Evidence of meeting #74 for Subcommittee on International Human Rights in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was commission.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Michael Kergin  As an Individual
Sonia Wayand  Assistant, As an Individual
Rolando Sierra  As an Individual

1:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Scott Reid

Our members of the committee would like to ask you some questions.

We'll go first to Mr. Scott from the New Democrats.

Mr. Scott, why don't you begin. We'll give you six minutes.

1:40 p.m.

NDP

Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON

Mr. Chair, is it okay if I focus on Mr. Kergin?

1:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Scott Reid

It is your choice who you focus upon. You're next on the list.

1:40 p.m.

NDP

Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON

Mr. Kergin, thank you ever so much for—

1:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Scott Reid

I might just inform our witness, if you don't mind. I'm not sure Mr. Sierra knows that.

1:40 p.m.

NDP

Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON

Okay.

1:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Scott Reid

Mr. Sierra, I should explain for your benefit, because I don't know if you know this, there are two witnesses here. You are one. The other witness is Michael Kergin, who is physically present in the room in Ottawa. The member who is about to ask a question will be putting his question to Mr. Kergin.

1:40 p.m.

NDP

Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Just also for full disclosure—Mr. Kergin knows this—I was a member, until elected, of the alternative commission in Honduras. So we share a role, in some sense, but my commission was a civil society one, and plagued with difficulties different from yours, probably.

I just want to ask three or four questions and then have you respond as you would like. Otherwise we might not get to them.

First, Mr. Kergin, given what you found out about Honduras and what exists now, did the commission consider, and do you think it's a good idea to have, something like what we have in Guatemala, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala? I know that the Canadian government has shown some interest in that. Is it still on the table, and should it be?

Second, I understand that the UNDP was engaged at one point by the commission to prepare a human rights report. It's not clear whether that actually is a public document. I just want to know if it's available.

To my third question, I think I know the answer, because we were having the same evidentiary difficulties. Was there any evidence at all that came forward to you, that you found credible, on U.S. government or American involvement in the coup? That's American as in “Americans”, not necessarily government.

Finally, as I think we discussed at one point in our former existence, at the alternative commission we were subject to—not so much me, but my colleagues—serious harassment and intimidation. We were focused on human rights violations as they occurred, not just up to Mr. Lobo's inauguration but afterwards, which could explain part of the attention that was paid to us.

Our two Honduran commissioners had to flee the country. We had an attempted assassination of the head of our security team. There was an explosion in our San Pedro office, mock machine gun battles outside of our Tegucigalpa headquarters, and a military officer threatening witnesses in Washington who were members of the commission.

Did your commission experience anything approximating that, or does what I describe sort of resonate with something that's plausible in terms of what you know about Honduran society?

1:45 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

Let me take each one of those very quickly, and in order.

Very much so we recommended that there should be a committee on impunity. We felt that what was going on in Guatemala was actually quite an effective help by the international community. Mr. Stein, who was our chair, of course, knew it quite well, being a Guatemalan.

It is one of our recommendations. I do not know if it has been adopted or not. I believe the government actually requested it, but where it went from there, I'm afraid I just don't know.

Second, on the human rights reports, yes, we asked the UNDP to select four human rights experts. They did a report. I think it is with UNDP headquarters. It was quite extensive. It was longer than...so we melded it a bit into our own report. We didn't attach it as a separate report. I suppose we could have done it as an annex, and I don't recall why we didn't, but we felt we took the essence of it and put it into our own words. That was our job. But I do believe it may be at UN headquarters in New York. I think that's the case.

Regarding evidence of the United States government participating in the coup, we didn't find any. There were rumours that the plane that took Zelaya to Costa Rica was refuelled, and that the Americans knew about this. I happen to know the U.S. ambassador quite well from a previous life and so forth, and I have no reason to believe, having asked him directly if they had foreknowledge or if they were in any way.... But the U.S. government is pretty big and it has a lot of different arms, so I honestly don't know. We certainly would not have put that in our report, because we had no evidence that the U.S. was involved in the expulsion or the coup part of it.

With respect to the harassment question, we did not find we were harassed. Of course we were a creature, in a sense, by a decree-law of the government, and our standing was fairly well known. If there had been any sense of harassment, there obviously would have been a pretty large amount of publicity about it. We weren't harassed at any time.

