Evidence of meeting #3 for Subcommittee on International Human Rights in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was conflict.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
My question is for Mr. Unruh, or maybe Mr. Medani.
I may be mistaken, but it seems to me that the African Union—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Sorry, Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe. Perhaps you could ask that question during the next round.
Ms. Kronis, you have the floor for five minutes, please.
Conservative
Tamara Kronis Conservative Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC
Thank you.
I want to thank all the witnesses and those who have come today to bear witness to the witnesses. You're experiencing an awful lot of pain. The crisis is heartbreaking. The witnesses have provided a lot of helpful updates about the nature of the crisis.
Dr. Babb, I'd like to ask you about some of the structural features of the conflict and some of the governance issues in Sudan. As you know, just about a month ago, we got the first substantive ICC decision, I think, at the trial level, where Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman was convicted of 27 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. That's important, because those decisions really do document for history what happened largely in Darfur in 2003-04 around the so-called emergency plan that was constructed after the El Fasher airport attack.
To set the stage a little bit more, as you know, the ICC is intended to complement, not replace, national criminal systems. The principle of complementarity has the ICC stepping in when states don't or are unwilling to genuinely prosecute crimes in their territory. What concerns me is that since that time frame in the early 2000s, things have just continued to get worse, notwithstanding the presence of some international justice mechanisms there. The reports that I've received have indicated that notwithstanding transitional constitutional activity or reform agenda, any reform in the legislative branch is still stalled. Attempts at civilian governments are repeatedly derailed.
I'm wondering what your view is of Sudan's capacity for governance. How do we get out of this? What is the capacity for governance in 2025? What is the state of the judiciary domestically? We've had 25 years of civil society being ripped apart in Sudan. What do we need to do to regain some form of governance capacity in Sudan?
Director of the Promised Land Program and Strategic Adviser to Doctors Against Racism and Antisemitism, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
Again, I'll be brief. Well, I think I'm usually brief. I don't know if I actually am.
Director of the Promised Land Program and Strategic Adviser to Doctors Against Racism and Antisemitism, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
I do think.... I don't want to divert to Professor Medani, but he would probably be better suited to answer this question.
As you noted, the international bodies that are supposed to be charged with upholding international law are not what they were some time ago, so it seems, evidently, and we're seeing that in other areas that are experiencing conflict.
In terms of internally to Sudan, the country has, as was noted earlier, a very rich and storied history of civil society. That is a great strength of Sudan. We need to find ways to empower them, uplift them and put them in positions where they can see a transition away from this carnage, which is really a war between—as we so often see in war—men who are power-hungry and are driven by perverse ideologies and desires. If we can find ways to uphold international humanitarian law and do as much as we can for civil society, then we'll probably be in a better situation.
In Sudan, these structural issues go back decades. Even when there is a pause in fighting, these issues persist.
Conservative
Tamara Kronis Conservative Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC
I want to take this opportunity to turn to Dr. Medani to elaborate a tiny bit in the little bit of time I have left.
The headwinds that the ICC and international society are facing are the usual ones, but they're legion here. The lack of co-operation from Sudanese authorities makes it hard to gather evidence; it makes it hard to get the evidence you need to be able to do trials. There's the ongoing conflict and security on the ground. There are the resource constraints. There are the usual problems with arrest warrants that I personally remember from a previous life when I was involved in this work. There are the issues around the protection of victims and witnesses. There is the blocking of humanitarian aid by all sides and the weaponization of aid. Then there are all kinds of allegations that international parties are arming one side or another.
What's the path forward?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Excuse me. The time is over, but I'll give you 45 seconds because the question is important.
Go ahead...but no more.
Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the African Studies Program, McGill University, As an Individual
I'll repeat the question: What's the path forward with respect to the governance structures and those kinds of elements?
Conservative
Tamara Kronis Conservative Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC
Yes, it's this question around governance. How do you find the truth that's going to enable the reconciliation, for lack of a better word?
Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the African Studies Program, McGill University, As an Individual
First of all, it's not easy, but it's in patches. The Yale laboratory, for example, is doing these things. This is very important for accountability. You have human rights activists on the ground, as well as journalists and others I prefer not to mention in open source, whatever you call it. That's very important. Civil society around the country—
Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the African Studies Program, McGill University, As an Individual
The judiciary has been decimated—there's no question. All of that is absolutely true. This has been a real objective of the war. When I began and said that this is a war against civilians, it was to actually decimate not only the infrastructure of the country but also civil society and those institutions. In that sense, it is a horrendous war in a way that is difficult to describe beyond even the numbers.
