, but could you get closer to your microphone?

11:15 a.m.

Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Patrick Leblond

Certainly. Is this better?

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Yes, thank you.

11:15 a.m.

Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Patrick Leblond

The act has a dual purpose. First, it encourages investment in Canada, which in turn promotes economic growth and job creation. Second, it seeks to protect national security. This is a more recent development.

It's important to note that the act can only achieve its first objective if the rules remain unchanged. If the act is amended every time there is a recession or pandemic—situations that can be considered temporary—things get a lot more complicated, given the uncertainty facing foreign investors and local businesses that might want to potentially attract Canadian or foreign investment.

If the rules of the game are constantly changing, do we not risk missing out on potential investors and undermining competitiveness? Doing so might not only hurt economic growth and job creation, but also devalue our businesses. When there are fewer buyers and investors in Canada, then there is less capital, which could then drive down the value of Canadian companies.

And so, we need to be very careful not to amend an act every time a temporary situation arises. In theory, the act should be able to address these changes on a case-by-case basis. That is the first point I wished to raise.

My second point has to do with the definition of a “strategic Canadian industry”, as it appears in the statement. We have to ask ourselves what a strategic industry actually is. Is it an industry that is essential to the health of the economy and society as a whole?

Mr. Burton raised issues related to competition and issues related to democracy, for example. What is essential? The problem is that every person can have their definition of what is essential.

In coastal regions, be it the Atlantic or the Pacific coast, the fishing industry is probably considered essential. And yet, that doesn't mean that it is essential to the health of the Canadian economy as a whole or to society. People in Toronto can just as easily eat Maine lobster rather than lobster from Nova Scotia or the Magdalen Islands, even if the latter are better than those from Maine.

The same can be said of the mining industry in Quebec, the oil and gas industry in Alberta or the forestry industry in British Columbia. Are these industries essential to the health of the Canadian economy? From a regional perspective, the answer is yes. From a business perspective, they're indeed essential. From a job creation standpoint, they're essential. And yet, if that's true, could it not be argued that the value of what is deemed essential is diminished?

Who decides which industries are essential and which are not? Will that be up to individual MPs, or rather public servants? Who will be in a position to assess the differences between industries? What criteria will we use? The list of strategic Canadian industries could end up being quite long, since everyone will want their industry to be deemed strategic.

In Quebec, hardware stores suddenly became a strategic industry for the Quebec economy when it was announced that Rona would be sold to Lowe's. In France, for example, the yoghurt industry is a strategic industry. The French government indicated that it could not allow Danone to be sold.

Industries that, at first glance, don't appear to be entirely strategic from an economic standpoint can quickly become strategic for political reasons. It could then be argued that if every industry becomes strategic, then no industry is actually strategic.

We have to wonder whether it's worth having a list of so-called strategic industries. This could have some repercussions, in that each potential transaction would have to be reviewed. Is it necessary to set thresholds for a strategic industry? This could be a very cumbersome process.

The act, as it stands, sets out an approach for thresholds: regular thresholds; thresholds for state-owned enterprises; or cases in which thresholds do not apply, for example when national security is involved. In my opinion, the act, as it stands, is sufficient to deal with so-called strategic industries. National security is what is strategic. We're not talking about job creation or economic growth, because that would raise the notion of net benefit, which the minister will of course have to define for any acquisition.

In conclusion, I'd like to touch on acquisitions by state-owned enterprises of authoritarian countries. Again, what is the objective here? Mr. Burton spoke about reciprocity. That could be an objective, but I think it comes back to national security.

What's the difference between a state-owned enterprise and a private enterprise? Is it a matter of economic performance? In most cases, studies show that there is not really much difference in performance or operations when comparing a private enterprise and a state-owned enterprise. If it's not a matter of national security, is there a difference between a state-owned enterprise of an authoritarian country or a democratic country? Again, I think that the act, as it stands, is sufficient and simply needs some guidelines for enforcement.

Thank you for your time, and I'm happy to take your questions.

11:25 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Thank you very much, Mr. Leblond.

With that, we'll now move to Mr. Daniel Schwanen.

You have the floor for eight minutes.

11:25 a.m.

Daniel Schwanen Vice-President, Research, C.D. Howe Institute

Thank you, Chair. Thanks to the committee for this invitation.

The question of whether companies within strategic industries have been devalued or have lost value would be easier to answer if we had a clearer idea of what constituted a “strategic” industry, and there, let me pick up where Patrick Leblond left off.

Also in the same vein as what Patrick was saying, we already have provisions—let's not forget that—for scrutinizing foreign investments of any size, for any national security concerns. We already have a lower threshold and different ways of calculating value for scrutinizing foreign state-owned or influenced enterprises, as Mr. Burton was saying, than we do for non-SOE investments. We already have, of course, restrictions in place in a number of sectors that we obviously consider strategic, whether it's culture industries, telecommunications, transportation and others. That's already our current regime, so when we say “strategic”, we need to have a new definition in mind that means more than that. In fact, in light of the COVID-19 crisis, I would agree that we see that the supply of goods that Canadians rely on for their security and safety—for example, medical or food supplies—is more fragile than perhaps we had realized, and enabling Canadians to scrutinize investments that threaten those supplies would have to be properly seen as a strategic matter in my view.

