Thank you.
The Canadian Bar Association recognizes the public interest in having well-funded law enforcement. The Canadian Bar Association recognizes the importance of public safety. However, the Canadian Bar Association also recognizes the critical importance and fundamental importance of the respect for constitutional rights and the rule of law.
We say that sections 25.1 through 25.4 are inconsistent with the rule of law. There's a risk of misuse. As you are well aware, the provisions permit, for example, an assault by a police officer or agent. And there's a fine line between assault and assault causing bodily harm. There is heightened concern because of the use of agents and because of inadequate mechanisms of accountability.
When we had the opportunity to comment upon Bill C-24, we expressed various concerns, which included that the bill was not restricted to organized crime or terrorist-related offences. That concern continues today. The provisions apply to the enforcement of any act of Parliament.
We continue to be concerned with the rule of law. Our Supreme Court of Canada has made it very clear that the ends do not justify the means, that the evidence or convictions may be obtained at too high a price, and that there are inherent limits on policing and law enforcement. The CBA continues to have these concerns.
We believe that section 25.1 is antithetical to the rule of the law and undermines the integrity of the administration of justice and public confidence in the fair and proper administration of justice by condoning intentional and calculated violations of law by agents of the state. We recommend that the provisions be repealed in their entirety, or, at a minimum, that they be amended so as to not apply to agents, so that they would apply only to public officers.
If the sections are not repealed we would recommend that the use of the provisions be dependent upon prior judicial authorization. And further, we would recommend that there be more detailed reporting and record-keeping requirements to allow for transparency and effective oversight.
With respect to the rule of law, it's not sufficient to simply ask whether there exists a law that permits certain acts on the part of the state or its agents. That is a part of the rule of law. But the rule of law demands scrutiny of the content of law as well. Is the law fair? Is it just? Does it comply with constitutional norms? Are there adequate mechanisms of control and oversight over investigative techniques?
When the sections in question are used to investigate or gather evidence against an individual, the individual's rights, as protected by section 7 of the Charter of Rights, are engaged. However, the investigative techniques in question go far beyond the rights of the individual or the interests of the individual. All people in Canada have an interest in effective policing, a safe society, and maintenance of the rule of law and the accountability of police.
With respect to the use of non-police officers or agents, we are concerned because of the inability to effectively control such persons. It is well recognized in common experience and also in the courts that agents are often themselves criminals, as was recognized in a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which said that informants or agents will often be persons of questionable character who are involved in the very operations that are the subject of a proposed investigation, and for that reason a skeptical attitude with respect to the information that is supplied by such persons is necessary.
We say that police agents may too readily disregard the constraints of law or any direction given by a police officer, and the skeptical attitude that was referred to by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in accepting information supplied by an agent should apply equally when considering whether an agent will willingly and scrupulously follow the direction of a police officer.
We are concerned that the section operates without prior independent judicial authorization. The Criminal Code provides for the authorization of many investigative techniques, including the interception of private communications, search warrants, general warrants, production orders, warrants to take bodily substances for DNA analysis, warrants to take impressions such as foot or hand impressions, or tracking devices. All of those may be used only with prior judicial authorization.
The constitutional importance—indeed, the constitutional requirement—of that was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, who held in a case called Hunter v. Southam that it is only when it is demonstrated that the interests of the state are superior to the interests of the individual that certain investigative techniques can be used, and that this determination can only be made by a person who is at a minimum capable of acting judicially, and that there must be an independent judicial officer.
We say the duties of a police officer are such that they are constitutionally incapable of conducting the required delicate and objective balancing of competing interests. A police officer is not an independent judicial officer and should not be making the decisions that are required for the operation of these provisions.
We are also concerned with the adequacy of the existing reporting requirements. On page 4 of the letter that has been provided, I refer to some of the language that is used in an annual report of the RCMP. It states:
In one instance, the RCMP was conducting an investigation into a drug distribution network. Justified acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute Criminal Code offences relating to the possession of stolen goods, theft over $5,000 and conspiracy to commit an indictable offence were committed.
This description is simply inadequate. It is impossible to know the nature of the drug distribution network in question and impossible to know what is meant by the “acts or omissions” relating to theft over $5,000 or relating to a conspiracy to commit an indictable offence.
Meaningful review and accountability can only be achieved if the required report provides enough detail to understand what has occurred and whether it complies with statutory and constitutional requirements.
We suggest that the reports include, at a minimum, a brief description of the offence or offences being investigated and the act or omission committed by the police officer or agent, along with a brief description of that act for omission. Further, the report should include whether an investigation resulted in charges being laid. That's important in order to determine whether these provisions are being used in a way that is of any value. If these provisions are being used and there are never any charges, it is reasonable to ask: why are there no charges resulting?
Finally, we recommend that there be parliamentary reviews conducted every three years to ensure ongoing accountability. It is our understanding that no court has yet had the opportunity to consider these provisions or the circumstances in which these provisions have been used. The insights that might be offered by a court will, of course, be of interest to subsequent reviews that might be conducted.
Thank you.
