Justice Committee on Nov. 19th, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights as we resume our study on Bill C-78.

It is a great pleasure to have with us today a very distinguished group of witnesses.

Our first group of witnesses includes members from the Barreau du Québec, Siham Haddadi, Valérie Laberge and Nicolas Le Grand Alary.

We have the Family Law Association of Nunavut, represented by Ms. Gillian Bourke.

Also with us today is Daniel Boivin from the Fédération des associations de juristes d'expression française de common law inc.

We have the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, represented by Ms. Shalini Konanur and Ms. Silmy Abdullah.

We're gong to go in the order in which I announced everybody, starting with eight-minute presentations.

We'll start with the representatives from the Barreau du Québec.

[Siham Haddadi, Lawyer, Secretariat of the Order and Legal Affairs, Barreau du Québec]

Mr. Chair, committee members, good afternoon.

First of all, on behalf of the Barreau du Québec, I would like to thank you for inviting us to this meeting to discuss Bill C-78. We are very happy to be here.

My name is Siham Haddadi, and I am a lawyer with the Barreau du Québec and secretary of the Family Law Committee. With me today are Valérie Laberge, who is a member of the Family Law Committee, and Nicolas Le Grand Alary, who is also a lawyer with the Barreau du Québec.

As a professional body, the Barreau du Québec has a mandate to protect the public and the rule of law. Reform of the Divorce Act, which raises issues of promoting the best interests of the child and protecting vulnerable persons, therefore challenges the Barreau in carrying out its mission.

To begin, the Barreau du Québec would like to welcome the reform of the Divorce Act, which puts the child at the heart of deliberations, adapts terminology to soften conflicts and, above all, modernizes the Divorce Act, which had its last major reform in 1997, to make it more relevant to today's family realities. That is the challenge that the legislator set for itself with this bill, and the Barreau du Québec thinks it has met that challenge with great success.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

I'm sorry to interrupt you, but you are speaking a little too quickly.

[Siham Haddadi]

I'm sorry. Would you like me to repeat the last part?

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

No. You may continue, but I would ask that you please speak a little more slowly.

[Siham Haddadi]

As I was saying, the Barreau du Québec generally considers that the legislator has met this challenge brilliantly, but we have some comments to make.

First, the Barreau du Québec notes that some provisions of the bill seem to be breaches of the principle of parental authority as defined in Quebec legislation.

In fact, Quebec civil law provides that parents exercise parental authority together, and that it is only in exceptional cases that the other parent fully exercises the attributes of parental authority. Having said that, a parent with parental authority may delegate certain responsibilities, such as custody, supervision and education of the child to a third person. However, the parent remains the holder of parental authority in general.

We therefore consider that clauses 16.1 to 16.5, which provide for the possibility for third parties to intervene in decisions concerning the child, constitute a major breach of the principle of parental authority. We consider that these decision-making powers must continue to be exercised by the holders of parental authority. We also believe that allowing such interference by third parties in this regard is not only contrary to Quebec civil law, but could go against the best interests of the child.

I will now turn things over to Ms. Laberge, who will continue the presentation.

[Valérie Laberge, Member, Family Law Committee, Barreau du Québec]

Good afternoon.

Another aspect that seems problematic to us is that several of the provisions, including clauses 16.1 and 16.2, are considerably unclear in our opinion. For example, subclause (9) of clause 16.1, which deals with parenting orders, prohibits the removal of a child from a specified geographic area. In our opinion, “geographic area” needs to be clarified. Does it mean a change of city, neighbourhood, country or province? “Removal of child” should also be clarified. Does this mean a trip or move? In our opinion, this part is a little unclear.

Paragraph (1)(b) of clause 16.1 is also problematic because it is not clear to whom the legislator is referring when it states that a person, other than a spouse, who intends to stand in the place of a parent to the child, would be entitled to parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of the child. As the legislation currently stands, the person who intends to stand in the place of a parent cannot be a person acting in loco parentis within the meaning of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Chartier case. In order to be qualified in this way, the person must have already acted as the parent and this must be apparent from his or her interactions with the child. In addition, under the Chartier decision, this person must be one of the spouses, but this is specifically excluded by subclause 16.1(1) of the bill. So, who is covered under this provision? In our view, this should be clarified by the legislator in light of the principles set out in the Chartier decision.

