Thank you. It's a pleasure to be back here, Madam Chair and members.
Where are we, and how did we get here?
We're discussing the attributes of the new NAFTA, having negotiated at an unprecedented speed and with a heretofore unseen bellicose and belligerent trading partner. This partner, our celebrated best friend, the United States, was bent on disrupting the global trading order with little regard for precedent or consequence.
It's important to understand context. We're not debating an academic study written in a vacuum to be picked apart by subject matter experts. We're here to discuss what happened in the real world from 2015 to 2019 to get us to where we are today. Members of this committee will be among the only ones tasked with voting to ratify the new agreement, or not. There is no vehicle for renegotiation, adjustment or request for discussions with the two other trading partners. You are faced with an up or down vote through no fault of your own or of the government that negotiated it.
It is what it is, and there are no surprises in it. The text of the agreement signed in October 2018 has been available online since November 2018. The text of the revisions negotiated between parties as a condition of U.S. congressional support was signed in November 2019 and available online since December 2019.
From August 2017 through September 2018, parties met in Washington, Ottawa, Montreal and Mexico City repeatedly, and I was present at every single round, including the December 2017 “this isn't really a round” round. I met with officials before, during and after every single round, and I did more than 600 on-the-record media hits on what we were looking for and what we needed to see. There were no surprises.
For the third time in the lifespan of these negotiations, I'm here again at committee to share candid thoughts and positions that probably every one of you knows I hold.
In June of 2015 at the infamous Trump Tower escalator speech where he announced his candidacy for Republican nominee for President of the United States, Donald Trump said this about the Ford Motor Company investment in Mexico:
...every car and every truck and every part manufactured that comes across the border, we're going to charge you a 35-percent tax...and that tax is going to be paid simultaneously with the transaction, and that's it.
We were in the middle of exhausting TPP negotiations that resulted in a flawed document in October later that year. In a New York Times piece that described the TPP as “subject of future political battles in the United States and elsewhere”, I was quoted as saying, “Anybody who is championing gains or who is forecasting losses is way ahead of themselves.”
In February 2016, Donald Trump declared that, if he won, he would extract the U.S. from it and its status as the defacto NAFTA update was put into question. In July of 2016, when challenged that his tariff plans would not pass WTO muster and his TPP withdrawal threat would be costly, candidate Trump said, “Then we're going to renegotiate or we're going to pull out”. Lumping in NAFTA he said, “These trade deals are a disaster. You know, the World Trade Organization is a disaster.”
We were warned in plain sight what a President Trump would do and mean for our trading relationship. Still, no one thought he would win at that point, thinking he was at best an ill-informed soon to be former candidate.
I took his election threat seriously. In September 2016, I led a delegation of Canadian automotive suppliers to Capitol Hill in Washington to speak to senior senators and staffers about the implications of a Trumpian reset on trade. I met with the USTR on his threat to pull out of TPP, which I had hoped for because it reduced the regional value content on automotive suppliers to as low as 35%, from NAFTA's 60%.
At an event at the prestigious Press Club on September 28, 2016, a month before the election, I delivered an address that said Canada was the smallest of the three NAFTA partners and that it needed to clearly target large, new, advanced manufacturing commitments from foreign automakers to keep pace with Mexican and U.S. growth.
All the tariff threats and angst were clearly on the minds of the industry and were the central focus of our pre-election activity that year.
In September 2016, in an Automotive News piece on the tariff threat, I said that Canada and other countries look to the U.S. to set an example, and that recklessness on the part of the U.S. would encourage other countries to disregard world trade rules.
My quote conceded that there was some merit to the Trumpian complaints, but cautioned that a U.S. overresponse would even be more harmful:
Some of the rest of the world does cheat on these obligations.... But the solution isn't for the global trading leader to drop its standards in response.
It's a tough spot to be in. But you're there for a reason. It's like Superman getting into a bar fight. Why?
Canada, its largest trading partner the United States, and Mexico have agreed to the CUSMA to replace the existing NAFTA. This is the first trade deal between major auto-producing nations since the original NAFTA that sees the regional value content for automotive production go up in the region. A higher RVC in vehicles means that, if an automaker wants to sell to a consumer in the three countries, it needs to source more of its content in those three countries.