Canadians also sense that new technologies will be at the forefront of our recovery from this crisis. Governments that have supported the development of new technologies via subsidies and the development of ecosystems that allow these technologies to be commercialized from a Canadian base, which is really ultimately the goal of policy, might want to discourage any panic selling by those firms or technologies in the current context, which might jeopardize this policy goal.

We can think of other strategic firms or sectors whose disappearance might trigger a really catastrophic loss of Canadian production capabilities in a number of sectors. The auto sector has often been mentioned in this respect. I would urge the following consideration. The loss of this kind of economic activity is not the same thing as selling a firm operating in these sectors to a foreign entity. FDI, in general, has been very good for the Canadian economy as long as foreign-owned firms, state-owned or otherwise, follow Canadian rules and regulations. To me, that's really the crux of the matter.

Having said this, I do not see generalized panic selling, and the market, as we've seen, has rebounded. What I hear is that, in general, government support measures and lenders that use liquidities, which are in turn supported by governments, of course, and the Bank of Canada, do, by and large, support their clients and provide the bridges, the lifelines, that allow companies some room to breathe and to continue operating through the emergency closures and a temporarily reduced demand.

Of course, some companies will not survive the crisis in their current form or will survive it only if they are allowed to restructure and refinance or become more sustainable under changed business models reflecting changes in demand and safety requirements, and in general, a different perceived risk return profile on the part of investors for different industries. I'm thinking of the airline industry, for example. As companies contemplate their future and seek more secure financing, or seek to restructure in some cases, foreign investment can again be a very useful way of providing capital to these companies or to channels through which capital is provided. I would again be careful of any knee-jerk reaction against FDI per se.

The other thing is that the changes these companies are going through are really a global phenomenon. It would be one thing if one Canadian airline company was alone in suffering, but all the airlines around the world are suffering, so it's not necessarily the case that competitors have the means to come in and pounce on Canadian firms. Again, I would be worried about imposing some new restrictions. Everybody is struggling, and while some investors will see opportunities for consolidation and perhaps even bargains, it's not necessarily such a bad thing to attract capital, including foreign capital, into these firms as they restructure, as long as this does not jeopardize public policy goals.

The trick is to give us the tools to quickly sift through investments that are potentially inimical to Canadian interests while retaining the door as wide open as we can to others. In the ordinary course of business, takeovers should be allowed, particularly as boards of public companies have more leeway now under provincial securities regulations to consider alternatives to a proposed takeover. This is something fairly recent.

What should this committee consider or recommend? It should think about clarity of criteria regarding any additional security over and above what we already have. This clarity could be obtained through examples or guidelines of what investment or investor might be considered problematic for Canada at the current juncture or going forward. It doesn't necessarily have to be rigid definitions that provide this clarity. It can be enhanced national security guidelines, for example.

I would also recommend swiftness of decisions on proposed acquisitions, with very clear guidelines. Swiftness of decisions is key to maintaining the balance between remaining open to foreign direct investment, with the benefits that FDI brings, and ensuring that the public interest is protected.

Having said this, my understanding is that it would be very difficult—certainly not easy—to change, in a timely fashion, the current thresholds that trigger the net benefit test. In this context, the key tool we can wield is expanding, in effect, the guidelines in the national security review to include matters that concern strategic questions of security and safety of supply and of potential systemic loss of otherwise competitive Canadian economic activity, as I fairly narrowly defined.

Last, we're thinking here about temporary changes, but I'm not exactly sure, to the extent we actually go through these changes, that they should be temporary. We could make them permanent. I think that would be very helpful to policy, going forward.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Thank you very much, Mr. Schwanen.

We will now move on to Mr. Gagnon, director of the Mouvement d'éducation et de défense des actionnaires.

Mr. Gagnon, you have the floor for eight minutes.

June 8th, 2020 / 11:30 a.m.

Willie Gagnon Director, Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires

Hello, everyone.

I'd like to start by saying that we believe the Investment Canada Act is legislation that is absolutely essential in any nation, no matter how democratic, but that it clearly does not go far enough. This act is the final link in a chain of provisions that should be much longer than it is. It's the culmination of a whole suite of measures, two of which are primarily aimed at protecting head offices in this country.

The two measures I'm referring to are multiple voting shares and the 66% takeover threshold. Everyone knows that under Quebec and Canadian law, when a company has a Canadian charter, it can't be acquired unless two-thirds of its shareholders vote in favour. This means that a takeover bid can be blocked by a shareholder who holds 40% of the shares but isn't a controlling shareholder, as is the case with Saputo.

The other measure is multiple voting shares. With multiple voting shares, it's possible for one shareholder, whether minority or otherwise, to hold the majority of a company's voting rights, which means—

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Mr. Gagnon, could you please bring the microphone closer?