On another note, the Barreau du Québec is very supportive of the changes in terminology. Indeed, the use of the terms “contact order”, “parenting order” or “parenting time” as proposed in Bill C-78 could limit conflicts between the parties. In addition, the previous lexicon, which used terms such as “custody” and “custody order”, may have had the effect of considering the child more as an object. However, in our opinion, other terms need to be reviewed by the legislator, such as the word “contact”. Instead, we might prefer “communication”, or “transfer” and “remove” which, in pertaining to the child, could be replaced by “transition modality” and “move” or “displacement”.

In addition, we reiterate that we are very much in favour of restoring the cardinal principle of the best interests of the child to clause 16 of the bill. We also welcome the list of factors to be considered that has been added to it, which could certainly allow individuals to better define this concept, which is sometimes considered vague.

However, we believe that it should be made clear in subsection (3), which lists the factors that the court must consider in determining the best interests of the child, that no one factor should have priority over another. We believe this addition is necessary to ensure that the analysis of factors is personalized and adapted to the child's needs.

On the other hand, we believe that the first factor set out in paragraph 16(3)(a), namely, “the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability”, should not be one of the factors on the list, but rather underlie the best interests of the child analysis under clause 16. We therefore suggest that the wording of this paragraph be incorporated into the conditions set out in subclause 16(2).

I will now turn things over to Mr. Le Grand Alary, who will present you with the rest of our thoughts.

[Nicolas Le Grand Alary, Lawyer, Secretariat of the Order and Legal Affairs, Barreau du Québec]

Good afternoon.

The Barreau du Québec welcomes the inclusion of family violence in the bill. It is indeed a sensitive subject, but one that must be taken into account when considering the best interests of the child.

However, we believe that the legislator must specify that the prohibition, for instance, of killing or injuring an animal does not apply when it is done in the context of hunting and fishing recreational activities. In addition, the prohibition against damaging property must be limited to situations where there was intent to cause damage.

We think these clarifications are necessary to avoid absurd situations in which normal behaviour would be considered family violence. Moreover, this behaviour could be raised by either party as a criticism in a divorce case, should things already be acrimonious.

Another factor that raises questions for us is the obligation for the legal advisor to inform the client of the possibilities for reconciliation.

Although clause 7.7 of the bill repeats clause 9 of the current act, with the exception of replacing the term “lawyer” with “legal advisor”, we believe it is important to add to clause 7.7(1)(b) the phrase “if necessary”. The Barreau du Québec is indeed concerned about the possibility that a legal advisor may put pressure on the parties to reconcile, mistakenly believing that they are fulfilling an obligation under the act. We also believe that it should be clear that it is at the discretion of the legal advisor to determine, based on the facts of the case, whether a discussion on reconciliation would be beneficial to the client. There may be situations in which a discussion on potential reconciliation would be inappropriate. This is the case when acts of family violence have occurred between the spouses.

Lastly, the Barreau du Québec raises two problems regarding section 22 of the current act, which refers to foreign divorces.

First, the provision states that a divorce granted by a competent authority would be recognized within the meaning of the act. However, it should be noted that in some countries, such as France, the parties may, when the conditions are met, sign an amicable agreement and file it with a notary instead of going to court. As a result, we think Canadian law must allow for the recognition of all divorces that respect public order and Canadian values, even if they are not granted by a judicial authority.

Second, we note that a constitutional conflict could arise between this provision and article 3167 of the Civil Code of Quebec concerning the jurisdiction of foreign authorities in divorce matters.

In closing, we would like to thank you once again for allowing us to share our thoughts on Bill C-78. We hope these in turn will be helpful in your considerations. We are available to answer any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to Ms. Bourke.

[Gillian Bourke, Lawyer, Family Law Association of Nunavut]

Thank you.

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting nuimati, which is the Inuktitut acronym for the Family Law Association of Nunavut, to provide our feedback about Bill C-78. Every resident family law lawyer in Nunavut is an active participant in our group.

I would like to specifically thank Stefanie Laurella and Anne Crawford for their work on the brief and this presentation.

Overall, nuimati is supportive of Bill C-78. We believe that, if enacted, it will reduce conflict for separating families.

