No, that's not the way the criminal justice section sees it. Indeed, in my deep contemplation of moments ago, I was taking a couple of notes. What Ms. Treacy had spoken about was some testing that, let's say, is suggestive of a central nervous system stimulant, and then there's corroborative testing of the urine, and in that testing of the urine it shows there's cocaine in the urine. I think the conclusion the court is going to be asked to draw, or that people are going to be asked to draw, is that the detection of the cocaine in the urine is somehow corroborative that a central nervous system stimulant, and specifically cocaine, was impairing that person's ability to drive a motor vehicle.
We see that type of logic generating an unbelievable amount of litigation. It would be our view that you cannot necessarily draw the conclusion that the presence of cocaine in the urine is corroborative of either the fact that the person was under the influence of cocaine as the central nervous stimulant—it might have been a different central nervous system stimulant—or indeed that a central nervous system stimulant was the precursor to the symptoms that the drug recognition expert found. I think you're going to have court challenges at every step of that process, arguing about what symptoms are indicative of what drugs, about what the differential diagnosis is. If a person is exhibiting symptoms A, B, and C, yes, it could be a central nervous system stimulant. What else could it be?
Those aspects of it, in the view of the criminal justice section, are just part of what we see as a set of circumstances in Bill C-32 that are going to generate an unbelievable amount of litigation, and attendant costs, both in terms of resources and in terms of the time the cases are tied up in the system.