Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to speak before you today.
I'm here on behalf of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. We are a civil liberties watchdog and advocacy organization. We've been around in Canada in excess of 40 years. Some of our primary objectives include the promotion of respect for and observance of fundamental human rights and civil liberties in Canada. Our major objectives also include the promotion and legal protection of individual freedom and dignity against unreasonable invasion by public authority.
We've provided the clerk with a brief, setting out some of our concerns about Bill C-15, and I will be reviewing some of those concerns in my presentation before you today.
In short, our overriding concern with Bill C-15 is that it is insufficiently nuanced and casts too wide a net. We share many of the concerns that some of the other witnesses have already expressed, and I'll review those now.
We're concerned, in large part, that persons who do not pose a significant danger to Canadian society will be lumped in with those who do and will be targeted for mandatory imprisonment. In our view, a more tailored approach is necessary to ensure that the bill does not cause significant collateral damage through the pursuit of its otherwise legitimate objectives and public safety goals.
Our primary concern with Bill C-15 relates to its overriding purpose: the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes in Canada. The CCLA has generally opposed mandatory minimums in all areas of Canadian law. We're particularly concerned about them when they're used to combat drug crime. Such sentences can be appealing because they purport to offer simple solutions to complex problems. The available evidence, however, suggests that the purported benefits of mandatory minimum sentences are somewhat of a mirage. Mandatory minimum sentences have not proven capable of effectively preventing or reducing crime. Studies have shown that citizens are generally unaware of which crimes come with mandatory minimum sentences and which do not. Indeed, the majority of social scientists who have studied the impact of such sentences have found they offer no value as a crime deterrent.
Such findings have been particularly pronounced with respect to drug crimes, where observers have found no discernible impact whatsoever on drug consumption or related drug crime as a result of the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentencing regime.
Moreover, because of their rigidity, such sentences create the risk that a particular offender will receive a sentence that is not appropriately tailored to the nature of their particular crime. Simply put, predetermined one-size-fits-all sentences are not capable of being sufficiently responsive to the unique characteristics of certain crimes, or of those who may commit them.
Inevitably, situations will arise where a predetermined mandatory sentence is excessive compared with the facts of a particular case. We've set out a couple of examples in our brief where courts have found the sentences they've had to impose as a result of mandatory minimum legislation to be, in their view—that is, in the view of those with the closest perspective of a particular case—unjust or unduly excessive.
While these negative consequences can result under any mandatory sentencing regime, they appear to be particularly from the use of such sentences to address drug crime. Drug crime, as others have noted, is a type of criminal activity in which a wide range of people can become involved for a wide range of purposes. Some, for sure, are violent offenders, profiting from drug users and drug addicts. There's no question about that. Others, however, may be addicts themselves, or users without addictions. Some persons may become involved in drug crime through low-level production or trafficking activity on a one-time basis, in order to deal with a personal financial crisis, for example.
Indeed, the danger posed to society by different drug offenders may differ widely, and courts should retain sufficient discretion to ensure that offenders receive sentences that are both appropriate for and proportionate to their particular offences.
In our view, Bill C-15 is not sufficiently nuanced to achieve proportionality in sentencing. And it is not difficult to imagine excessive sentences, should the bill become law.
The provisions relating to the production of marijuana, for example, would require that the same minimum sentence of six months' imprisonment be imposed on offenders who grow a single plant for profitless distribution to friends and on offenders who grow 200 plants to be sold for profit to strangers. While one can certainly imagine that the courts may wish to differentiate between such offenders, Bill C-15 permits no such distinctions. The likely result of this rigidity, of course, is that persons for whom imprisonment may be inappropriate could find themselves being incarcerated, nonetheless.
There is simply no reason for Canadian law to risk this type of injustice, as there are alternatives to mandatory minimum sentences that can minimize their negative consequences. Indeed, Parliament could instead set out presumptive minimum sentences, which would apply, unless the relevant court believes there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or the particular offender that would warrant diverging from the presumptive sentence in a particular case. The key distinction, of course, between these two options is that one takes final discretion away from courts and one leaves final discretion with courts.
As a result of the foregoing, our first recommendation regarding Bill C-15 is that all of its mandatory sentencing provisions should be excised. Such action would significantly reduce the potential for injustice created by the bill and in no way undermine its legitimate goals of promoting and protecting public health and safety.
A second point of concern set out in our brief relates to the aggravating factor under the trafficking provision that would require that a mandatory minimum sentence of two years' imprisonment be imposed on anyone trafficking certain substances--I quote from the legislation now--“in or near a school, on or near school grounds or in or near any other public place usually frequented by persons under the age of 18 years”.
While we take no issue with the notion that dealing drugs to or near minors could be an aggravating factor in assessing the appropriate sentence, we are deeply concerned by the broad and vague language used by the bill to describe such circumstances in its current form.
Indeed, there's no indication of what is meant by “near a school”. Are we talking about three kilometres, 300 metres? It's simply not clear. Similarly, the term “any other public place usually frequented by persons under the age of 18 years” could mean virtually anywhere in urban areas. This could include malls, parks, concerts, downtown streets, and so forth. Really, anyplace--other than those where minors are not permitted--could fall under that legislation, and thus require that a two-year minimum sentence be imposed.
This lack of clarity is of course particularly concerning in the context of mandatory minimum sentences. Basing a two-year imprisonment requirement on the extremely broad and unclear language of this provision is sure to result in people being sent to prison who perhaps should not be there. In our view, the overbreadth of this aggravating factor alone is sufficient to condemn its use.
Accordingly, we're recommending that to the extent that Parliament wants to make proximity to minors an aggravating factor in sentencing for trafficking offences, it should focus only on those situations where minors were present when the impugned conduct occurred.
Our third and final recommendation regarding the bill relates to its provisions regarding drug treatment courts. Such programs, of which we are generally supportive, have proven capable of effectively reducing rates of criminal recidivism, an outcome that is clearly in the interests of both society and individual offenders. By allowing certain offenders to avoid mandatory punishment by participating in such a program, these provisions of Bill C-15 will help ameliorate some--I stress, only some--of the negative consequences that the mandatory provisions in the bill do incur. In our view, however, drug treatment court participation is unduly restricted by the bill.
While we acknowledge that the presence of certain aggravating factors may be an appropriate basis for determining ineligibility for such programs, we believe such assessments, like the assessment of the appropriate sentence for a particular crime, are best made by the courts, who have an on-the-ground view of what's actually happening with a particular offender. Legislation is simply not sufficiently aware of a particular case to make that type of analysis, which is very complex.
The automatic exclusion of such offenders from drug treatment court will result in people who may need drug treatment going without it. Cycles will not be broken, and the risk of criminal recidivism will be less effectively addressed.
I would also point out, as Ms. Tara Lyons has pointed out, that there are only drug treatment courts in certain cities in Canada. This is not something that's going to apply everywhere where somebody could be charged with a drug crime. So we're going to be treating people differently, effectively by where they're located in the country.
As a result, we are recommending that Bill C-15 should permit broader access to drug treatment courts and not limit access on the basis of the enumerated aggravating factors.
Those are our remarks. Thank you very much.