We have focused our response on the relocation proposals in Bill C-78. We are in favour of legislating relocation, as the current law set out in the Supreme Court of Canada in Gordon v. Goertz is highly discretionary, resulting in unpredictable outcomes for family law litigants.

There are three areas that nuimati would like to address and propose changes to.

First, we propose to simplify the procedure for relocation. The proposed procedure for relocation set out in Bill C-78 is the foremost concern for our group. Proposed section 16.91 states that when a parent receives a notice of relocation, their only means of stopping the relocation is to file a court application within 30 days.

In our opinion, the requirement to go directly to court is contrary to one of the aims of this bill—for parties and legal advisers to encourage the use of family dispute resolution processes. Parents become adversarial from the outset and rely exclusively on the litigation process. In our opinion, the court should not be the first step in resolving issues between parents.

Many factors could prevent an objecting parent from filing a court application within the 30 days, particularly in the north and remote regions. In our opinion, this causes significant access to justice issues. If a parent cannot afford to privately retain a lawyer, there may be delays in being approved for a legal aid lawyer. If a lawyer cannot be retained in the required time period, there are many barriers for people to bring a court application on their own within the 30-day time period.

Many communities throughout Canada, including 25 in Nunavut, are served exclusively by a travelling court. There is no permanent court presence in the community. There may be difficulty in obtaining the required forms from the court. If a parent cannot speak English or French, they may not have access to the resources to understand the requirements under the Divorce Act, or have the ability to prepare the necessary court documents. A parent may also be required to leave their community for work within this 30-day period. In the case of Nunavut, it's often for hunting or fishing to support themselves and the community.

We believe that a parent who objects to the notice of relocation should only be required to do so in writing to the other parent. This significantly reduces the likelihood of a parent being permitted to relocate with a child based on a procedural technicality, rather than in the child's best interest. We also believe that the notice of relocation should include a caution to the other parent, that if they do not object within 30 days the relocation will be permitted.

Second, we propose to simplify who has the burden of proof on relocation. Proposed section 16.93 sets out different burdens of proof, depending on whether a child spends substantially equal time in the care of each party, or spends the vast majority of their time in the care of the party who intends to relocate.

Relocation is defined in Bill C-78 as “a change in the place of residence of a child...that is likely to have a significant impact on the child's relationship with...a person who has parenting time [or] decision-making responsibility”. This is a high threshold that is not going to include parents who rarely see their children.

Unless a child is an infant, a relocation would also make a drastic change to the rest of the child's life. The child would have to adapt to a new community, attend a new school, make new friends and develop a new routine. We believe that a parent seeking to change the status quo should have the burden of proof of why it is in the child's best interest.

Third, we would like to add provisions about the financial consequences of relocations, and to clarify them.

In Nunavut, there's no year-round road access between any of the communities. The cost of airfare is frequently in the thousands of dollars. Currently, there is no legislation or regulations that specifically set out who is to pay the travel expenses of a child to facilitate parenting time after a relocation occurs, and there is mixed case law. The child support guidelines only speak to a reduction of the table amount of child support in cases where undue hardship is made out for the parents' high access costs. In our experience, the financial consequences are one of the most contentious issues in relocation cases.

Another factor to consider is that a relocation may trigger a child support obligation for the non-relocating party where one may not have existed previously. Proposed section 16.95 of Bill C-78 states:

If a court authorizes the relocation of a child of the marriage, it may provide for the apportionment of costs relating to the exercise of parenting time by a person who is not relocating between that person and the person who is relocating the child.

This proposed section is highly discretionary and creates uncertainty about who is responsible for paying to facilitate parenting time upon relocation. We suggest that there should be a presumption that the relocating parent has the obligation of paying the additional cost of facilitating parenting time as a result of the relocation, absent an undue hardship claim as is already set out in the child support guidelines.

This approach adds certainty, reduces conflict, and has safeguards to ensure that the child enjoys similar standards of living with each parent. We would also suggest adding a requirement that the parent providing the notice of relocation include a proposal for the financial consequences of the relocation. This could reduce conflict from the outset if there is an open dialogue about the financial consequences between parents from the start.

This concludes our proposals. I thank the committee for considering our feedback.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We'll now move on to Mr. Boivin.