11:35 a.m.

Director, Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires

Willie Gagnon

Can you hear me better now?

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Yes, thank you.

11:35 a.m.

Director, Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires

Willie Gagnon

This means that if a company has multiple voting shares, a controlling shareholder with multiple voting shares can block a takeover bid. The protection of the company rests on the shoulders of a single shareholder, who is generally the company founder.

We long ago adopted the conclusions of the report entitled “The Maintenance and Development of Head Offices in Québec” that was published in 2014 by the Task Force on the Protection of Québec Businesses. This report contains numerous recommendations that could also be useful for the country as a whole.

The report relied mainly on a brief submitted by Mr. Martel, an attorney who had researched safeguards already in place in certain U.S. states that we should import here to protect our businesses. For example, the buyer's voting rights can be temporarily withdrawn for a given period, and transactions, or business combinations, with the buyer can be restricted. I should also mention poison pills, which everyone has heard of. They involve diluting the buyer's shares by allowing other shareholders to buy shares at a certain price. In addition, fiduciary duties could be enshrined in corporate law in favour of stakeholders. Staggering directors' terms means the process for replacing all the members of a board of directors is spread out over a period of several years. This complicates the takeover process, because it takes more than a year to replace the entire board. That can sometimes deter potential buyers from attempting a takeover.

We focused particularly on the fiduciary duties of company directors, especially with regard to the treatment of stakeholders. As you may already know, British law sets out all of the fiduciary duties towards stakeholders, along with a list of all stakeholders. Allow me to quote directly from the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006:

A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—

(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,

(b) the interests of the company's employees,

(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,

(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment,

(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and

(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.

According to the law, corporate directors in the United Kingdom have a duty to consider the interests and rights of all stakeholders, including the state and the environment. Therefore, all the issues raised previously by all the other speakers concerning the acquisition of a corporation, whether by a foreign state that is a dictatorship or a state where there is little respect for human rights, would be part of the legal, judicial and fiduciary responsibilities of corporate directors if we had such provisions in Canada. These issues would not have to percolate until addressed by provisions such as those of the Investment Canada Act. Due to the current situation in the country, considerations concerning the fiduciary duties of corporate directors is left to case law.

I would refer you to the 2008 ruling in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.

...it may also be appropriate, although not mandatory, [for the board of directors] to consider...shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.

Here, in Canada, it is not mandatory and it is left to case law. We would be well served by going beyond the reflections of this committee on these issues, beyond the Investment Canada Act, and see what is happening upstream to cause files to be subject to this law.

There is also the 2016 study by Mr. Allaire on the head offices of major corporations in Quebec. This study lists corporations at risk of being taken over. In Quebec, they do not have the protections already in place, that is they do not have multiple voting shares or a group of shareholders holding more than 40% of shares. The study lists 16 firms at risk of takeover, including Metro, Gildan, SNC-Lavalin, Dollarama, Valeant and TransForce. You can have a look at the list.

One of the problems with the act in its current form is that the department determines whether the transaction is of net benefit to Canada, but it does not have to disclose the reasons why that is the case. In our opinion, there should be more transparency in that regard.

11:40 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sherry Romanado

Thank you very much.

We will now move to our rounds of questions.

Our first round of questions goes to MP Rempel Garner. You have the floor for six minutes.

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Michelle Rempel Conservative Calgary Nose Hill, AB

Thank you, Madam Chair.

As just some broad comments based on the witness testimony, I went into this study with a fairly open mind because of the amount of coverage that has been placed on this issue in recent months and weeks, and I would give two observations.

First of all, I believe Dr. Leblond stated some good points with regard to our having to have consistency within our regulatory framework in order to attract investment, yet on the other hand, we also have to ensure that we're not literally selling Canada for the sake of short-term gain. It's getting that balance that I think is what's at stake here.

As the world changes, it's incumbent upon Parliament to see if we actually do have that balance struck within our legislative and regulatory framework, and that I'm not convinced of right now.

I believe it was Dr. Leblond as well who talked about the fact that while there's no definition of “strategic industry”, the premise was therefore made, “Well, if everything is strategic, nothing is strategic.” I would argue that a strategic industry would be one that, if sold or if majority control were given to an authoritarian country, the sale or shift in control would threaten Canadian sovereignty. That would be a strategic industry in and of itself. I'm not sure that the ICA right now gets to the core of that, so perhaps I'll start with that premise.

My question is to Dr. Burton.

We have in Canada right now a process in place for visas and for deciding whether Canada requires a visa. It's a visa framework review. We have a set of criteria through which we decide whether citizens of a certain country can come to Canada on a visa status or a visa-free status.

Is there anything similar to that type of a framework within our current law whereby we look at a country—let's say it's an authoritarian country—and say certain criteria have either been met or not met, and review all the investments coming in from a certain country based on those criteria? Is there anything in our current framework that takes that type of approach?