Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Feb. 20th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Good morning, colleagues.

I think we have a quorum.

I call to order this meeting of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, pursuant to the motion adopted by the standing committee.

With respect to our study on the Canada-China human rights bilateral dialogue, I would invite to the table witnesses we have scheduled to appear before us today: the Honourable Sergio Marchi, president of the Canada China Business Council, and Mr. Paul Evans, co-CEO and chairman of the executive committee of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

Welcome to the committee, gentlemen. I think you're both experienced witnesses—in fact one of you is a former member of a parliamentary committee—so you know how this works. We welcome you both warmly. I think you're probably aware of the context of our study, which we will soon be wrapping up, on these matters.

Both of you have a period for presentation, followed by questions. Which of you would like to begin?

Please go ahead, Mr. Evans.

[Paul Evans, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee this morning.

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada was created by an act of Parliament in 1984. It's funded by the federal and provincial governments and the private sectors, and it is an independent think tank on Canada-Asia relations. It aims to broaden public understanding of Asia and to be a resource for Canadians in making policy choices about how to respond to and influence the enormous changes that are happening across the Pacific.

Mr. Marchi and I come today at the end of a long number of witnesses who have been before the subcommittee over the last four months. You have heard a great deal about human rights conditions in China, individual consular cases, and the approach and instruments that Canada is using to protect Canadian citizens and promote human rights and democratic governments inside China.

My remarks will focus on the broader political and economic context in which the bilateral human rights agenda is playing out. I have two main points to make today. The first is that however important the state of human rights in China is to Canadians, this is just one of several big issues in our bilateral agenda with China. The second is that it is essential to establish a positive political relationship at the most senior levels before we turn to any of these issues, whether they be human rights, commerce and trade, human exchanges, or management of a host of global problems.

Recent events suggest that the political relationship between Canada and China is on unusually shaky ground. The public response indicates that Canadians are not of a single mind about how to manage the relationship with China. Here, we are not alone. China poses huge challenges for every country in Asia and around the world.

Our current debate in Canada is almost unique, because it does not centre on global economic shift, trade irritants, job losses, international hot spots, or the strategic risks of China's rise. Rather, in Canada the debate has been about political conditions inside China and in the current context a particular consular case.

Human rights are important to Canadians. A survey we conducted last year in association with The Globe and Mail found that 63% of Canadians believe the human rights situation in China is better today than it was ten years ago. At the same time, 72% agree that promoting democracy and human rights in Asia should be a priority for the Government of Canada.

Few doubt that China has become a global economic and political force. It is now the second-largest trading partner of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. It now exports more to the United States than does Canada. By our studies, it is likely to become America's principal trading partner within five years.

China is not just the shop floor of the world; it is at the centre of regional and global supply chains that are transforming the world economy. Chinese multinationals are shopping the world for assets, and not just in the resource sector. China is no longer out there, it is here, the sharp edge of globalization and a daily economic presence for most Canadians. It affects what we produce and consume, the nature of our jobs, and our role in the world.

The road to solving the world's big problems, from global climate change to UN reform to human security in Darfur to the weaponization of space to global counter-insurgency, still run through Washington, but they now run through Beijing as well.

The Government of Canada now appears to be on a somewhat different track from its Liberal and Conservative predecessors in responding to the rise of global China. Its principled foreign policy emphasizes freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The government has not issued a major statement on China policy, but it is signalling something that some have characterized as “cool politics, warm economics”, a phrase first used to describe the Sino-Japanese relationship under former Prime Minister Koizumi.

Our Prime Minister's public remarks have focused on human rights and consular issues, and he has already said that he will not sacrifice human rights for the almighty dollar. A variety of cabinet ministers are tending to the functional parts of our relationship with China.

This approach is not an easy sell in Beijing. China's assistant foreign minister commented in early February that the economic relationship goes hand in hand with the political relationship.

Some fear that with cool politics and warm economics, Canada risks playing a game of chicken against a bulldozer. They argue that it will be impossible to make progress on complicated consular cases and the broader human rights file without a working political relationship at the most senior levels. They observe that the new government set a positive tone with Washington before moving matters like the Arar case to prominence in the bilateral agenda, and they have noted that the new Prime Minister of Japan, despite abiding differences with China, has made a strong effort to warm up the political side of Japanese relations with China to a temperature equivalent to that of the economic.

