Justice Committee on Feb. 11th, 2013

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

The next questioner is Mr. Seeback from the Conservative Party.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Brampton West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have two questions. I don't think they'll take a lot of time.

To start, the prohibition against making a device I think was added at the Senate when it was being studied there.

John—and if anybody from the RCMP wants to answer, that's fine—would you say that adds strength to the bill, and if so, why do you think it does?

[John Davies]

I think it would be better for our Justice colleagues to answer. My recollection is that the minister, or perhaps it was the senior counsel, thought it would help clarify. It wasn't overly needed but it was helpful in clarifying.

[A/Commr James Malizia]

I would have to agree that it would be a question better suited for our colleagues at the Department of Justice.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Brampton West, ON]

Okay.

It was noted by one witness who testified before the Senate committee that Canada has been a leader in the effort to secure nuclear materials worldwide and to prevent nuclear terrorism.

John, you mentioned the funding of $365 million from the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. I think that was for the global partnership program. Taking that into account, do you support the swift enactment of Bill S-9 as moving with that, and if so, why?

James, if you want to answer that as well, I'm happy to hear that.

[John Davies]

The bill doesn't directly talk about capacity building abroad, but I think that issue is embedded in a lot of the other aspects of the various regimes around controlling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In that sense, absolutely that's an important initiative originally born out of earlier G-7 and G-8 meetings.

The important thing that's happened with the global partnership program is how it's starting to look around the world more strategically. Originally this was about helping countries of the former Soviet Union contain their nuclear supplies and stockpile. Now that the program has been adapted to work anywhere, it makes it a lot more flexible and it helps us build capacity consistent with the regimes out there. A lot of those regimes are looking to Canada and to other countries with the capacity to take that knowledge and help others build and broaden their capacity.

[A/Commr James Malizia]

Maybe I can just touch on the international aspect of cooperation. By ratifying the convention it allows us to take advantage of the mutual legal assistance treaties that all signatory countries will be part of. That is a key advantage for law enforcement as we proceed and look at different tools or mechanisms to be able to cooperate internationally.

As you know, most investigations today, aside from being very complex, are global in nature.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Brampton West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Thank you, Mr. Seeback.

Our next questioner is Madame Boivin from the New Democratic Party.

[Françoise Boivin, NDP, Gatineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here.

My first question is for Mr. Davies.

In your brief and your comments, you spoke about your role and that of Public Safety Canada, which is to work with more than a dozen departments and agencies to identify proliferation-related threats.

I realize that it's not always easy to give details. But for the benefit of those watching and for us, here around the table, would you mind giving us a brief explanation of what you mean by identifying proliferation-related threats? I know what the words mean, but what does the statement actually mean for Canada specifically or for the world? Why do we need these kinds of treaties or agreements with our allies?

[John Davies]

Thank you for your question.

There's a lot of different layers again, I think, to how you would look at threats in this area. The first is as I mentioned before, the aspiration of terrorist groups to obtain these weapons and then to use them. That's one angle, a lot of known, publicly available intelligence and facts of certain groups that want to obtain them and use them against Canada and Canadian interests.

The second one is the issue of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, a number of known countries aspire to obtain nuclear capability. The most obvious now is Iran. There's North Korea...political instability perhaps in Pakistan. The more countries that try to obtain nuclear capability to begin with, the greater the potential for proliferation and for access of terrorist groups. That's another angle.

On the third angle in terms of the threat and looking at the threat, I would talk about perhaps the Canadian context, Canada being an obvious advanced economy. A lot of technology, a lot of advanced knowledge and expertise of components or dual use equipment could find its way away from civilian uses. We're an attractive target for that point of view, but also it's our proximity to the U.S. and trading relations and so on.

The fourth way to look at the threat of counter-proliferation is just on the process of globalization, in general. This is not just beyond those that have weapons of mass destruction or even energy, like nuclear power and so on, that could be converted over to nuclear for nefarious reasons. There's just the issue of greater trade flows, greater movement of people. Finance is globalized, and knowledge. I think knowledge is the bigger thing that's come up. When you think of knowledge, it's the ability, the expertise to actually put one of these things together.

I would look at it probably from those four angles. That might help people understand the threat.