We had high security, because we were worried about drug dealers and so on in some of these remote areas, and we'd just go through in our cars at about 150 kilometres an hour. Things could be quite sticky in some of the areas, but I think that was more drug-related than related to our own situation as human rights commissioners.

I suppose you do have a kind of parallel group in Honduras of maybe former military, who maybe have links with the current military, or certainly with the police, and they would turn a blind eye, which could involve harassment for one's group. I'd be surprised if it happened in Washington, but it wouldn't surprise me if you say your colleagues had difficulties of that nature, that they might have been perpetrated by these parallel organizations, or paramilitary organizations, or para-police organizations—the wink wink, nudge nudge sort of thing. I wouldn't think it would be happening with official sanction of the presidential palace, but it could possibly be happening.

1:45 p.m.

NDP

Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON

Just to fill it out, the—

1:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Scott Reid

Actually, I'm sorry, we did turn the clock off to allow the intervention, and we're still over time.

Mr. Sweet, you are next.

1:45 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

Thank you very much.

I just want to do something unusual. If Mr. Scott feels he would like to rebut anything regarding any question, I'd like him to feel free to do so, because not being intimately involved with the two commissions.... Mr. Scott might be able to shed some light on some things.

Were you surprised, Mr. Kergin, after you did the work? You listed 450 days, 300 meetings, 20 town halls, 50,000 pages of documents, 900 video.... You did a substantial amount of work. Were you surprised afterwards that there were citizens' groups calling for more investigation, and that they felt there were some things that were whitewashed?

1:50 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

To be candid with you, I wasn't aware that there were groups asking that more be done. The commission that Scott was involved with was going on at about the same time. So I can't really answer your question, because I wasn't really aware that there were groups that were seriously saying there had to be more and more done. I'm just not aware of that.

1:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

Was there anything significant regarding recommendations that came from your commission's investigations that were different from those of the second citizens' commission?

1:50 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

I would have to ask him. I don't think I've ever seen any results of that commission, so I'm not in a position....

I think if they reported that, it was much later, and I'm afraid I was not dealing with Honduras at that time.

1:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

Mr. Scott, did you want to comment on that?

1:50 p.m.

NDP

Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON

No, but I'd be happy to talk at some other point, and it could enter into the evidence if it would be helpful.

1:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

Okay, thank you, Mr. Scott.

To your knowledge, did the OAS review their decision? You mentioned that their decision to “out” Honduras...it appears to me now in hindsight to have caused a lot more issues than it solved. Has there been a review of the decision at the OAS and what they would do in the future?

1:50 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

Interestingly enough, I can't answer would they have, but we, in our report, were rather critical. We had a section on international. Time prevented me from getting into it in any detail, but we were very critical that the OAS moved as quickly as they did in expelling Honduras. The secretary general of the OAS came to Honduras within 24 hours of the coup, but refused to meet with anybody except for the judiciary. Therefore, he wasn't able to have—and he was prevented by a decision of the council of the OAS to enter into—any discussions with anybody perceived as being in charge of the coup, i.e., the legislature, Micheletti and company, or the executive branch or the head of the legislature of the party.

He was not able to provide a dialogue, and of course those people in charge, if they weren't able to dialogue with the OAS and couldn't talk to them...it meant that the OAS was not in a position to broker any kind of an arrangement. To some extent, it reinforced the isolated, almost paranoid, feeling of this small country, when the big countries like Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina had obviously worked the council to stop any kind of communication or mediation type of role.

1:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

Okay. My next question was going to be what precipitated such a swift decision, but you feel that....

1:50 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

Yes, it came very much from Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil. These were countries who were very supportive of Mr. Zelaya and tried, in fact, to bring him back into the country at one point, sometime in August 2009. I think that, being a small country, the Hondurans felt they were being put upon by the big players outside.

1:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

Neither you nor, as Mr. Scott had mentioned in his preamble to his question, the commissions had the capability to subpoena—

1:50 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

No, we did not.

1:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Sweet Conservative Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON

—to demand that people testify. You mentioned this handful of families who have a significant play in business and media, etc. On their own volition, did they testify at either commission?

1:50 p.m.

As an Individual

Michael Kergin

Yes, they did. The only person we asked who didn't appear before the commission was the former president, Mr. Zelaya. We talked to the senior financial groups, and some of Mr. Zelaya’s ministers appeared before us, certainly. But Mr. Zelaya himself did not. We had pretty good access to most of the players from the time of the coup.