[Daniel Boivin, President, Fédération des associations de juristes d'expression française de common law inc.]

Mr. Chair and committee members, thank you very much for agreeing to hear the comments of the Fédération des associations de juristes d'expression française, or FAJEF, on a different aspect of the amendment to the Divorce Act, that of protecting the right of individuals to use the official language of their choice when they must go before the courts in a divorce matter.

The FAJEF brings together lawyers' associations from across the country. Our mandate is to promote access to justice in French in the predominantly English-speaking provinces and territories. The seven associations of French-speaking lawyers represent approximately 1,700 lawyers, and the number is increasing every year. More importantly, they represent a population of approximately one million Canadians.

FAJEF works with other organizations in the national legal community, including the Canadian Bar Association, which I believe will appear before this committee, and with francophone organizations such as the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada, or FCFA, which supports FAJEF's representations on language rights issues.

To give you some background, in 1998, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate on Child Custody and Access already recommended an amendment to the Divorce Act so that parties to proceedings under the act could choose to have proceedings in either of Canada's official languages.

The committee recommended that the amendments be based on section 530 of the Criminal Code, which gives individuals the possibility of using the official language of their choice in criminal proceedings. The Divorce Act being another federal law, that act was scaled up, which was quite appropriate.

In 2002, the Department of Justice stated in its report, “Environmental Scan: Access to Justice in Both Official Languages”, that the federal Parliament had the right to impose language requirements on the provinces if it decided to entrust them with the administration of a law. However, despite these recommendations, the Divorce Act, which is still in force, still does not recognize the right of Canadians to divorce in the official language of their choice.

This means that in many provinces, Canadians who must face the courts for what is probably the most personal aspect of their lives cannot do so in the official language of their choice, particularly in French. This is already possible in some provinces and territories, namely Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.

In some provinces, if you know the clerk, if the judge is a friend, if people are able to accept certain documents by turning a blind eye, it is possible to obtain a divorce judgment by consent, but certainly not to have a debate in French before the courts. In British Columbia, and Newfoundland and Labrador, it is absolutely impossible to have anything in French.

We believe that the fact that Bill C-78 does not contain a provision on language rights is a gap. The bill should be amended to explicitly recognize language rights in any proceedings brought under the Divorce Act.

Divorce affects Canadians directly. It is an intimate and difficult matter. When people who divorce have to go to court, it is a very difficult time. It is a procedure that often has significant financial and emotional consequences. For these reasons, the ability to express yourself in court in the official language of your choice is of extreme importance.

In federal law, imposing language rights on the provinces would not be new. As I just mentioned, the Criminal Code already provides, in sections 530 and 530.1, for the obligation to provide judicial services to Canadians in both official languages.

It is also very important to recognize that many Canadians appear in family courts without the assistance of counsel. A lawyer is often able to somewhat mitigate language difficulties, with a command of both languages. However, when people appear in court without a lawyer, they have to deal with a dual problem, in that they cannot express themselves in the precise legal language needed for the debate, or in a language that the court can understand.

The FAJEF will submit a brief with the suggested wording; it looks a lot like the wording in section 530 of the Criminal Code. This recognizes the possibility of using one official language or the other in cases brought under the Divorce Act, not only for the trial, but also for all the steps that go on outside the courtroom.

There must also be a requirement for the judge to understand the language or languages used by the parties, for the witnesses to be able to express themselves in the official language of their choice without consequence, and for the record of the hearing to include all the debates in the official language that each party used.

The provisions should also indicate that courts may provide interpretation services for the parties to cases heard in both languages, and decisions to be rendered in the language or languages that the parties used in court.

Finally, we recommend that it be possible to use the official language of choice for every decision taken to appeal.

The FAJEF strongly recommends this addition, as a language right that clearly meets the federal government’s obligations to promote the use of the official languages, as set out in section 41 of the Official Languages Act.

This is a matter of access to justice. Canadians who cannot express themselves in the official language of their choice before the courts do not have adequate access to justice. This is a situation that must be resolved.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to Ms. Konanur and Ms. Abdullah.

[Shalini Konanur, Executive Director and Lawyer, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario]

Thank you.

On behalf of the South Asian Legal Clinic, we would like to thank you for allowing us to appear today in front of the committee. I'll be sharing my time with my colleague Silmy Abdullah.

