Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will present first, and then my colleague will present after me.
First of all, I want to acknowledge you, Mr. Chair, and the members of the committee. Thank you for providing us with this important opportunity to be here to speak about Bill C-14, which responds to last year's unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter v. Canada and introduces a federal framework around medical assistance in dying.
Medical assistance in dying, as you said, Mr. Chair, is a complex and deeply personal issue. Every jurisdiction in the world that permits it or has debated it has carefully considered the wide range of interests at stake. In Canada, we work within a distinct legal and constitutional framework, which includes a division of powers between provincial, territorial, and federal governments, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, all of which inform the government's choices as reflected in this bill.
Bill C-14 would establish criminal law rules regarding medical assistance in dying that address eligibility, procedural safeguards, and the framework for a monitoring system. The proposed legislation would re-enact sections 14 and section 241, paragraph (b), of the Criminal Code, so that it would continue to be a crime to assist another person to die or to cause another person's death with their consent, except if either of these actions were done in accordance with the rules for medical assistance in dying as set out in this bill.
Bill C-14 would exempt physicians and authorized nurse practitioners from criminal liability if they provide medical assistance in dying to an eligible person in accordance with the procedural safeguards in the legislation. It would also exempt others who might be involved in this process, such as pharmacists who fill the prescription for medication.
Importantly, the bill includes a parliamentary review five years after coming into force. The government is also committed to further studying the complex issues of medical assistance in dying in the context of advance requests, mature minors, and where a mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition, none of which were before the court in Carter.
The government chose this approach after thoroughly considering the full range of potential options for a medical-assistance-in-dying regime. As noted in our legislative background paper, which I tabled at second reading, this included analyzing and comparing regimes in other jurisdictions, including Quebec's legislation, certain American states, several European countries, the country of Colombia, and others.
The government also relied on consultations conducted in this country, including the work of the special joint committee, the external panel, the provincial-territorial expert advisory group, and Quebec's multi-year study that informed the development of that province's own legislation. We also engaged and consulted with a wide array of stakeholders.
With the benefit of all this evidence and knowledge, which exceeds even the detailed record that was before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Carter case, the government has thoughtfully addressed this issue. Bill C-14 would allow for greater flexibility than the laws that exist in the United States, which are limited to terminally ill patients. At the same time, it does not go as far as some of the more permissive regimes in European countries. As the court noted in its Carter decision, “Complex regulatory regimes”—such as this—“are better created by Parliament than by the courts.”
Bill C-14 is fair and practical, and presents a balanced approach.
In terms of eligibility. I'm aware the requirement that a person's natural death be “reasonably foreseeable” has received some attention, including in terms of how it relates to the Carter decision. I would like to address these concerns.
The bill was deliberately drafted to respond to the circumstances that were the focus of the Carter case, where the court only heard evidence about people with late-stage incurable illnesses who were in physical decline and whose natural deaths were approaching. The court said the complete prohibition on assisted dying was a violation of charter rights for persons in these circumstances. In this way, the eligibility criteria in Bill C-14 comply with the Carter decision. They focus on the entirety of the person's medical circumstances and not on the specific list of approved conditions or illnesses.
By defining the term “grievous and irremediable medical condition”, the bill would ensure that all competent adults who are in an irreversible decline while on a path toward their death would be able to choose a peaceful, medically assisted death, whether or not they suffer from a fatal or terminal condition.
A person can be approaching a natural death based on medical circumstances that are not directly related to a serious, incurable illness, for example. As well, eligibility does not depend on a person's having a given amount of time remaining, such as a certain number of weeks or months to live, as in the United States. Reasonable foreseeability of death is ultimately a medical decision, and not a legal one, to be made by taking into account all of the person's medical circumstances, including the types and number of medical conditions, frailty, age, etc.
The vice-president of the Canadian Medical Association has confirmed that reasonable foreseeability of death is a standard that provides sufficient guidance to physicians and nurse practitioners by taking out a lot of the subjectivity that was left by the court's undefined concept of a grievous condition, while allowing those with the necessary medical knowledge and expertise to make the decisions based on the individual circumstances of each case.
