Yes. Thank you, Chair.
As I indicated earlier, I was going to look at the group of clauses between 137 and 166, for which there are no amendments, and all of which we are voting against. I won't refer to them all. These are what are known as consequential amendments that begin in clauses 137, 138, and 139, and refer to amendments related to the pardon issue and the imposition of record suspension into the Canadian Human Rights Act.
The effect of this is that the discriminatory practices, what they call the prohibitive grounds for discrimination, will continue to include pardon. However, as a result of the changes in this act, pardon does not have the same meaning. The only kind of pardon that the Canadian Human Rights Act now talks about is a pardon by royal pardon, or royal prerogative, which is essentially the Governor in Council—in other words, the state, not the Parole Board of Canada.
What's been added is “or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.” So the same protections for non-discrimination will be included in the Canadian Human Rights Act, but the word “pardon” is included with an entirely different meaning. I just wanted to point that out as a problem.
There's a whole series of other pieces of legislation that are referred to—the Contraventions Act. There's a whole series of matters in relation to the Criminal Code where this is mentioned. There's clause 141, for example, which changes the definition of pardon. This is the one I just referred to. The definition of pardon is changed to “a conditional pardon granted under Her Majesty's royal prerogative of mercy”. That's in the Criminal Code of Canada.
So what we're talking about here is that pardon remains in some sections, but it refers to a particular type of pardon granted by the royal prerogative, which I'm not aware, frankly, of any case in which it has been used in modern history. Somebody else might be able to enlighten me on that, but it's certainly not something that I'm familiar with the use of in Canada, so leaving it there is, in my view, just a bit misleading because of course pardons are not available as they were.
There's a whole series of other pieces of legislation that refer to pardons, which are also amended. There's an amendment to the National Defence Act, for example, in clause 152; there's a consequential amendment in that. This goes on to all of the Criminal Code matters, the DNA Identification Act in clause 148, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the National Defence Act—as I pointed out before but also in clauses 152, 153, 154, and 155—and the Youth Criminal Justice Act is also amended. The name of the parole board is changed in one of these sections, but mostly we're dealing with transitional provisions related to record suspensions. And this goes on to clause 166, which is the coming into force.
We're opposed to all of these because they are the ones that set out the consequences of the changes from “pardon”, as it currently exists under the Criminal Records Act, to “record suspension”—a very regretful move being made by this government, and one that I think members opposite will also learn to regret when they see the consequences of it.
I frankly think there are an awful lot of people in this country who are going to be displeased with the fact that the notion of a pardon is missing from our criminal law, as is the sense of hope, I suppose, and encouragement that it gives to people to amend their conduct to become good citizens and to be treated in a way that says it's no longer in the interest of society to have that record hanging over their heads. It gives them an opportunity to reform their lives and to move on after paying their debt to society, as we pointed out.
I may be speaking for more than 10 minutes, but we're dealing with probably 40 clauses there, or maybe a little fewer than that. My stopwatch has run out of battery. It's only a 10-hour battery, and we've been here for more than 10 hours so far. I'll have to rely on the stopwatch the chair has. I'll take your advice into consideration when my time is running low, given the fact that we've also agreed to operate under good faith during these proceedings.
Having said that, Mr. Chair—and I don't think any of my colleagues have any comments—I would suggest we vote on clauses 137 to 166 as a block, if my colleagues opposite have no objection to that.