Well, the reason is that there was a constitutional process that came about because of the disaster that preceded, which resulted in the P.E.I. reference being necessary in the first place. The constitutional process was to appoint an independent, high-quality commission to work independently, not as an arbitration group but in the public interest, to hear input from the public, from the participants, and to come up with recommendations that, except with very good reason, would be accepted by Parliament to set judicial salaries.
Therein the process mandated not only the method of selecting the commission but the way in which the commission's report was to be addressed by Parliament. The commission had a mandate to report by May 31, 2004--and every fourth year on May 31--which we did. The government had an obligation, under the legislation, to respond in six months, which it did, and either accept the recommendations of the commission or give cogent reasons why it didn't and why the recommendations of the commission should not be accepted.
The government of the day did that, and with one minor exception, which isn't germane to what we're talking about, the government of the day accepted every one of the recommendations we made.
There is no provision in that constitutionally mandated process for what transpired after that. There's no provision for a second report after a new government comes in a year and a half or two years later. In my view, that politicizes the process, and it's extremely dangerous because it causes disrespect for the process among the judiciary, among the public, and it will make it more....
I say, immodestly, this was a very talented commission, and we thought what we were doing was very important to the public of this country. If a future commission's recommendations can be treated in the way that the process has transpired here, there will be a great deal of difficulty finding the kind of commissioners that this country needs to conduct this process every four years.