Many are worried that a cool relationship with top Chinese leaders will have economic consequences. Here we need to be very careful in assessing the claim. Most commercial transactions with China are commercial in nature and largely untouched by high-level politics, but there are genuine concerns that some high-value commercial transactions do depend upon high-level government involvement, for example, in big infrastructure projects that depend on government procurement, and in the area of aviation and financial services, which are subject to government regulation.

The longer-term economic risk is that the efforts to form new partnerships, the big thinking around the Pacific gateway, and opportunities for joint research and development projects may be held back. The immediate diplomatic risk is that without a comprehensive relationship, we will lose traction with Beijing on a range of global policy issues ranging from Kyoto to Darfur.

It is unwise to overestimate Canadian access to top Chinese decision-makers on any of these issues, but it is equally unwise to think that cool political relations will increase our access or impact. The sobering human risk is that we are dealing with a long list of consular and related matters in which there are already many irritants on both sides and a growing flow of transnational migrants to complicate the picture. By the estimates of my foundation, we think there are more than 300,000 Canadian passport holders in the area of greater China.

For the first time since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, we are back to a national debate about the fundamentals of the relationship. It is not clear that the strategic partnership announced during the visit of President Hu Jintao to Canada in September 2005 is still in place, and it is not clear whether we are starting a new chapter or a new book in the relationship with China.

Over the past three decades, the Canadian government and civil society actors have developed a range of instruments for monitoring and promoting human rights in China. This subcommittee has heard proposals for several new initiatives.

Let me conclude by adding one more proposal for the committee's consideration. It concerns corporate social responsibility beyond China's borders. In addition to China's undertaking activities at home, it plays a role as a major investor and developer in projects around the world, which is becoming big news, especially in Africa and Latin America. Codes and practices in the conduct of business, labour relations, and provisions for transparency and accountability of Chinese companies all have a big impact on tens of millions of people outside of China, and they have a big impact on China's international reputation and influence. This is a frontier issue, part of dealing with a global China, and a problem of mutual concern for Canada and China, in which the Canadian government, our NGOs, and our business sector can work together in providing leadership and new connections with counterparts in a global China.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Thank you, Mr. Evans, for making the effort. You have come all the way from Vancouver, I believe.

[Paul Evans]

It's always a pleasure.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

I have just one point needing clarification. You estimate that there are 300,000 Canadian passport holders in greater China. How do you define greater China?

[Paul Evans]

That would include the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau. Some would also include some adjoining regions, but that would be the core area.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Thank you.

Mr. Marchi.

[Sergio Marchi, President, Canada China Business Council]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Let me first thank you for the invitation to participate in this morning's deliberations at your committee. The Canada China Business Council is grateful for the opportunity.

As you know, the CCBC is a business organization. For almost thirty years, we have served Canadian business interests in China, while also attracting foreign Chinese investment into our country. Accordingly, we do not profess to have detailed expertise in the area or discipline of human rights. However, the CCBC’s rich history in China provides us with a keen perspective on the many issues and characteristics of Chinese society. It is that perspective that I am pleased to share with you this morning.

The CCBC supports the view that Canadian foreign policy vis-à-vis China must represent the full range of our country’s values and interests. Trade and investment are indisputably important elements of that bilateral relationship, as are human rights.

No one suggests that Canada pursue a purely commercial relationship. However, if the focus is solely on human rights, our country runs the risk of never establishing the kind of relationship in which difficult questions can be raised, discussed, and settled in a mutually respectful way, and in a manner that is likely to lead to change.

The Chinese may place more importance on relationships than other nations, but in most countries and cultures an open and trusting relationship is a prerequisite to achieving the goals of each country.

Essentially, our foreign policy is made up of two ingredients, values and interests, and the two are inextricably linked. Over the years, Canadian prime ministers, ministers, and their officials have not shied away from discussing the importance Canadians place on the respect for human rights in China and around the world.