Since the original NAFTA moved RVC on vehicles up from the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement from 50% to 62.5%, we've seen a succession of trade deals where Canadian governments have progressively negotiated Canadian automotive suppliers' considerations downwards: Canada-Korea is 55%; CETA RVC is 50%; CPTPP is 45%.
In the CUSMA, the vehicle RVC level rises from 62.5% to 75%, a 20% notional increase. That means more local activity and jobs. To get to the NAFTA RVC, an automaker has to track local content in 29 parts categories. To be eligible, the RVC of those automotive parts must only be 60%. The CUSMA expands the list of categories by almost double and raises the automotive parts RVC as high as 75%, an increase in some cases of 25% notionally through the supply chain.
The North American automotive market is approximately 21 million units annually and is the most sought-after consumer market in the automotive world. Raising the thresholds to access it benefits companies that have invested in plants and in people within the CUSMA.
While the cost of an automobile may increase marginally if the manufacturers are required to source supplies from within the NAFTA region rather than from the cheapest global sources, the benefit will be more investment in Ontario, Quebec, B.C. and in many U.S. and Mexican states, and less in the places that sell to us but do not buy from us, like the members of the CPTPP, CETA and Korea.
In automotive, the CUSMA addresses the protectionist needs of the U.S. administration but wraps in its purview Canada and Mexico as primary partners.
Side agreements for exemptions on tariff threats were a major challenge, but Canada and Mexico achieved an insurance policy on this that's worth noting. As detractors here at home decried the side agreements, I told The Economist magazine that, normally, trade agreements are self-reinforcing but that this one is being held together with threats. This is the context that we are working in, not some respectful bargaining between partners with equal leverage.
All vehicles in the CUSMA will now need to meet a minimum threshold of 40% being made by workers making at least $16 an hour. Canada will benefit; Mexico may suffer.
This provision was created during the final course of the negotiations in bilateral U.S. and Mexican discussions that caused a stir with Canadian commentators who said Canada has no role in those talks. Meeting frequently with U.S. and Mexican negotiators during that period, I didn't share that opinion. I told a Wall Street Journal front page report that the labour value content proposal “disproportionately affects Mexico” and that we were “advising Canada not to comment or take a position until the Mexicans do.” That's what Canada's negotiators did.
The U.S. is committed to raising the cost of importing automotive goods from overseas. In June 2019, I told this committee that the U.S. was using the section 232 steel and aluminum tariff threat to bully its partners and intended to use the WTO process to raise the 2.5% most favoured nation tariff dramatically. On February 12 this year, Bloomberg reported from Washington that the Trump administration is mulling a plan to increase those long-standing tariff rates at WTO. This is a move that is aimed at rewriting its relationships with major trading partners.
Importantly, Canada negotiated section 232 exemptions from the U.S. at production levels that materially outpace export growth models to the U.S. over the next five to 10 years. Specifically, Canada will be permitted to ship 2.6 million vehicles annually and $32 billion in automotive parts to the United States tariff-free, up 40% from today.
Ending the fraught negotiation process with a deal that increases investment and more competitive market access for Canada is extraordinary. Unlike the Houston Astros hitters, nobody hit the garbage bins for us. We had to react to pitches on skill with no warning, and we won.
We enjoyed unprecedented access to the Canadian negotiating team. In addition to this, I sought and received in-person access to the White House, USTR and the Mexican president and his negotiation team.
I will write a book one day chronicling the behind-the-scenes actions. Chapter one may be the USTR reaction to my November 2017 Canadian Press headline lampooning their silly materials-tracing proposals: Do we need to know where the dinosaurs died?
Today I want to give full credit for our success on CUSMA to Chrystia Freeland, Steve Verheul and their team of tireless officials who consulted constantly with the Canadian automotive industry all over the continent. They deserve specific credit: Martin Thornell, Karen LaHay, Andrei Marinescu, Aaron Fowler, all of team Canada and the Government of Canada. It was a non-partisan, public-private effort and it was amazing. I was proud to be a footnote in this history's chapter.
Thank you.