I will say, however—that's a joke, obviously—there's a principle, the same principle that's behind all of these amendments to clause 136, so I can debate them in my comments at once. I will do it first of all by taking the first amendment, NDP-41, and say that the current clause 136 says:
In determining whether to consent to the transfer of a Canadian offender, the Minister may consider the following factors:
—and then there's the list of them:
(a) whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the offender’s return to Canada will constitute a threat to the security of Canada;
What we're suggesting is a change to those lines on page 73, so the bill would then read:
In determining whether to consent to the transfer of a Canadian offender, the Minister must consider the following factors:
The change to “whether the” would now read,
(a) whether the offender's return to Canada will constitute a threat to the security of Canada;
Similarly, the other amendments, NDP-42 through 48, are all to the same effect, deleting certain lines and making changes that essentially avoid the ministerial discretion that's offered, the reason being—and this is where it's important—is that the whole purpose of the International Transfer of Offenders Act is to permit offenders who've been charged and convicted in another country, as much as possible, to be able to serve their sentences in Canada if certain factors are taken into account. Obviously public safety is an important matter: a threat to the security of Canada; the safety of people within Canada; whether they've abandoned Canada as their permanent residence. Obviously these are factors.
We're not going to have somebody back who really has no connection with the country and happens to have Canadian citizenship. But if someone is going to come back to Canada at some point after their sentence, then obviously it's in Canada's best interest to ensure this person is, as far as possible, rehabilitated. This is the key to proper operation of clause 136 of the bill.
We have a big problem with ministerial discretion that is “in the opinion of the Minister”. Again, the reason for that is it's a choice of words, and it's a choice of words that's very important. Lawyers will know that if you use the words “in the opinion of the Minister”, it's very difficult for there to be an objective review of such a decision. We've seen that in many court cases that have gone to the Federal Court. The intention of the existing act, insofar as is possible, is to allow people to serve their sentence in Canada and be eligible for supervision, for parole, for the kind of rehabilitation matters we talked about earlier under the corrections act.
This is not about being nice to offenders, although maybe in some cases, if someone is in a prison in a foreign land where they're subject to inhumane conditions and because of our international human rights standards we would be appalled that any Canadian citizen would suffer from prison conditions, we may want to recognize that Canada's international human rights standards are higher. If you're a prisoner you're entitled to certain basic standards, and we would prefer that they have those standards. We would exercise the powers under this act to ensure someone wasn't languishing in a jail where they weren't getting proper food and would be able to serve their sentence in Canada and be subject to proper human rights conditions.
So it is about humanitarian considerations, but it's also about someone who, if they are going to return to Canada after they serve their sentence...let's ensure they're able to get the benefit of Canadians' rehabilitative efforts, the supervision of a parole, and the easing back or reintegration into society, so that they would be less of a threat to Canadian society then they might otherwise be if they came back after serving a long sentence under the conditions of another country's law. That's what the purpose of it is here.
It's feared by us that the use of the term “in the Minister's opinion” would give other factors. It's also added in here, “any other factor” that the minister believes to be relevant. As the Canadian bar has suggested, “With such open-ended discretion, these critical decisions would be determined according to the opinion of the Minister in each case.”
Now, they're suggesting there that there may be a constitutional issue and a constitutional challenge. They say, “It remains to be seen whether Canada's courts will interpret this broad discretion as a 'reasonable limit' demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter”. So the red flag has been waved by the Canadian Bar Association, and they're not just doing this because they want to do that. They're doing it because, in their considered opinion as lawyers who are concerned about these issues, they want to raise this flag and object to the arbitrariness of the ministerial discretion here.
Discretion is not to be exercised willy-nilly. When a minister has discretion to make a determination, it's not based on the minister's personal opinion; it's the discretion that's exercised as an officer of the crown. It has to be quasi-judicial, if I may use that term, and it has to be exercised in good faith, and it has to be exercised in a particular manner.
To use the term “in the Minister's opinion” is to remove it one step from judicial review, a step that we don't think it's appropriate to take. This is not a reflection on any particular minister; it's one that applies to any minister of the crown. It's not that we're suggesting that this minister would operate in a certain way. We're suggesting that it's inappropriate for any minister to have that type of apparently personal discretion, because it's open to putting something beyond the reach of the courts and beyond the reach of an adjudication separate from what is in fact said to be “in the Minister's opinion”.
This is why this is being opposed. This is why this scheme that's set out here we feel is wrong. We have opposed this in the past when this suggestion has come forward and we oppose it now.