Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to start by focusing on potential tweaks to the legislation. We do have a “baby being thrown out with the bathwater” approach by the mover of this bill. I want to at least remain open-minded about what could be done to improve it. We already have a submission from the CBA that refers to section 54.1 and the penalty provision as being something that probably should go. That has a history, with others making that same recommendation. Let's leave that on the table for the moment.
I'd like to ask Mr. Freiman, in particular, a question. Mr. Freiman, you mentioned that effectively—and I'm not sure whether the point was that in practice this is the way it's gone or whether this has been read in jurisprudentially—the Dickson language in the Taylor decision about extreme hate has tended to be, or has been, where this provision has been focused. I'm wondering if that is an accepted jurisprudential reading into section 13. If it is or isn't, do you think it's worth considering adding the word “extreme” in front of “hatred” or “contempt”, or would that be a problem?