Interests and values cannot be pursued in isolation from one another or with one as a precondition to the other. It is our experience that only when they are pursued in tandem can one make progress on both fronts. Moreover, Canada does not take a human-rights-first approach in its relationships with all the other countries of our globe.

There is no doubt that the bilateral relationship is bedeviled by attempts to resolve ongoing consular cases. Naturally, the CCBC expects China, as well as other countries, for that matter, to fully recognize and respect the rights of Canadian citizens abroad. A determining issue is that China does not recognize dual citizenship and is reluctant to grant access to Canadian consular officials in many of these cases. Therefore, unless some means can be found to bridge this gap, I'm afraid it will be a continuing source of disagreement.

While these consular cases may involve human rights issues, we also understand, of course, that this committee is focused on a much broader consideration of how human rights are respected or not respected in China's evolving society.

It is difficult for Canadians to try to visualize the scale of the social change underway in China. There are roughly two Canadas on the move each year. Some 30 million people a year enter China’s rising middle class, and an equal number of people migrate from the countryside to the big cities.

China’s economic growth since 1978 has lifted hundreds of millions of people above the World Bank's poverty line. In fact, Chinese officials are concerned with developing the social policies necessary to ensure a stable society. Chinese authorities spend considerable time examining foreign approaches, in our country and others, to see how they might be applied in theirs.

There is considerable openness to hearing ideas from friends and allies. But there is a growing popular resentment in China—and not just in China, of course—to lecturing by foreigners, in the absence of deep understanding of the Chinese realities. Even in the western world, lecturing can be a delicate affair, be it by presidential candidates in France or American ambassadors in Ottawa.

Since taking power in 2003, the Chinese leadership has taken as their core task the narrowing of the gap between rural and urban areas, as well as between the rich and poor. Now that Chinese society has succeeded in creating relatively enormous economic wealth, one of the challenges in building that harmonious society is to find ways to better share that wealth.

Their five-year plan for 2006 to 2011 focuses very specifically on the quality of that growth. This includes the need to develop environmental protection standards and enforcement, social safety nets, educational improvements, health reform, and measures to improve conditions for migrant labour, among others. These action plans have been well conceived in the past and have yielded concrete results. This, I think, clearly opens the door to meaningful discussions on the issue of values where sharing Canada's experiences and best practices can and hopefully will influence Chinese policy and thinking.

Talks at the official level, of course, play a large role in achieving influence, but so do practical development assistance programs led by CIDA, Canadian university exchanges and training, foundations, NGOs, and private companies. However, it is difficult for these to operate in the absence of a strong working relationship at the senior political level. Failing to develop this relationship merely will ensure that we will be left on the sidelines, lacking the ability to engage and thus impact social change in China.

Moreover, Canadian corporations active in China continue to contribute greatly to the export of their respective national values. Foreign firms operating in China have played an important role in China's economic advance, the rise in the standard of living, and in the adoption of more advanced work practices. Typically as well, these practices spread gradually to Chinese competitors as they seek to attract employees from foreign enterprises.

China has taken up the challenge of participating actively in the global economic and political system. An accelerated timetable of WTO accession, for example, which imposed considerable hardships for Chinese domestic firms, demonstrated just how determined China was to become a full global player.

By contrast, North Korea has taken the path of isolation. As it stands, China's multilateral and regional participation has been central to the tentative resolution of the security situation in North Korea. We should therefore encourage China to assume more responsibility regionally and globally, and not less.

There is no doubt that political change has proceeded much more slowly than economic development. Yet at the same time, we must recognize that considerable progress has been made and that engagement of foreign countries, including Canada, has played a constructive and positive role in this development.

An understanding of individual human rights is evolving in China. For example, the Chinese have sought the advice of Canadian insurers and large pension funds, on various aspects of establishing an effective public pension fund system for the Chinese citizens. As well, the Chinese judge who made a recent landmark IP ruling was trained at the University of British Columbia, under the Asia Foundation program.

