Good morning, Mr. Chair, honourable members of the committee and staff.
Thanks for the invitation to appear before you today.
My name is Angelo DiCaro, and I work as a national representative and trade policy analyst in the research department at Unifor. I do apologize if folks were expecting our national president, Jerry Dias, to be here. I know he livens things up quite a bit. You have a good second prize from Unifor in this case, so I apologize for that.
For folks who don't know, Unifor is Canada's largest union in the private sector. We represent about 315,000 members who work in nearly every industrial sector, including trade-dependent sectors such as auto, auto parts, various manufacturing, forestry and resources.
As many know, Unifor was a fully engaged stakeholder in the NAFTA renegotiation process. Unifor and its predecessor unions have been staunch critics of the NAFTA and trade agreements like it, agreements that have bestowed extraordinary privileges upon investors, and agreements that have forced competitive imbalance with often unscrupulous trading partners to the detriment of workers and fundamental labour rights.
For our union, the occasion of NAFTA's renegotiation was a once-in-a-generation opportunity to shift our trade priorities, fashion a deal that corrected some of the worst aspects of trade policy and signalled that trade reform is not only desirable but also necessary.
We know Canada's trade performance has weakened, that economic inequality festers and access to good jobs has become more fleeting. Without overstating it, under CUSMA, there is some reason for optimism.
The new deal strikes down controversial investor-state dispute settlement privileges under NAFTA's chapter 11. This is the first time we have done that in any Canadian trade pact. The new deal deal eliminates so-called proportionality rules that sought to limit Canada's management of energy production and exports. It preserves, as was stated, a very necessary cultural policy carve-out, despite sustained and very real pressure by the U.S. media industry to whittle this down. It also corrects a broadcast policy misstep of the previous federal government on the issue of simultaneous substitution that is spelled out in Bill C-100, which is very welcome news.
To some degree, the CUSMA acknowledges the failings of current trade treaties, notably the CPTPP, and their inability to promote fundamental labour rights. The final text on labour standards is far superior to the NAFTA in its current form, although it's still at a distance from the initial and very ambitious text that was sought by Canada's negotiators.
Bill C-100 spells out the conditions in the SIMA, for instance, that make preferential tariffs now impermissible in cases of forced labour. That change is long overdue and must now apply to all of our trading partners.
Important labour law reforms prescribed within a special annex swing a sledgehammer at what is a broken and rotted Mexican industrialization system. Compliance measures introduced by the Mexican Senate are a good first step, but they do need regular, careful and proactive oversight and enforcement to be meaningful.
On auto, as was explained in the previous panel, the CUSMA sets bold new standards for made-in-North America cars and parts as well as a never before seen market access condition premised on high-wage labour. The terms are complex, and they are not without flaws, but are nonetheless a market departure from standard trade rules that have failed to grow and support our auto sector.
All that said, there is no denying there are concerns with this deal. New market access rights to the Canadian dairy market clearly threaten farmers, while extended patent terms for life-saving drugs originally conceded to the U.S. in the first iteration of the trans-Pacific partnership is, in our view, a step backward. Any opportunity to reverse course on these treaty terms and concessions should be carefully considered by the federal government prior to CUSMA coming into effect.
On the handful of key measures that I have noted above, the CUSMA is an encouraging departure from the original NAFTA. The expression of advanced progressive priorities in trade negotiations is an important shift in Canada's policy frame and one we hope will continue.
Does the CUSMA signal a progressive reshaping of trade policy in Canada? No. Was such an objective even feasible under the current U.S. administration? Probably not. What we have, though, is a renewed understanding that alternative approaches to trade policy matter, that the evolution of trade terms is not something that's predetermined or preordained and that good ideas can surface with proper dialogue and a government that's willing to listen.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to any questions you might have.