Having said that, in other countries like Somalia, where I worked, and others, the Sudanese diaspora here and elsewhere is extremely.... It has very high capacity, just like it does in Somalia and Somaliland, for example.
Canada actually worked for capacity building in terms of the South Sudanese diaspora. That didn't work for political reasons, but not because it was a bad idea. That's why a Sudan working group—if you don't mind me reiterating—that brings the expertise together to facilitate this kind of capacity building is important. That's part of the peacebuilding phase. It's one, two, three. Other countries have implemented this.
However, I am not going to sit here and say that there isn't decimation in—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Professor Medani.
Ms. Dhillon, you have the floor for five minutes, please.
Liberal
Anju Dhillon Liberal Dorval—Lachine—LaSalle, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will start with Mr. Unruh.
You were speaking about something very interesting that nobody mentioned before about the underlying Darfur conflicts. Even if Sudan is globally resolved, there are still those underlying issues. Could you please elaborate on those?
Professor and Director, Department of Geography, McGill University East Africa Field Studies Semester, As an Individual
Certainly.
Initially, in the first Darfur conflict, which was around 2003 or so, what was thought to be one of the primary drivers of that conflict was climate change, which drove a lot of the nomadic population south from the Sahara into central and southern Darfur. They interacted with the farming population over grazing resources.
Previously, there was a lot of north-south movement seasonally by the nomadic population. They would come down into the farming areas using corridors that everybody knew about and they would interact with the farming population. There were agreements between the two with regard to when they would enter the agricultural areas and graze and when they would not. That was fairly resilient up until the time when the Sudanese government decided to change things and favour the nomadic population. Now they could enter the farming areas anywhere they wanted, ignore the previous rules, the governance structures and the customary land rights restrictions that were there, and do what they wanted. That really aggravated, in an earlier way, the ongoing conflict.
That's a tough one to solve. It's difficult to get back to a situation where everybody knows the rules and you can co-operate on coming and going.
It does resonate today, though, in terms of civil society. There is a high value there. The Sudanese civil society is robust. We saw in 2009, out of that UN effort, many of what we call “mini peace accords” between one constituency and others, with constituencies supporting opposite sides in the conflict. They know each other. The constituency of the RSF knows who the constituency of the farming population is. They live amongst each other. They have descendants and relatives, so they would stitch together a small peace accord amongst themselves. There would be commerce back and forth, etc., and they would agree to these things.
Once we saw one, we started to ask where else they were. They were, in fact, sprinkled around the area.
Supporting that would be an interesting effort. There's a lot of capacity internationally that has direct access to those constituencies on the ground. That could actually be used.
With the civil society there that actually belongs to opposite constituencies in this conflict, you could, from the outside, ask what they need. More importantly, you could actually ask them what they have for us, such as evidence of what they're witnessing getting to the outside. It could be proposals for what would they suggest in terms of an on-the-ground, civil society effort involving women and others to stitch together these small-scale, constituency mini accords where the constituencies are on the opposite sides of the conflict.
That's a sort of bottom-up effort that can be done. You'd have to pair that with top-down sanctioning of actual combatants that are active on the ground.
Liberal
Anju Dhillon Liberal Dorval—Lachine—LaSalle, QC
Thank you so much. That was going to be my next question for you.
I see Dr. Medani nodding as well. Would you like to add to that about civil society? You mentioned it's the people—millions of civilians—who wish to have peace and resolve this issue.
I see behind us that the room is full today. I thank the audience very much and members of the community who came and took the time to listen to this very important testimony and show us that they're here in solidarity.
Would you like to pick up on this, Dr. Medani?
Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the African Studies Program, McGill University, As an Individual
I would like to say that these traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are extremely robust. My colleague knows far more than I do as he's a geographer, but I am in Darfur and I have seen it with my own eyes. It is not only in Darfur, but elsewhere.
I wanted to jump in to say something about the way forward. Underlying all of this—conflict resolution at the grassroots and the multilateralism—is something that is very important and the ultimate objective. I have to be cautious about saying this, but the ultimate objective is a civilian democracy.
In the context, globally, where there is disillusionment with democracy, particularly in that region but also in the west, it's interesting to see that both warring parties are, in their rhetoric, talking about a democratic transition. I know it's hard to believe, but that represents their desperate attempt to get legitimacy because they know domestically that this is ultimately what the Sudanese people want. Also, it's good, at least for the time being, that this is agreed upon by the Quad, the majority of which are not democratic countries.
