We come here today not to extol our report, but to lament the process that has been followed or, properly, not followed. I think it's appropriate to recall the sorry history of why the legislation creating this commission developed. It's outlined in the Drouin report, the report of the first quadrennial commission. At page 2—and I will just say what that says. The Drouin report, as you are aware, came from the first commission called under the changes to the Judges Act following the P.E.I. case in the Supreme Court of Canada. What Drouin reviewed was this.
Before 1981, judges’ salaries and benefits were reviewed by advisory committees, a process which was generally unsatisfactory to the Judiciary. Judges felt that the process merely amounted to petitioning the government to fulfill its constitutional obligations.
In 1982, section 26 was introduced to the Judges Act, establishing the “Triennial Commission”. The intention was to create a body which would be independent of the Judiciary and Parliament, and which would present the Minister of Justice with objective and fair recommendations. The goal was to depoliticize the process, thus maintaining judicial independence.
There were five Triennial Commissions. Despite extensive inquiries and research by each of them, many of their recommendations on judicial salaries and benefits, between 1987 and 1993, generally were unimplemented or ignored. The Government of Canada...froze judges’ salaries and suspended indexation in the mid-1990s. The last adjustment to judges’ salaries was made in November 1998 pursuant to recommendations made by the Triennial Commission chaired by David Scott....
In its 1996 report, the Scott Commission described the problem with the triennial commission process by stating:
In spite of the thorough recommendation by successive Commissions, Parliament has failed, in a proactive sense, to fix judicial salaries and benefits for many years.
Furthermore, successive reports have failed to generate any meaningful response from Government. The whole subject of judicial salaries and benefits has, in spite of best intentions, been politicized.
As a consequence of that, the reference went to the Supreme Court of Canada—the P.E.I. reference—and the legislation pursuant to which Drouin acted and we acted was created. The clearest possible object of that legislation is to do away with the sorry history of judicial recommendations with respect to judicial compensation and to depoliticize the process. Our grave concern is that the process established, along with the resulting legislation that created this commission, is being perverted into a politicization of the exercise called for by the act.
Consider that we must act within two confined timeframes. The report that we produced must be tabled in Parliament within ten days. The minister must report or shall report within six months. These things surely say the process is to be regarded as requiring prompt action.
Here we are for the first time, two and a half years after we filed this report, to assist parliamentarians to address their constitutional obligations. We have discharged ours. Our concern is that neither the spirit nor the letter of the Judges Act, pursuant to which this commission was created, has been observed thus far by Parliament with respect to the report we filed.
For example, it's inappropriate, in my submission, to focus on a 2006 budget to consider a report that we had to file in May 2004. It's reasonable to expect a certain degree of prescience, but that may be too much. It's inappropriate, in my submission, to focus on this table or that table in the report, to say that an error was made or that there's too much emphasis here or too much emphasis there.
This exercise is somewhat an exercise of arbitrariness. You have to shrink the arbitrariness by gathering all the facts you can so that your decision becomes as informed as possible. But at the end, there's no way we or any other subsequent commission could file a report saying that 3/8 of 42,000, times 12, divided by 16, produces the adequate proper salary for judges. It can't be done. It has to be an exercise in judgment.
So it wasn't presented on the basis that it would be unassailable. Of course it's assailable. You have to work with all these numbers and do the best you can to come up with your best exercise in judgment, and it isn't bulletproof. But it's clear that it's done with the expectation that it will not be viewed through 2006 lenses, which is apparently the case.
I want to cite an observation that the government's second response makes, and with which I wholeheartedly agree. It is at paragraph 1 on page 5 of the second response of the government to the report:
It is...clear that the Commission undertook a detailed assessment and analysis of data and information available with respect to the relevant comparators for establishing the overall adequacy of judicial compensation. This has been a perennial challenge with which all previous federal judicial compensation commissions have grappled. As successive commissions and governments have discovered, it is as much an art as a science. There is no readily available mathematical formula to apply and a high degree of well-informed judgment is ultimately involved.
I assure you that's what we endeavoured to do. We looked at all the material that was put before us, and we considered it carefully. We debated the issues that it presented; we compromised our respective views; and all our conclusions were reached unanimously. We believe that what we came up with was in the public interest and was consistent with the legislation and the governing priority of judicial independence and securing for this country a pool of potential appointees to the federal judiciary, of outstanding candidates for those important roles.
To be absolutely clear, it couldn't matter less to us whether or not Parliament endorses our recommendations or not. It's the process that we're concerned about. But I want to be clear that we have no proprietary interest in the result of this. Mr. Cherniak and I are too old and Ms. Chambers is overqualified.
Our only concern is that we didn't labour pursuing what we thought was a public duty—and hence poorly paid, I might say—only to have produced a report that falls prey to politicization, such as has happened in the sorry past, when one government said too little, another government said too much, and a third government said, “Well let's just not deal with judges. They're not that important anyway.”
Our job is legislatively mandated and we believe we acted within the confines of our jurisdiction. Your job is constitutionally mandated and has yet to be performed. We hope it is exercised consistent with the honourable minister's assurance that appears on page 11, but which I won't repeat to you now because he said it when he was here giving evidence.
It's for this committee and it's for parliamentarians to decide what the appropriate compensation for judges is. Our sincere hope is that this exercise is promptly done, and is done consistent with the principles of which everyone is aware.
If there are going to be any questions, Mr. Chairman, we may not be unanimous. Frequently, we haven't been. So I would invite any questions, but I would also ask Ms. Chambers and Mr. Cherniak to supplement or contradict anything I might say.