The speed at which progress has been made in China may not be what we had envisioned; however, we think a policy of continued engagement is vital. Human rights are in part a function of degree of economic development. Canada did not have a Bill of Rights until 1960, for example, and its perceived ineffectiveness was the key reason for the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. We are also reminded that with Canada's recent official apology, it was not too long ago in Canada that a head tax was imposed on Chinese immigrants to Canada.

Canada has been evolving, then, and so has China. Since China's opening in 1979, some 300 laws and regulations have been enacted to construct their legal system, which has been heavily influenced by the models of other countries. In 1982, a Chinese constitution was written and introduced, and it was subsequently amended in 1994 to protect private property.

We should also consider that genuine self-criticism on human rights questions in China and Canada may open productive dialogue. In the Maher Arar case, the Canadian government has been fully open in investigating the problem. Public and rule-of-law processes to investigate human rights abuses are common in Canada, and this is a model that should be encouraged with the Chinese.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, both Canada and China have progressed. Clearly, we are further along that road and are therefore in a position to offer our experience to the extent that it may be helpful to the Chinese in addressing the challenges that come with massive social and economic change.

We therefore need to engage China and to help encourage and facilitate this continued pace of reform. We need to appreciate that effective and constructive dialogue on any subject is based on a relationship built on trust and mutual respect. In this regard, the recent visits by the Canadian Ministers of Finance, International Trade, Natural Resources, and Agriculture were most valuable, as is, I think, the continued work of the Canada-China Legislative Association.

Let us therefore engage China effectively on human rights. At the same time, let us also have a comprehensive and balanced framework for our bilateral and multilateral discussions with China, for the pursuit of values without also emphasizing interests puts both at risk.

Thank you.

We've also attached to our original, much longer presentation, Mr. Chairman, a series of recommendations for the committee that flow from our presentation. I will forgo, because of time, the actual reading of those recommendations, but they're found in our presentation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Thank you very much, Mr. Marchi.

Mr. Cotler.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Welcome to you both.

The presentations here were informed and will allow us to go right to the core issues.

You've mentioned, in a kind of generic sum-up, referencing the Canadian government's position with respect to cool politics and warm economics, specific reference to the fact that the Prime Minister has said we will not sacrifice human rights to the almighty dollar. And you've also mentioned that without a political relationship, there won't be traction on a whole gamut of issues as China emerges in a global sense, both economically and politically.

I think you can appreciate that we've had witness testimony that has said there is no relationship or more particularly no adverse impact between human rights advocacy on the one hand and adverse fallout for Canada's commercial interests on the other. I want to ask you whether you believe that is correct. What is the relationship between human rights advocacy on our part in the form of policies, programs, statements, and actions on the one hand, and our commercial interests? Have you any examples where such interests have been adversely affected?

In that context, perhaps you might make some suggestions as to how both can go forward together. And if you want to comment on the Canada-China bilateral dialogue and its efficacy, that would also be welcome.

That is to either one, or both.

[Paul Evans]

Perhaps I can begin and say that the central message I was trying to convey is that we can and must deal with China on a range of human rights issues, a broad range of economic issues, and also a range of global issues. We are not in a position yet where we have established the high-level political relationship with China that I think will allow us to deal with those issues in some sort of balanced or comprehensive way. Until we have that high-level political relationship, individual cases and the dimensions of what we want to do in promoting good governance and democracy in China not only falls on deaf ears, they fall on ears that are both confused and hostile.

If we take a step back on the Canada-China relationship, for almost a third of a century there has been a consensus on the way to balance these multiple concerns. That's even before China became as important to us as it is now. We're at an interesting moment when that consensus is being looked at again—revisited—and it's natural and proper for any new government to do it. At the moment, I think we're not square on what we would like to do in advancing our human rights agenda.

So far, there are trade-offs, Mr. Cotler, as you noted. Are there specific instances in which Canadian pursuit of human rights issues or consular cases have cost us in the past? I don't know. It's always hard to measure where retaliation responses come, with another party who doesn't agree with you. I think as we move forward it's essential that we have a way to speak with the Chinese so we can dig into those issues and the trade-offs can be minimal.