That becomes a very important aspect of the way forward.
What role can Canada play? I can't give too much advice except to say that what is being talked about is the rule of law, federalism and constitutionalism. Those are the beginnings of what many Sudanese.... Even now, at least in rhetoric and discourse, the regional actors, who are not pro-democracy as such, are actually signing on the dotted line for a transition towards a civilian democracy. I think that's important.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Professor Medani.
Now we have Mr. Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe.
You have five minutes.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I'm going to ask the witnesses a question, but they are obviously not obliged to answer it.
The government released Canada's Africa strategy just before the election. The document is about 18 pages long. Sudan is mentioned perhaps once or twice, at most.
Do you think the strategy is consequential enough?
Should Canada adopt this strategy for the entire continent?
Does this point to a misunderstanding of the humanitarian crisis that's happening in Sudan and of the role Canada should play there? The Africa strategy document is barely 18 pages long.
Mr. Medani, I'll go to you first, then to Mr. Lawson.
Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the African Studies Program, McGill University, As an Individual
My colleague Jon and I share something, and that is that we are both part of McGill University's African studies program. I think I can speak for both of us here and say that it's not nearly enough, but then the rest will be my point of view.
Not to say too much about the Africa strategy, but it's very.... I'm not sure what the peace and security component is, and I can't tell you what the insider discussions are. All I can say is that the issue of peace and security is not a marginal thing. It's not exclusively a soft power thing.
It is something that Canada has a great advantage in because of its neutrality in these contexts. It is not a superpower like the United States, but certainly, with respect to resolving conflicts, to engaging with African leaders, IGAD and the African Union, that is something that is under-theorized, let's just say, in the document, so one questions how serious Canada is with respect to the Africa strategy.
I think it is the wave of the future. China knows it, and so does the United Arab Emirates, which is the fourth-largest investor in Africa. The Africa strategy should be more robust and, of course, Sudan and the Sahel should be central, because that region of Africa is actually the most wealthy in terms of natural resources.
You can correct me if I'm wrong, Jon.
Humanitarian Representative to Canada, Doctors Without Borders
As a representative of an international aid organization, I'm not going to speak to the geopolitical value of Canada's Africa strategy, but I will say that the fact it exists is important, as is the fact that Canada recognizes that there is engagement needed in Africa. A huge portion of the work we do takes place in Africa.
One thing we would note is that in any strategy for engagement, humanitarian assistance and the need to address the large number of humanitarian crises and conflicts that remain on the African continent are of paramount importance. Whatever the strategy that brings Canada there, it is essential for humanitarian assistance to remain a fundamental component of how Canada engages with different parts of the world, including very much in Africa, where we continue to see an overrepresentation of conflict and crises.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you.
I didn't have enough time to ask my next question earlier. Here it is.
You are, of course, experts on the African continent and everything that is happening there. I may be mistaken, but I get the sense we're talking about the silence of the international community.
Am I mistaken, or is the African Union also very silent on the current crisis in Sudan?
Would you shed some light on that for me, please?
Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the African Studies Program, McGill University, As an Individual
I'm going to keep talking if you ask me questions. That's my problem. That's what I get paid for. I apologize.
The African Union is very compromised. The problem is that the leaderships of the African Union and IGAD have taken sides. That's the perception, at least. Long story short—the Kenyan government is seen to be taking sides with the Rapid Support Forces. At an inopportune time, Museveni hosted the head of the Rapid Support Forces. What they did is something that peacemakers cannot do in the context of war, I think, and that is to show bias. That really undermined the negotiations. Within the African Union, they are a collection of countries. They have represented their biases and that has undermined the kind of coordinated and coherent coalition you need to negotiate a peace.
What does that mean? That means that.... I don't want to keep returning to Canada. What that usually means is that a third party has to come in there, whether it is in Europe or elsewhere, or in Canada, in order to actually reformulate that process and give more legitimacy, even to the IGAD and the African Union. An example, of course, in this instance, would be that the IGAD and the African Union now affirm their support for the Quad and its framework, because their framework was, of course, compromised.
That outside third party angle is why we are asking Canada to be part of this process, despite the criticism and tensions. This is about Africa and a very different conflict—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Professor Medani.
Mr. Majumdar, you have the floor for five minutes.