--but we were actually the instructing counsel for those legislative drafters on this provision.
Your first question is a longer one and is perhaps a broader one with respect to other international jurisdictions and how they handle an analogous situation. I can give you a roundup of some other countries. I can't do a complete around-the-world tour, as in fact I don't have the legal knowledge.
I preface all of this by saying I am a Canadian lawyer, so any assessment of other legal systems has to be viewed with a little bit of caution.
I can tell you the jurisdiction we are probably the most analogous to in respect of our law enforcement justification is Australia. That is because Australia faced a situation very similar to ours. They faced it before we did in the case of Ridgeway, where their supreme court actually made a ruling very similar to the one our Supreme Court ruled in Campbell v. Shirose, and they were left in a similar situation, looking for statutory authority for what had been expected to be long-standing police activities that were thought to have been justified under common law.
They proceeded with a justification regime along somewhat similar lines to ours. Ironically, it was actually in part based on discussions that went back and forth between us when they had seen what we were in the midst of doing with the police enforcement regulations. Their overall statutory scheme, which I emphasize is one that's shared because criminal law in Australia is shared--it's mostly a state law matter and is dependent on individual states--is a generalization of our police enforcement regulations to broader circumstances. That was their approach, but it is broadly analogous to what we have done in its ultimate legal purpose and effect. That is effectively because they faced a similar situation and there is commonality between our legal systems and even policy exchanges between us.
Another interesting country, of course, would be Great Britain, the United Kingdom. To the best of my assessment, the situation in the United Kingdom is probably best analogized to the situation Canada was in prior to the judgment in Campbell v. Shirose, where there has been no judgment that I'm aware of. I would like to update my research on this, and certainly this is something we can come back to, but there's been no judgment I've been aware of where their House of Lords has indicated that a common-law law enforcement justification doesn't exist. They had an opportunity I think in a 1996 case, Latif, to look at this, the House of Lords.
It's a similar situation in many ways to what happened in Campbell v. Shirose in that it's also a drug situation, and I think there was, similarly, a motion for exclusion of evidence rather than abuse of process. But it might have been abuse of process as well. I would have to double check on that. But once again, the general allegation was that the police, or customs officers in that case, had broken the law in enforcing the law. Their House of Lords, without adopting a similar approach to ours, rather than a broad discussion of the principle of police justification, simply said, “We do not consider this case to be an abuse of process”, leaving it open.