Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Alexi Wood. I am the director of the public safety project with the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. I am joined today by Ken Swan, a board member with our organization, and Brooke Wagner, an intern.
Five years ago, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association appeared before this committee. In our remarks at the time, we expressed concern about the breadth of the powers being given to law enforcement. We are here again today to reiterate many of those concerns.
For months now, the CCLA has been waiting for the committee to undertake this review, and we are pleased to have this opportunity today. We hope the committee will take the comments from the CCLA and others and use them to make recommendations for amendments to the legislation.
In a democratic society there is a fundamental principle that all people, regardless of their position, must obey the law. If this basic principle is going to be violated, it should require the most compelling of circumstances and must be closely scrutinized. Unfortunately, the law enforcement justification provisions of Bill C-24 do not adequately provide for either of those safeguards.
In addition, if government is going to violate this basic principle, then it is government that must demonstrate the need for such extraordinary powers. This has not been done. Several years ago, following Campbell and Shirose, law enforcement complained that the impact of that decision was to hobble certain police investigations. However, subsequent legislation effectively addressed this concern, and police acquired the power to break certain provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act even before Bill C-24 was introduced.
The CCLA did not then, nor has it ever, objected to legislation that allows for limited power to break the law within certain carefully controlled circumstances. If there are other situations in which such powers are required, the burden is on government to come forward, identify the circumstances involved, and propose a limited law-breaking power to address them. Unfortunately, Bill C-24 creates a general law-breaking power that can be used in an infinite number of circumstances. We have viewed and continue to view this law as unwarrantedly dangerous, and we urge the repeal of this law as it is currently formulated.
In the alternative, the CCLA has several recommendations it wishes to make that could at least make Bill C-24 less bad.
The legislation allows designated public officers to determine what illegal acts they are going to undertake, as long as they believe the act or omission is reasonable and proportional in the circumstances. There are two problems with this provision.
First, there is nothing in this provision to require that the illegal act must be necessary for the protection of an overriding interest. Allowing law enforcement officers to ignore the very laws they are sworn to protect must always be seen as an extraordinary act. The CCLA therefore recommends that the legislation be amended to require that all contemplated acts of illegality be necessary, not just reasonable and proportional.
Second, the decision about usage of these extraordinary powers should not be left to the officers themselves. Officers contemplating breaking the law in the line of duty should be required to obtain prior authorization from their superiors. In the event that such authorization cannot be obtained prior to the act, officers should be required to notify their superiors as soon as possible. Currently, the proposed legislation does not provide for such internal reporting in all circumstances.
In fact, reporting, both internal and external, is only legislatively required in two limited circumstances: one, when public officers direct someone else to commit an otherwise illegal act; two, when the act or omission would likely result in serious damage to property. There is also a requirement to report a temporary delegation of the authority to commit an illegal activity.
The CCLA recommends that external reporting should be expanded to include all illegal activity undertaken by law enforcement. If law enforcement officers are going to conduct illegal activity, the activity must be closely scrutinized by public officials and by members of the public.
I would like to take a minute here to discuss the reports that are submitted.
We have canvassed the reports from provincial police as well as the RCMP and have found them insufficient. They often provide such limited information as to essentially be meaningless.
The reports do not indicate where the act took place. While we recognize that the exact location may be sensitive information, we believe that the reports should contain at least the province, because that would be essential in order to seek a possible redress. In addition, the public ought to know if the RCMP was acting as a municipal police force or was acting in its national capacities.
In one specific example, an RCMP report stated that, and I quote, “...acts or omissions...relating to the possession of stolen goods, theft over $5,000 and conspiracy to commit an indictable offence...”. That description is too vague to give the public the remotest idea of what happened.
In our opinion, the report should provide sufficient detail so as to satisfy the public that the acts are permissible under the legislation and provide enough information so as to know who to hold accountable. Where law enforcement agencies believe they ought to keep such information from the public, the law should specify the criteria that would justify such withholding, and the officer should have to apply to court for an order.
In addition, the legislation allows law enforcement agencies to delay even limited reporting now required. We recognize there may be certain circumstances where external reporting may jeopardize an ongoing investigation or put an undercover operative at risk. In such circumstances, delay in reporting may be acceptable; however, if there is going to be a delay in the reporting, it should not be left to law enforcement to make that decision. Again, if the annual report does not provide the requisite disclosure of all illegal acts, the agency at issue must apply to a court for such authorization.
The provisions cover a wide range of illegal activity, and we are mindful of the necessity for police to be able to conduct covert operations, and they may need to infiltrate criminal elements. There are some illegal acts, however, that, in the opinion of the CCLA, should never be permitted to occur.
The current legislation expressly prohibits the infliction of bodily harm, but arguably allows threats of physical violence. We recommend that the legislation be amended to explicitly prohibit such threats, as well as any act of violence, whether or not it results in bodily harm. The CCLA also recommends that law enforcement should never be allowed to instigate illegalities. In addition, compensation should be required in every case where police law-breaking has caused injury, whether personal or property, to innocent individuals. Finally, no police force should be allowed to engage in this type of conduct unless the governing legislation provides for an independent audit. An agency, independent of law enforcement and government, should have ongoing access to law enforcement records, facilities, and personnel, so it can conduct investigations and ultimately report publicly on the way these powers are being exercised. This agency could operate in much the same way that SIRC currently does in regard to CSIS.
Again, I would like to thank the honourable chair and the members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today, and we welcome any questions.