The South Asian Legal Clinic is a legal aid clinic that serves exclusively racialized communities in Ontario. Of our work, 40% involves family violence and gender-based violence cases. We do a significant amount of work in family law. The number one questions we receive are on divorce, child custody and access, as the old terms were.

We're here today to speak about the lived experience of our clients and how that translates into the impact of these changes. Our recommendations are going to be limited to the cases we see and how we think those cases will be impacted by these changes.

I want to start by saying that we are very pleased that the government has decided to do a reform of family law. We are very pleased that you have framed that reform as a consideration of the best interests of children, and of family violence. This is really important work for the clients we see on a daily basis.

As I mentioned, our recommendations, which will follow in a second, come out of the cases, the on-the-ground work that we see. I mentioned in my brief, which you may or may not have before you, that just last week, I alone worked with six clients who faced family violence, and that was the reason that their marriages or partnerships ended.

One client in particular, who is still sitting with me, was chained to her bed and had her head shaved because a man talked to her when they were at the grocery store. I'm telling you that story because the work you are doing on these updates is so important to those lives.

That being said, our first recommendation is that the legislation itself should have a preamble. That preamble should recognize that family violence is both a gendered issue and an intersectional issue.

The truth is that the lived experience of SALCO's clients supports the understanding that family violence is gendered. Most often, the family violence that we see is perpetrated against women, transgender, queer and non-conforming people. They are subject to violence by people who often identify themselves as men. This is sometimes a hard thing for people to accept, but this is what we see.

We would like to echo the submissions of a sister organization called the National Association of Women and the Law, or NAWL, and Luke's Place, which will be in front of this committee later this week, in stating unequivocally that family violence is a form of violence against women.

We also recognize that violence is experienced in different ways by different women, based on their intersecting sites of oppression: age, disability, immigration status, religion and so on. These are very complex issues. We must take time and care in the way that the law addresses those issues. Nothing will be perfect, but we can take that time at committee to have care.

We strongly encourage you to consider a preamble. When you look at the submissions of NAWL and Luke's Place, they've drafted something that can give you guidance for the language. I'm not going to read and repeat it, but I encourage you to refer to it.

In my other work, particularly in immigration, we use the preamble of immigration legislation at the federal level for decision-makers to understand the intent. It recognizes the importance of the screen. It provides a framework, and it guides decision-makers when they are applying the specific sections.

Second, by extension, in the definition section, if the committee accepts that family violence is gendered by nature, you should also include a definition of violence against women. We have been working for many years on having our judiciary in the family courts, in the criminal courts, in immigration decision-making to have a broader understanding of violence against women. This is an opportunity to create that understanding by including that definition.

[Silmy Abdullah, Lawyer, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario]

Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to provide our recommendations on Bill C-78.

As my colleague Shalini mentioned, I am with the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario. I'm a staff lawyer.

Our next recommendation is regarding the definition of “family violence”. We recommend that the definition be amended to include a couple of other types of abuse. We welcome the inclusion of different types of abuse, such as physical, sexual, threats to kill or cause bodily harm, psychological and financial. However, we recommend that cyber-violence and spiritual abuse also be included in the definition, as they reflect both the reality of the communities we serve and our current society at large.

Spiritual abuse would entail, for example, mocking someone's spiritual beliefs, forcing someone to practise certain aspects of their faith, preventing someone from practising certain aspects of their faith, or using religion as a justification for violence or abuse. We see this from time to time in our casework.

Cyber-violence is increasingly being used as both an intimidation and revenge tactic against intimate partners. Recently, a client of ours who was going through a divorce and also facing immigration issues disclosed to us that her husband had spread intimate photos of her on the Internet and via email to her friends and family. This can have devastating consequences for women who belong to particular communities, especially certain South Asian communities where reputation is paramount. It's not only used as a way to threaten and control women, but it could also lead to their ostracization from the entire community.

We believe that recognizing spiritual violence and cyber-violence as part of the definition of “family violence” would provide for a more fulsome definition.

Our next recommendation is with respect to the terms “custody” and “access”. We recognize that the bill proposes to do away with these terms to promote a less adversarial framework for parenting decisions. However, we do have some practical concerns.

