Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good afternoon, honourable members. I guess it's good evening.
As said, my name is Leah Lawrence and I'm the former president and CEO of Sustainable Development Technology Canada. I served there from 2015 to 2023.
When I started at SDTC, it was on the brink of shutdown, but I was able to put in place a team that transformed the organization. We took it from being consistently 20% over budget to under budget. We were formally commended by the Auditor General of Canada and the Treasury Board Secretariat for our increased flexibility, our diverse funding streams and overhead costs that were half of those of comparable federal programs. Given this, ISED increased SDTC's funding during my tenure by over 200%.
Over the last year, I spent a lot of time responding to various inquiries as a result of the actions of a whistle-blower. This, and the resulting media attention, took a big toll on me and the organization. I felt that my leadership had become a distraction that would prevent SDTC, an organization that I had dedicated myself to for over eight years, from fulfilling its mandate, so, despite having the continued confidence of SDTC's board of directors, I resigned. I note that in resigning I received no severance, and because SDTC's employees are not civil servants, no government pension.
I decided to resign two days after appearing before the House of Commons ethics committee after I listened in disbelief to ISED CFO Doug McConnachie testifying on the same panel. He told the committee he had spent 30 hours talking to SDTC's whistle-blower, speculating as evidenced by recordings obtained by media on the outcomes of the various investigations under way while they were still ongoing, including saying that these investigations “could have been done in a way that exonerated the board and scapegoated Leah”.
As the ISED overseer of the investigation, Mr. McConnachie's actions were unethical and compromised the investigation. Despite his actions, the investigation still found no wrongdoing or misconduct and made several administrative recommendations that the team and I were implementing when I decided to resign. However, I am here today to talk primarily about governance and conflict of interest.
The SDTC Act and the Government of Canada set the public policy framework. The board of directors sets the governance framework. In the case of SDTC, half of the board is appointed by the Government of Canada. Also, an assistant deputy minister from ISED attends all board meetings and is privy to all materials. That includes all funding recommendations and all discussions of conflict of interest.
The CEO's and the management's job is to take that policy direction from the government and the governance direction from the board and turn it into operating practices for the organization. I note the board also approves all project funding.
From 2015 to 2019, I did a lot of work on governance reform with the previous chair and the chair of governance, Jim Balsillie and Gary Lunn.
A key change—to harmonize the conflict of interest rules for our two categories of board members, including limiting and eliminating direct conflicts and implanting cooling-off periods—was blocked when a non-government appointee got a ruling from the Ethics Commissioner that they did not need to follow the same governance standards as government appointees. This made it impossible for management to hold all board members to the same rules.
Early in 2019, it became very apparent to me that the government wanted to replace the chair of the board. In May or June of 2019, I was informed by ISED's official representative, ADM Andy Noseworthy, that Ms. Annette Verschuren was going to be appointed to replace Mr. Balsillie.
I expressed concern SDTC was funding a project for her company. I expressed concern there was a potential for both conflict of interest and the perception of conflict of interest. I expressed concern that both Ms. Verschuren and SDTC could potentially be damaged by the appointment.
In the days that followed, our government relations lead contacted the minister's staff to reiterate our concerns about Ms. Verschuren's appointment, noting that no previous chair had direct or perceived conflicts of interest and that, further, it was previously a condition of the chair's appointment to be conflict-free. ADM Noseworthy subsequently told me that in the absence of a written policy explicitly prohibiting a beneficiary of funds from becoming chair, the appointment would go ahead.
I fear that my ongoing efforts to continue to strengthen the governance regime at the board level were largely stymied from this point on. Henceforth, it became largely an exercise in managed conflict, rather than precluding or eliminating conflict.
I continued to work on governance reform with legal advisers, and was pleased when the board finally adopted a policy of post-directorship cooling-off periods and hired a board ethics adviser. These are good developments; however, they are not enough. Another important reform remains outstanding: that any appointee to the board be free of conflicts of interest.
My second recommendation is that the Treasury Board Secretariat convene a group of chairs and CEOs from the many independent agencies that provide funds on behalf of the government and ask them what supports they need to discharge their mandates from a governance and public accountability point of view.
In closing, independent government-funded organizations like SDTC play an important role. They have access to people and resources that the government does not, and can deliver on outcomes that complement and support government policy.
The action plan that ISED has required of SDTC, which they have implemented, does not address the matters of governance and conflict of interest that I have raised here today and that I advocated for throughout my time at SDTC.
I thank you for your time today, and I am happy to take your questions.