Thank you, Madam Chair, and good afternoon.
As you heard, my name is Michael Geist. I'm a law professor at the University of Ottawa, where I hold the Canada research chair in Internet and e-commerce law. I'm also a member of the Centre for Law, Technology and Society. My areas of specialty include digital policy, intellectual property, privacy and the Internet. I appear today in a personal capacity, representing only my own views.
As you know, the typical approach before committee on a bill study is to examine the bill and identify provisions to support and areas for amendment. In this case, however, what really matters is not what is in the bill, but what is not. Indeed, the most notable issues from a digital policy perspective won't be found in Bill C-4. Rather, they are found in the new NAFTA itself, and they typically limit Canada's policy options for future reforms rather than require immediate legislative action. I think this raises a significant challenge, since the flawed aspects of the deal cannot, to my knowledge, be fixed in Bill C-4. Rather, they require change in a trade agreement that has been largely presented as a take-it-or-leave-it deal.
I'd like to briefly discuss four issues along these lines: copyright term extension, the cultural exemption, privacy and data protection, and Internet platform liability.
First is copyright term extension. The intellectual property provisions in the agreement raise some significant concerns, but none more so than the requirement to extend the term of copyright from the international standard of the life of the author plus 50 years to life plus 70. The additional 20 years is a reform that Canada rightly resisted for decades. By caving on the issue, the agreement represents a major windfall that could run into the hundreds of millions of dollars for rights holders and creates the need to recalibrate Canadian copyright law to restore the balance.
The independent data on copyright term extension is unequivocal: It results in less access to works, higher costs for consumers and no incentive for new creativity. In the words of Paul Heald, one of the leading researchers on the effects of term extension, it effectively represents a tax on consumers to the benefit of publishers with no obligation to benefit the public.
The copyright review that was conducted by the industry committee in the last Parliament included an extensive review into the issue and concluded that extension should only occur as part of a trade agreement ratification. In such a circumstance, it recommended establishing a registration requirement to obtain the additional 20 years of protection to mitigate against the disadvantages of term extension and increase the overall transparency of the copyright system.
Copyright term extension does not appear in Bill C-4 because the government, I think, smartly negotiated a 30-month transition period to address the issue. The government has not rushed into term extension, and it should take full advantage of the transition period to follow the copyright review recommendation by establishing the registration requirement for the additional 20 years. That would allow rights holders who want the additional protection to get it, while also ensuring that many other works enter into the public domain after their term has expired, after life plus 50.
Second is the cultural exemption. Now, much like the copyright term extension, there is no reference to the cultural exemption in Bill C-4, and that's because the cultural exemption doesn't require legislative reform. However, I'd argue that the exemption is one of the most poorly understood aspects of the agreement. Consistent with the government claims, the cultural exemption covers a broad range of sectors, with a near complete exemption for Canada.
However, while the government has emphasized its broad scope, it rarely speaks of subarticle 32.6(4), which comes immediately afterward. That provision was the price of the exemption, and it permits the U.S. to levy retaliatory measures of “equivalent commercial effect” where Canada relies upon the exemption. The retaliatory measures provision means that the U.S. is entitled to levy tariffs or other measures that have an equivalent commercial effect in response to Canadian policies that would otherwise violate the new NAFTA if not for the exemption.
Since the provision does not limit the response to the cultural sector, the U.S. can be expected to target sensitive areas in the Canadian economy, such as dairy or steel, in order to discourage the use of the exemption. That was the U.S. strategy when it recently responded to a French plan to levy a new digital tax: The U.S. planned to levy $2.4 billion in tariffs against French goods such as wine, cheese and handbags.
How could that play out in a Canadian policy context? The recent report of the broadcasting and telecommunications legislative review panel, the so-called Yale report, contains what I view as many ill-advised recommendations on regulating the Internet and online news services, such as news aggregators.
Should the government adopt the broadcast panel recommendations on content, the U.S. would have a strong case for permitting retaliation with measures of equivalent commercial effect. Panel proposals that may violate the new trade agreement include requirements to pay levies to fund Canadian content without full access to the same funding mechanisms enjoyed by Canadians, licensing requirements for Internet services that may violate NAFTA standards, and discoverability requirements that limit the manner in which information is conveyed on websites and services.
I'll emphasize that I think this is bad policy that should be rejected. However, for the purposes of this review of the new NAFTA, note that the policy flexibility to enact reforms in this area is severely limited by the agreement, which establishes the possibility of retaliatory tariffs for cultural policy.
Third is privacy. The limitations of new Canadian policy also arise in the context of privacy and data protection. Unlike the cultural exemption, which permits violations of the treaty subject to potential retaliatory tariffs, on the issue of privacy Canada would run the risk of being offside of its commitment under the new NAFTA.
Note, again, that there is no provision on point in Bill C-4. There is no need for one, since the new NAFTA prohibits certain privacy-related provisions, rather than requiring them.
For example, the new NAFTA includes a provision that prohibits data localization, which refers to measures requiring the data to be stored in Canada. The new NAFTA actually features a more restrictive provision than the one found in the CPTPP. There are some general exceptions that build in GATS-related rules, but the Canadian government will clearly be restricted in its ability to establish localization requirements under the agreement.
The implications of this limitation are far-reaching. With respect to data right now, consider the wide range of policy issues we're grappling with, whether that's Canada's digital charter and the proposals for privacy and data reforms, concerns around data sovereignty, AI-related issues, or fears about the competitiveness of Canadian businesses in relation to Canadian data.
It's notable that the Canadian government itself has established localization requirements as part of its cloud computing policy. Indeed, there is a recognition that data localization may be needed in some circumstances. Yet under this agreement, Canada is severely limited in terms of its ability to implement such requirements.
The same is true on the issue of data transfers, as the new NAFTA limits our ability to restrict them as well. As we enter into discussions with the European Union about the adequacy of Canadian privacy laws, there are concerns that the data transfer provision could put Canada between a proverbial privacy rock and a hard place, with the EU demanding certain restrictions on data transfers and the new NAFTA prohibiting them.
Finally, there is Internet platform liability. A similar dynamic arises in the context of Internet platform liability, which raises the question of what responsibility lies with Internet companies for third party content hosted on their sites. This issue captures large players, such as Google and Facebook, alongside anyone who offers user comments or content. Once again, there is no provision on this issue in Bill C-4. The reason it isn't there is that the new NAFTA restricts policy in the area rather than requiring a new provision.
The new NAFTA includes a legal safe harbour for Internet intermediaries and platforms for content posted by their users. The rule is designed to provide the platforms with immunity from liability both for the removal of content and for the failure to remove content. Contrary to some claims, the rule doesn't mean that “everything goes”. Sites and services are still subject to court orders and the enforcement of criminal law. Intellectual property rights enforcement is also exempted.
However, there are some who argue that the responsibility of Internet platforms should go further, with potential liability for failure to act even in cases of harmful, albeit legal, content. That position raises important freedom of expression concerns and questions about how to balance free speech safeguards with protection from harm.
The issue for a review in Bill C-4 is not to debate where Canada should land on the issue. For example, the broadcast panel recommended liability for online harms, even if the content is legal. Others, including myself, would argue that liability should rest with illegal content, but to create liability for legal content is to render Internet companies judge and jury over what remains online, thereby further empowering those large Internet companies, as well as limiting competition and freedom of speech.
The key point here is that there is a policy debate to be had. Under the new NAFTA, Canada has effectively already committed to a position, one that restricts our ability to establish liability for third party content.
I look forward to your questions.