There are other compelling reasons for there to be a requirement that the person's natural death be reasonably foreseeable. First, it provides a fair way to restrict eligibility without making assisted dying available to almost everyone. Second, restricting eligibility in this way is necessary to protect the vulnerable.
Other approaches to eligibility that were proposed and suggested would be arbitrary. For example, it would be arbitrary to permit people with degenerative but non-fatal conditions to have access to medical assistance in dying before their deaths have become reasonably foreseeable, while excluding individuals with mental illness alone, or those born with a physical disability, or those suffering physically or psychologically for any other reason. These are not viable options, in our opinion, as they discriminate on the basis of a person's medical condition from the outset rather than allowing the medical practitioner to consider all of the person's circumstances.
Others have suggested that the government should grant access liberally, based on the subjective experience of suffering of each individual and the right to choose when life ceases to have meaning, with little in the way of objective parameters related to their condition or safeguards. Our government firmly believes that medical assistance in dying should not be available for any and all types of suffering. If that were the case, the risk to vulnerable people would be greatly increased and, frankly, would be unacceptable. Such an approach could contribute to the stigmatization of persons with disabilities; it could undermine suicide prevention; and it could lead marginalized or lonely individuals to seek medical assistance to end their lives prematurely.
As the court noted in Carter, when crafting legislation, Parliament must balance and weigh the perspective of those who might be at risk in a permissive regime. Our government respects the Supreme Court of Canada, and believes that in legislating in this incredibly complex and personal area, we must be concerned with protecting the dignity of these Canadians' lives.
This is why the criteria in the bill address the full range of medical circumstances that can make a person's death reasonably foreseeable. In doing so, the law sends a clear message about the intended purpose of medical assistance in dying: to give competent adults who are in a path toward their natural death the choice of a peaceful passing. It also provides maximum flexibility for medical assessment to health care providers, both in terms of the circumstances that led a person to be on a trajectory toward death and in terms of the time during which they can seek medically assisted death.
I want to emphasize the importance of having a legislative response in place before June 6, 2016, when the court's declaration of invalidity expires. Without a new law, on June 6 the parameters of the Carter decision would come into effect.
The scope of the decision is uncertain in several respects and, as a result, there would be uncertainty as to how it would be applied in practice. Assuming for a moment that the Carter decision read down in section 14 and section 241, paragraph (b), of the Criminal Code so that except for medical assistance in dying these criminal laws would be in force, sufficient uncertainty would still remain.
First, given that in the medical community there is no common understanding of a “grievous and irremediable” condition, it would become difficult for a patient who would be eligible under Bill C-14 to gain access to medical assistance in dying. Without a clear law in place, some physicians who may otherwise be willing to provide it could refuse to do so because they are not clear on who properly qualifies.
As well, failing to define the Carter parameters with federal legislation could lead to a wide variation on how eligibility is applied, not only between provinces or regions, but within them. Access in remote and rural areas would be negatively affected, not only because physicians may be unwilling to provide medical assistance in dying in such an uncertain legal environment, but also because, under the Carter decision, nurse practitioners are not able to provide assistance.
Second, the current interim court approval process will end on June 6. Therefore, outside of Quebec, there would be no legally binding framework to govern medical assistance in dying in Canada. In other words, there would be no mandatory procedural safeguards to prevent abuses and protect vulnerable persons.
Guidelines published by medical regulators are not binding, nor are they uniform, which further risks creating a patchwork across Canada. This can pose very serious public safety risks. For instance, a patient could both request and receive medical assistance in dying on the same day. Without going through an exhaustive list of risks, needless to say, it would be irresponsible to let June 6 come and go without a federal law in place.
As the court made clear in paragraph 117 of Carter, “the risks associated with physician-assisted death can be limited through a carefully designed and monitored system of safeguards”. Bill C-14 provides a responsible and balanced framework that limits those risks and puts in place those safeguards.
I certainly welcome the opportunity to discuss this bill and contribute to your study of the proposed legislation. The approach in Bill C-14 responds to the Carter decision with what I believe is sensitivity in all of the issues that were before the court in this case and creates a responsible and fair legal framework to permit medical assistance in dying in Canada for the first time in our country's history.
Now, with your permission, Mr. Chair, I would like to turn it over to Minister Philpott.