As I looked through the testimony given before this subcommittee over its four months of deliberations, one of the remarkable things is that there's almost total agreement on what we should do by way of programming substance. Some want to go a little further than others, but we have a 90% consensus out there. The point is, though, before we can move on these individual activities on human rights, we have to have the political relationship that will allow us to be effective. There, I think that some of the lessons Mr. Marchi pointed to about how Canada deals with other countries, including the United States, where we're not always eye-to-eye on some very difficult bilateral issues and human rights and consular cases—The situation of having a warm relationship with Washington first does matter.

Mr. Cotler, it's amazingly difficult to be able to calculate where retaliation or consequences come if we have disagreements with the Chinese, as we've had many disagreements with the Chinese government over the last 35 years. My sense is, though, that we won't find specific acts of retaliation. Simply, if our relationship cools or even cools further, we're going to fall further behind in connecting with China. That's not on individual deals; our relationship with China is so much bigger than individual deals. This is about the very structure and nature of industrial restructuring in Canada.

I can't give you specifics at this point. We don't know them. Virtually every country in the world is trying to build a political relationship with China at the same time that it deals with a host of economic and other issues. The balance sheet is not yet clear, but it seems that's the necessary condition.

[Sergio Marchi]

I certainly would underscore many of the things Paul just touched on.

There are a couple of points. First, I think we could, we should, and we can pursue warm relations both on the political and on the commercial front. I think that's entirely possible. That should be our pursuit, and that would be in keeping with the traditional foreign policy stance vis-à-vis China and many other countries. Politics, commercial relations, human rights, and global multilateral partnerships and issues are at stake. It's really about engagement. It's first about building the rapport, the relationship, the chemistry that will then allow the vast bureaucracy, particularly on the Chinese side, to hopefully function in a positive way.

I still believe that the marketplace is becoming a bigger self-determinant of how business gets done. In countries like China, governments still play a huge role, particularly in the sectors and on the projects that Paul touched upon in his original presentation. On those major contracts, governments do have a say and a sway.

In addition, we are facing increased competition, not less. Again, the whole world is in China. It's not like it was in the 1970s, when we were the first country from the west to open diplomatic relations with China. The whole world is seeking both political and commercial relationships.

We've had examples in the past. While it's very difficult to measure, in the 1970s, for example, the French sold a fleet of Mirage planes to Taiwan, and there was severe commercial backlash. French consulates were closed; contracts were cancelled. People say they lost the inside track on providing China the nuclear reactor, which in the end went to AECL from Canada. It wasn't until they signed a ban on weapons sales to Taiwan that those commercial relationships were put back in good standing.

It's also very difficult to measure, because if someone is asked to pay, how do you know that company A, B, or C is paying for that original reason? The Chinese, like any other country, aren't going to spell it out for you. If you talk to Canadian business people on the ground in China, they are concerned and anxious that we have a political relationship that provides a positive context. So we shouldn't test whether this is going to happen in any tangible way for Canadian companies, because I think it's Canadian jobs and investment that are on the line.

The last point I was going to draw your attention to, Mr. Chairman, is that there are more than just commercial implications of a bad political relationship. My argument is what does it do for advancing human rights? My position and the position of the CCBC is that if you don't have a relationship in which you can discuss these tough issues, and if the Chinese think that a country is lecturing them, and then if we don't have engagement, how do we hope to advance the cause of human rights? There are more than just commercial consequences. There are the consequences of not moving human rights files forward. That's why, in the balance, we should be doing both and showing results on both fronts.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Mr. Cotler, we're well over time on that round.

Madame St-Hilaire.

[Caroline St-Hilaire, Bloc, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC]

Thank you, sir.

We are certainly very happy to hear you this morning. If you do not mind, I will ask you some questions with reference to testimony we received previously. I think you are not in agreement with-- I mean what you said is very far from what we heard, mainly from NGOs and other organizations.

From what I heard this morning, you both said essentially the same thing: you were rather shocked by the Prime Minister's statement that he will not sacrifice human rights in China for the almighty dollar. I understand that you both advocate the status quo that has been in existence for 30 years. We will have economic ties, we'll mention human rights from time to time so it looks good for the media, but what we actually want is economic relations and more business with China. I can understand why this is so.

This brings me to my question.

