Evidence of meeting #73 for Subcommittee on International Human Rights in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was egypt.
A recording is available from Parliament.
March 21st, 2013 / 1:35 p.m.
NDP
Pierre Jacob NDP Brome—Missisquoi, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Professor Brown, thank you for joining us this afternoon.
In your view, how could Canada best promote respect for freedom of expression and for the rights of women and religious minorities in Egypt during the transition period? Are there some actions that might be more effective? In your view, are there institutions in Egypt or non-state entities with which Canada should engage more than with others?
1:35 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
I think various countries will have to get used to dealing with Egypt as a more democratic society. For that reason, I think the question is a very good one.
When you deal with an authoritarian regime, you're used to dealing with generally the office of the head of state. You don't have to worry about the rest of the state apparatus, the rest of the political opposition, and so on and so forth.
That's not how countries that are democratic tend to interact with each other. They tend to interact across the board. It would be absolutely routine, for instance, for a diplomat to meet regularly not simply with the governing party but with the political opposition, and to have meetings with various civil society actors as well.
I think that's the way things should move, and I think it has to be done very carefully. As I've tried to make clear, one of my big worries about Egypt is that you have a transition process that is not regarded as legitimate by a large sector of Egyptian political society.
The political opposition, I think, realizes that when they go to elections, they lose. The problem is that this has led them to look for saviours—in the military, in the judiciary, in the international community—rather than deal with their own people and deal with the fact that the Brotherhood is doing very well in elections.
I worry sometimes that we might communicate too strongly to them, “We are your backers.” There is some natural affinity with groups that have a more liberal social and political agenda. I think that kind of broad engagement has to be done, and I think it can now be done in a way that is much easier than it was under the authoritarian period, but we have to be very careful that we are not communicating the message that we are picking particular winners or particular losers or particular people we want to see in power.
Right now the perception in Egypt is that the international community, led by the United States but with other western countries involved, has reached an accommodation with the Brotherhood. I think that's essentially correct, but the perception in Egypt is that we can't go so far in tilting the level of engagement the other way to communicate the message that we are against the Brotherhood and that we're with the political opposition.
1:40 p.m.
NDP
Pierre Jacob NDP Brome—Missisquoi, QC
Thank you.
How would you describe the observance of the rule of law in Egypt right now?
1:40 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
I'd say it's shaky. There is a sound legal structure there. Egypt has a judicial system which at this point is a century and a half old. It is very well established within Egyptian society. Levels of litigation are extremely high. Egyptians go to courts very easily. The basic fundamental structures there are sound. They are sometimes creaky. They are sometimes slow. They are sometimes inefficient. But the basic structures are sound.
There are real problems, however. The problems have to do, I think, with going back to the security environment. If you went to an Egyptian courtroom, you would be surprised at the low level of security that is there. In the past, Egyptian courtrooms have been able to try a large number of civil and criminal cases simply with the majesty of the law and the courts, and, as I say, with a very light police presence.
There have been repeated incidents in which courtrooms have been stormed. There have been attempts to intimidate judges in which court sessions have been broken up. There is now a feeling among the Egyptian judiciary of being somewhat besieged and a little bit of a feeling that they cannot operate their courts very effectively.
There is also laid on top of that a strong tension between the presidency and the judiciary, so they feel they don't necessarily have the support of the security apparatus and of the apex of the Egyptian state.
1:40 p.m.
NDP
Pierre Jacob NDP Brome—Missisquoi, QC
Thank you.
I have one last question.
Do you think it is likely that President Morsi's government is trying to establish the facts and the responsibilities with respect to past violations of human rights?
1:40 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
No, I don't think they are trying to walk away from their responsibilities, but I don't think it's their priority right now.