[Françoise Boivin, NDP, Gatineau, QC]

It does. It does become helpful. Thank you.

That's why I was a bit surprised, and maybe it's because we don't understand it. My colleague Mr. Marston was talking to you about those big headlines that usually can scare people, when they read about the transport of something that sounds very nuclear, that if it gets in the wrong hands and so on....

I understand it's more

the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the authority for the transportation of dangerous goods,

but you all work together, I assume.

It's not a vacuum.

Technically, shouldn't you be informed that there will be some type of transport that could possibly be viewed by some terrorist elements that are in Canada or elsewhere? Maybe it's because we don't exactly understand the material that they will be transporting. But for me, anybody with bad intentions could use those and transform them and maybe do something. So you should be aware of that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Thirty seconds.

[John Davies]

Again, we're from the policy group at Public Safety. We have a lot of links to the operation side and national security.

[Françoise Boivin, NDP, Gatineau, QC]

You're not saying that it's your branch policy. You're not telling us that

only the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission deals with those types of matters. I would think that branches in your department deal with them as well.

[John Davies]

I'm not sure if Public Safety would be normally informed on these kinds of things. I imagine a number of the portfolio agencies.... Certainly the CBSA would be as materials cross borders. Perhaps there are components at the RCMP. Obviously, Transport Canada would play a big role in facilitating that. I don't want to leave the impression with anyone that there's not a full regime in place, there's not a lot of support to get those materials to where they're supposed to go.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Thank you very much.

Our next questioner from the Conservative Party is Monsieur Goguen.

[Robert Goguen, Conservative, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question deals with the enforcement aspect, so I'll direct it to Assistant Commissioner Malizia.

Assistant Commissioner, our Conservative government has recently announced that counterterrorism strategy asserts as one of the six fundamental principles that terrorism is a crime that will be prosecuted. The deny element of this strategy aims to deny terrorists the means and the opportunity to carry out their activities. I know you know that.

A key objective of this strategy is to disrupt the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Do you think that Bill S-9 would strengthen law enforcement's ability to meet this important objective by specifying that actions associated with possessing, using, transporting, exporting, importing, altering, or disposing of nuclear or radioactive materials will be deemed a serious crime with severe penalties?

[A/Commr James Malizia]

The provisions that are being proposed would certainly assist us in the disrupt and the detect portions of the strategy.

When we look at the additional tools that I described earlier as they relate to wiretap provisions—DNA warrants, the MLAT requests, being in a position to extend notice of interception of communications—those are all key tools that allow us to do our job better.

Of course, as you know, these types of investigations, whether we're talking about nuclear-based investigations or counter-proliferation investigations, are very complex. They require a whole-of-government approach, where many agencies work together. I'm sure you've heard from most of them here. It's certainly a type of investigation that on a regular basis we're able to exchange on with our colleagues from other agencies, assess the threat, and then take appropriate actions accordingly. It could be a criminal charge. It could be a disruption activity by a partner agency or by the RCMP. Depending upon the investigation, the situation, and the best way forward, that's always taken into consideration in a whole-of-government approach.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Thank you.

Our next questioner is Mr. Mai from the New Democratic Party.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for joining us today. Your input goes a long way towards helping us understand what happens on the ground when we review a bill.

Bill S-9 introduces new offences related to nuclear terrorism under the Criminal Code.

My question is for Mr. Malizia.

Do you think these new Criminal Code offences will mean more investigations and a heavier workload for the RCMP?

[A/Commr James Malizia]

I don't think the workload will increase, but it will give us more tools to do our job. It will give us greater flexibility. But I don't foresee an increase in workload per se.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

On the more practical side, are there already specific charges related to these nuclear activities? You mentioned the Yadegari case. Are there others?

[A/Commr James Malizia]

On average, we have about 20 of those investigations a year. Of course, we are always working with our partners. We get referrals from partners, both domestically and internationally. Information sharing is key. It allows us to lead our investigations properly, to work with our partners, as I mentioned earlier, and to contribute to a broader government approach.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

You said there were 20 or so investigations. Will the passage of Bill S-9 and a larger arsenal of tools lead to more successful prosecutions? Will it change things?