I would like to hear from you on this. Mr. Marchi, you're talking about balance. How can you justify that, ultimately, human rights are important, but not more so than trade, business and deals we have with China? This is what I understand. We will not neglect human rights but political relations are more important. Is this what you're saying?

[Sergio Marchi]

The first part of your question was about pursuing human rights so it looks good for the media, but that Canada is primarily interested in economic issues with China. Let me respectfully disagree. We at the CCBC do not argue for one moment that Canada should not pursue with China and other countries its values surrounding human rights, democracy, and religious openings. The fundamental question is how do we do that? How do we advance that? What systemic bilateral instruments do we have in place? Can we put in better instruments? Have the old ones now come to the end of the road? If so, what do we replace them with?

So we're saying that we fully expect our government to pursue a human rights line with China. Past governments of both political persuasions that have occupied 24 Sussex have done that, so it's not a partisan issue; it's a bilateral and global issue. But we would suggest that speaking publicly about human rights in the absence of a relationship is not necessarily the way to advance success in human rights with also consequences in whatever commercial interests we have at stake.

I had the opportunity to be trade minister and was privy to meetings with our Prime Minister at the time and either the premier or president of China, and I can say to you very openly that all issues were discussed, whether they were economic, political, UN, WTO, global, and ultimately those tough issues on consular human rights cases. The Prime Minister of the time in my presence didn't speak in code language or in terms of briefs, but spoke quite openly with the President and Premier, saying, “There are cases where we have a very strong difference of opinion, and we want you to look into this. We expect you to look into this.” The interlocutors on the other side, the Chinese president or premier, did not go apoplectic because of the Prime Minister's utterings. In fact, they expected a democratic country like ours to raise those issues. But it was done in the context of a pretty good relationship, a mature relationship, in a context where you could also agree to disagree.

We agree to disagree in our respective families. We did it from time to time, as I recall, in our caucuses. It's sometimes healthy to air things out. The president or the premier of China would say at that point to the foreign minister, “Mr. Minister, I want you to look into those three cases raised by the Prime Minister.” That's what we needed to get things going.

So we should advance the cause of human rights in China and elsewhere. The question is how to do it in a way that is also sophisticated enough to show respect, in this case, for the Chinese. If you show respect, you are likely to get respect. Then you can advance the files, because I don't want to feel good about lecturing the Chinese on a human rights case, and wake up the morning after and find out that case is going backwards rather than forward.

The question is, how do we best advance that case? That's where we're coming from, and not saying whatsoever it's business at any cost, at any time, for any deal. Of course it's not, because that's not the way we live in Canada. And therefore we should also export those kinds of approaches and values, as I think we have, around the globe.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Madame St-Hilaire, you have two minutes left.

[Caroline St-Hilaire, Bloc, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC]

I do not want to embarrass you, but do you feel it was wrong for the Prime Minister to blame the Chinese authorities? Do you think it was a mistake? Basically, what I understand is that there was a break with tradition. In the past, human rights violations in China were mentioned but in a polite and respectful manner. You are now observing a change in international policy. I am simply asking a question. I am not trying to embarrass you.

[Sergio Marchi]

No, no, you're not embarrassing me, and I also don't want to embarrass anyone.

I wouldn't categorize it as an error. I don't think any prime minister goes out to make errors in foreign policy in this case or in others. It's obviously an issue Mr. Harper feels very passionately about, that he feels is a fundamental aspect of our relationship, and I accept that at face value. I have no qualms with Mr. Harper feeling passionately about human rights.

I also happen to believe that former prime ministers also felt quite strongly about those kinds of basic values. It's also then a question of judgment, it's a question of style, it's a question of the rapport that one enjoys in terms of asking how we advance these values, and how he can advance this cause. Mr. Harper is free to choose the style and the approach he thinks is going to work.

In terms of the CCBC, we have no quibbles with Mr. Harper on the passion that he brings to respecting the human rights of Canadians in China and ultimately to try to influence Chinese thinking and policy on how they treat their own people. But we happen to believe that if you want to show success and if you want to move the file forward, you need a much more comprehensive, balanced approach, but ultimately one that is predicated on a strong relationship.