The priority right now is, I think, to establish a sound political system and economy. The sorts of pressing human rights issues are ones that I think they are willing to postpone, and that is a matter of concern for me. I do take Morsi's commitment to at least [Technical Difficulty—Editor] very seriously, but I do worry that the longer he stays in power and the more his opposition background fades the less this will seem like a priority to him. So matters, for instance, of accountability for past human rights abuses have basically not been raised. That's a clear political judgment on the part of the country's senior leadership, the president and those around him, that they cannot tackle this issue right now, because there are too many other issues on the agenda.
Freedom of the press, for instance, is an area in which I think domestic criticism of Morsi is extremely strong. In my view some of that criticism is fair and some is unfair, but the fundamental underlying problem with freedom of the press and in other legal areas as well is that the authoritarian legal heritage that was so deeply entrenched in Egypt for decades is still on the books, still legally there. There almost has to be a comprehensive review of operative laws in all areas relevant to human rights. That simply has not started, and I don't see it being a priority.
1:40 p.m.
NDP
1:40 p.m.
Conservative
1:40 p.m.
Gary Schellenberger Perth—Wellington, CPC
Thank you. It's always great to be the last questioner, because all the good questions have been taken already.
You've answered a lot of the questions. I have more papers in front of me right now than most people would.
I have one question on education in Egypt. Is there segregation in the school system, or is there a public system that integrates all Egyptian children regardless of religion?
1:45 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
Basically yes, there is informal segregation in terms of housing and neighbourhoods, which would mean that Christians would tend to be concentrated in specific areas, and there would be large areas that would not have Christians.
There is also the Al-Azhar system which is alongside. It is part of the Egyptian state, but it has a religiously based Islamic curriculum, and it's a separate school system which I would guess has maybe about one-tenth of the Egyptian school-age population.
There is also a large network of private schools, some with religious affiliation and some without.
Finally, what I would say is that religious education is a mandatory subject in Egyptian schools. If you go to a school that has a mixed Muslim-Christian population, students would be separated for religious instruction.
1:45 p.m.
Perth—Wellington, CPC
You referred to the northern states where segregation was not the law but was practised anyway. I'm probably a little older than you are, and I do remember the situation in Detroit which was quite prevalent back in the 1950s. There would be white neighbourhoods and black neighbourhoods. Maybe a house on a white street would be sold to a black family, and before long all the white families moved off that street. It then became a black neighbourhood.
Does this happen in Egypt with people and religions?
1:45 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
Not as far as I know. I don't think, first, that the segregation is quite as severe. I did live in Chicago in the 1970s and the segregation there was absolutely extreme. You could go block by block. I don't think the informal segregation in Egypt is nearly that strong, nor are there the same socio-economic differences laid on top, nor is it always obvious when you see somebody on the street that somebody is Muslim or Christian.
I would say that it's probably less severe than Detroit, but it is still fairly marked. There are areas, as I say, where I don't think they're exclusively Christian areas, but there would be areas where you would find a heavy Christian concentration, and areas of the country where you would find very few Christians at all.
1:45 p.m.
Perth—Wellington, CPC
At various committee meetings we have discussed the situation in Honduras and various other places, and the rule of law is very important. It seems to me if people don't go by the law, are not law-abiding, it can cause all kinds of problems. At this time is there a judicial vacuum, or is the rule of law being followed relatively closely?
1:45 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
I don't think there is a judicial vacuum in the fundamental sense. There are courts that are active, that are trusted throughout the country. In fact, the judiciary is probably one of the country's most respected institutions. What has happened over the past two years in Egyptian life, I think, is a breakdown in, I would say, informal social control. Public behaviour has become more problematic. I don't have numbers on this and I'm not sure there are numbers, but I do know how Egyptians talk, that street crime is simply more prevalent, even carjackings and violent crime which were very rare in Egypt before, and sexual harassment on the streets, even sexual assault on the streets. Those sorts of things are increasingly common in Egypt. There's a feeling of decreased personal security which I think affects people's perception of the rule of law.
In a sense the structure is still there and the structure is sound, and there's plenty of confidence in the personnel who man that structure, but there's much less of a perception that if you go out the door of your house, you're operating in an environment in which the rule of law prevails on a normal daily level.
