I also took note, by the way--and I say this with the utmost respect and levity--that Mr. Comartin has admitted that he does think that judges make mistakes, at least when they don't agree with his policy. I appreciate that. I mean that with respect, Mr. Comartin, and you know that.
I want to thank these witnesses in particular, because I regard them as being in a different class, if I may use that word, from many of the witnesses we see.
I'm assuming you are all lawyers, and I see from your credentials that you all hold senior positions. Without imputing too much to your age, I'm going to assume that you've probably all practised law for at least 10 years or more and that you are very familiar with the details of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which therefore gives you a position of expertise that many of the witnesses we see here don't have.
I would like to just briefly go back to something you said, Mr. Hawkes, because when you were here last, we had an exchange about section 3. I asked you if I was right in my reading of the current section as including protection of the public and in reading the amendments as not changing the fact that there are four factors in section 3, and that paragraph 3(1)(a) has no greater or lesser priority than paragraphs 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c), or 3(1)(d). You did agree with me at that time on those things, and I think today when you said that the amendments add protection of the public to section 3(1)(a), you were misspeaking. In fact, if you look at the existing provision, you'll see that it is there, albeit referring to “long-term protection” rather than just “protection.”
I feel it's important to make that clarification, because so many of the witnesses we have heard from seem to be drinking from water that makes them think that protection of the public isn't already there, and I wish to dispel that notion. However, I would like to ask all of you, as serious and experienced counsel, about what my colleague Derek Lee was talking about earlier.
He was suggesting that somehow there has been creep, which makes the sentencing principles for youth criminal justice or the principles of the Youth Criminal Justice Act come very close to the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code proper. I noticed that at the time, he wasn't actually reading from Bill C-4; he was reading from the existing provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and suggesting that they were already too close to the adult provisions of the Criminal Code.
I would like to get your opinion generally on whether you think that the Youth Criminal Justice Act, with the amendments in Bill C-4, does still preserve the necessary distinction and the necessary separation between youth criminal justice and adult justice principles.
Perhaps, Mr. Hawkes, I'll start with you, since I was picking on you earlier.