Even if it was briefly, we were pleased that in Vietnam Mr. Harper, with his Chinese counterpart, at least were able to put a face to one another beyond the G-7 meeting that I think they had briefly in St. Petersburg. It is my hope, built on these last ministerial visits, that Prime Minister Harper one day soon—not necessarily in a third country, but I hope in Canada or China--can build that chemistry and rapport. We are convinced that if that happens we will be more successful in seeing gains on those issues he feels so strongly about.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Merci.

Mr. Sorenson.

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you again for coming here today.

As you know, this is the subcommittee on human rights, and we are looking at a number of countries today. You're here speaking about China, but specifically we look at areas where there are human rights violations or perceived human rights violations and we then ask the best way this committee can make a recommendation to the standing committee and then ultimately to the government to see effective change.

In your recommendations you say:

Canadian foreign policy development should consider that the Chinese community in Canada is diverse with views covering a wide spectrum. One cannot reduce the view of the Canadian-Chinese community to a singular and unified voice. Certain issues can be divisive amongst Canadians of Chinese heritage. Consequently, Canadian foreign policy should be sensitive to the diversity.

Can you give me some specific examples where you really believe we don't recognize the diversity among the Chinese community here in Canada? You must have some real specifics where we need to change policy to have that as one of your recommendations.

[Sergio Marchi]

Thank you.

In fact that was recommendation number 6. I didn't read that paragraph because I was afraid I'd go over your time limits, but it's in our presentation. That was a reference essentially to the fact that it is our experience in dealing with the Canadian Chinese community across our country that there is a divergence of views in terms of how a Canadian government approaches foreign or trade policy in China.

What we've said in our brief is that, yes, there are those elements in the Chinese Canadian community that would applaud a very hardline, tough human rights approach first and sometimes only with China, but there are also other elements of that same community that have either a nuanced view or a very different view, where they would not want to see their government approach China on that basis.

What we are saying is therefore we shouldn't simply take silence as saying we are all on the same page, if we are to take a harder human rights first or only line. We're saying foreign policy must also reflect the plurality of opinion within that community, because there are elements in that community that would also favour perhaps a more traditionalist approach in terms of showing signs of progress, be they on human rights or political issues.

So what we're saying is let's make sure we're reflecting the plurality of opinion that we know from our context exists in the Canada-China community as we know it.

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

So you aren't necessarily saying that our foreign policy isn't sensitive to that. This recommendation is basically a reminder that there is diversity, that there is not a unified voice in Canada. It's a reminder.

You mentioned that Prime Minister Harper has a passion for human rights. But you've never said that he's overdone it. He has stood up for human rights. We all recognize that and acknowledge it. But according to this, it would seem that if you have a recommendation dealing with sensitivity to foreign policy, given the variance of opinion here in Canada in the Chinese community, there is no one real set point. This is just basically given as a reminder that one must proceed cautiously on both fronts.

[Sergio Marchi]

Well, I think it's a recommendation based on our relationships in the community. I prefaced my remarks earlier by saying that we don't pretend to be a body that is expert in the discipline of human rights, per se. We were invited to come this morning, and I'm very happy to have the opportunity. In our relationships with different elements of the Canada-Chinese community, we have found that there are points of divergence in terms of how we engage China, as I'm sure there are points of divergence in many other communities when governments like ours interface with America, Australia, Europe, or Africa. It's stronger than a reminder. It's also to let you know, based on our relationships, that yes, there are elements in the Canada-Chinese community that would applaud a very hardline approach. There are other elements that are not convinced that this is the way we're going to meet with success, not only in furthering the cause of human rights, but in cementing a bond with a growing political and economic power when it is in the interest—in the vested interest—of Canada to enjoy a good relationship with China.

That does not mean always agreeing. It actually means that it allows us to disagree in a mature way without anyone paying the penalty or the price. That's what we want. And we're saying that there's that element in the Canada-Chinese community today, based on our relationships and dealings with that community.

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

If you could take off your hat as president of the Canada China Business Council for a moment and put your old political hat on—

[Sergio Marchi]

Am I allowed to do that?