1:45 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
As before? Yes. There has been virtually no change in the judiciary. It's a very, very strong institution. When the 2012 constitution was written, it changed the composition of the constitutional court, but that was about it. If anything, the judiciary has gained some autonomy, I think, since 2011. It used to be that the president had a very strong set of informal tools by which he could influence the judiciary. Those, I think, have dissipated, so if anything, the judiciary would be a more powerful institution, or at least have more autonomy now from the executive than it did previously.
1:50 p.m.
Perth—Wellington, CPC
Unemployment in Egypt right now is fairly high, or is it relatively in a good spot? Again, this will cause problems in these various neighbourhoods. What do you see going forward for employment?
1:50 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
I think that's an absolutely critical issue. When you go back to 2011 and how is it that Egyptians understood and what it was that they did in 2011, they often talk about it as a revolution of the youth, and the youth who were.... In a sense, there was a generational change in Egypt. This generation of youth was going to be much less deferential, but there was also a strong sense that the society had failed its youth. It was providing bad education. It was not providing housing. It was not generating jobs at the level at which it was producing children.
As a result, this was not simply an unemployment problem, but a particularly severe unemployment problem among Egyptian youth and those people who wanted to enter the labour market, and really at all levels, including people who were well qualified and at college graduate levels. There was a sense in 2011—again, this was primarily youth who led the revolution—that the political system had failed them, that they needed to build a new political system, one that was responsive not to the needs of a few officials, or the president, or the narrow group around him, but to the broader society.
I think an awful lot of the disillusionment in Egypt with the current state of the political process is that it simply hasn't led in that direction at all. They've managed to bring down the old rule, but they do not have a political system that is capable, at least so far, of generating employment opportunities for this generation of Egyptian youth that led the revolution.
1:50 p.m.
Perth—Wellington, CPC
For my last question, if I may, we had some people commenting on Honduras the other day. In Honduras, 54% of the population is under the age of 15. The daily wage averages $2. Looking forward, I think that five years from now in Honduras the average age of 60% of the population, or maybe 65%, will be under 20.
Is there a big population of young people in Egypt that makes it very difficult for the government to get ahead and have those jobs for those people?
1:50 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
Yes. I don't know what the exact figures are in Egypt, but I suspect you're dealing with a very similar kind of situation.
1:50 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Scott Reid
Thank you.
We have time for a final round of questions. Monsieur Jacob has told me that he has one question, so I suggest that we go to him first. Then we'll go to Mr. Sweet.
1:50 p.m.
NDP
Pierre Jacob NDP Brome—Missisquoi, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My next question is for Professor Brown.
In a speech delivered at the United Nations in New York in September 2012, President Morsi said:
Egypt would like to stress that the international system will not get fixed as long as the application of double standards remains. We expect from others, as they expect from us, that they respect our cultural particularities and religious points of reference, and not seek to impose concepts that are unacceptable to us or politicize certain issues and use them as a pretext to intervene in the affairs of others.
In terms of promoting human rights and Egypt's transition to democracy, how should we interpret President Morsi's statement?
1:50 p.m.
Professor, Political Science, George Washington University, As an Individual
As an extremely guarded attitude towards international human rights instruments that deal with very specific issues, I think, and I would say most particularly gender. The most relevant political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, for instance, specifically cited in its campaign platform the convention on economic discrimination against women as a document that it was uncomfortable with.
I don't think it's an attempt to question international human rights standards across the board. As I say, especially in the political sphere, the brotherhood has accommodated itself to those, but I think especially when you get into the issue of gender relations, that's when they begin to get very suspicious and start looking at the fine print.
The fact is that Islamic personal status law is a gendered law. You have different rights according to whether or not you are male or female. That is something that is very hard for them to get around, and something that they regard as based on divine instruction, and not the sort of thing that the United Nations should be telling them not to do.
1:55 p.m.
NDP