Let me speak then to the clause in general and why we made the amendments, which have been found to be, by your ruling, sir, not in order.
The change for a summary conviction period prior to being able to apply for what was a pardon—in three years for a summary conviction offence—we feel was perfectly adequate.
Again, going back to the statistics and the record, when you look at the number of people who have actually had their suspensions revoked, it appears that the three-year time limit was working well and the system itself was working well. The reality is that if people aren't entitled to apply for three years, given the amount of time that it takes typically, particularly recently, to get an application approved—it's in the order of 18 months—I think it's already de facto very close to the five-year period that's being proposed.
We are opposed to that. We are opposed to the three strikes and you're out in terms of being eligible for a pardon. Either you meet the test that the board is required to do to determine whether an applicant is of good conduct—I mean now of good conduct. It doesn't mean of good conduct when they committed the offences. Clearly, the offences indicate bad conduct. But to be able to establish to the board, after it makes inquiries to satisfy itself, that an applicant is of good conduct and that the conviction for which they applied should no longer reflect adversely on the applicant's character, surely that's a sufficient enough test.
If they couldn't establish those provisions, if they couldn't establish those conditions, they wouldn't get a pardon in the first place. But if they can establish those provisions, if they can satisfy those conditions, if they can satisfy the parole board that they are of good conduct, and the board is satisfied that the conviction should no longer affect adversely on the applicant's character, then why would you deny them a pardon? Why would you deny them the advantage of the record suspension, as you're now calling it?
It's unduly harsh. It's unduly punitive. I can understand the concerns that one might address if we're talking about persons of trust, etc. But the existing provisions of the law already take those things into account. If someone is seeking to carry out a community situation with young people, for example, the fact of a pardon wouldn't stop you from being on a registry. It wouldn't stop your name from showing up on CPIC. None of those things that we associate with the public safety aspects of our criminal law, with respect to a conviction, get suspended when a pardon takes place. The provision for that is already accounted for.
So there's no valid reason, in our view, to avoid the notion that persons who meet that test should be ineligible to apply. We think the increase to 10 years in the case of an indictable offence, or an offence punished by indictment, is all right. We've agreed with that in the past, but to go to five years for summary conviction offences is unnecessary and we disagree with that.
(Amendment negatived)