In terms of our international experience, just to give you an example again, SALCO recently worked with a client whose children were kidnapped to Pakistan by her abusive ex-husband, and the only way she could get her kids back was if she showed the court in Pakistan that she had sole custody. The court in Pakistan was looking for that specific language, so if we change those terms, we have to take into consideration whether that would be understood and recognized in the international context.

As well, the terms “custody” and “access” are still used in other domestic legislation, such as in immigration legislation and child protection legislation. We know that family violence does not happen in a silo. It often intersects with immigration and child protection matters, so changes would jeopardize the consistency with other legislation.

We recommend that either these terms be retained, or, if they're removed, that there be clear language that explains the equivalent of these terms as they're used in other legislation.

Finally, we also know that even though these terms have been changed in other jurisdictions, we don't really have any evidence that changing these terms has actually led to a reduction of conflict.

SALCO has been doing a lot of public legal education in communities because a lot of our clients have language barriers and simply don't have a lot of knowledge about their legal rights. We have spent a lot of time and resources in developing language-specific materials explaining these terms, so changing them would mean that we'd have to revisit and revamp all of that, and we simply don't have the resources to do so.

[Shalini Konanur]

Moving on, I'd like to address some of our specific concerns about proposed subsection 16(3) regarding the best interests of the child.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Sorry. You're at eight and a half minutes. I'll ask you to wrap up quickly.

[Shalini Konanur]

Okay. I'll do this very quickly.

I won't go through them in detail, but I will say that there are three proposed subsections in particular around the willingness of a spouse to help a child foster a relationship with their partner, and the willingness to communicate. The confusion we have about those proposed subsections is that in cases of family violence, it's actually sometimes appropriate and legitimate that spouses not have a willingness to communicate and foster that. When you are looking at those enumerated grounds, think about specifically adding a “family violence” exception, because as the legislation reads, that is not the case.

Do you want to conclude?

[Silmy Abdullah]

Sure.

Very quickly, our last two recommendations have to do with proposed section 7.3, which encourages using family dispute resolution processes where it is appropriate to do so. Again, we would just bring to the committee's attention that in cases of family violence, it's not appropriate to go through family dispute resolution processes, especially where there is such a power imbalance. We would recommend that the language be a bit more explicit in saying that in cases of family violence, it is not appropriate and should not be encouraged.

Finally, we recommend that sections be added to Bill C-78 that require mandatory education about family violence for judges, lawyers and other people involved in the family court system.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We really appreciate the testimony from all the witnesses.

We now move to the time for questions and comments.

We're going to start with Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

I'll address my first question to Ms. Bourke.

You discussed the issue of relocation, and you endorsed the fact that, in the legislation, the reasons for relocation shall be considered by a judge in making a determination as to the issue of relocation.

That may be a good idea; I'm certainly open to it, but I just wanted to get a better understanding of the rationale behind it, as you see it. You did allude to the Gordon v. Goertz decision, and at paragraph 22 of that decision, the court stated that:

All too often, such applications have descended into inquiries into the custodial parent's reason or motive for moving.... The focus thus shifts from the best interests of the child to the conduct of the custodial parent.

To sum up, the court said that only in exceptional cases where relocation is relevant to the parent's ability to meet the needs of the child should it be considered.

I was just wondering what your thoughts are and how your position squares with the determination of the court.

[Gillian Bourke]

I think that, from a survey of the case law, even though the Supreme Court of Canada in Gordon v. Goertz says that the reasons for the relocation of the parent shall not be considered except in extenuating circumstances, it's often framed in a different way through the other factors. These are taken into consideration by the court, I would say, and I think that it is relevant to consider the reasons for the parent's moving, but only as it relates to the best interests of the child.

If the relocation is to support a career that would provide an increase in income to better support the child, or the relocation is to take the child to services that would better serve them, I think that those reasons should be taken into account within the context of the best interests of the child.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Does the Barreau du Québec have a position on that issue?

[Valérie Laberge]

Can you repeat the question? I want to make sure I fully understood.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

My question was in regard to the fact that legislation makes it a requirement that a judge shall consider the reasons behind the move in the case of a relocation. That's inconsistent with the Gordon v. Goertz decision, where the court said that it should be considered only in exceptional circumstances.