Justice Committee on Nov. 28th, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome, everyone. It is a pleasure to resume our study of Bill C-78 with a very distinguished panel of witnesses.

Joining us today we have Professor Nicholas Bala from the faculty of law at Queen's University. Welcome.

We have Julie I. Guindon, a Lawyer, Mediator and Parenting Coordinator at Société professionnelle Julie I. Guindon.

Welcome

We have Mr. Robert Harvie, attorney, advisory board member at Huckvale LLP, National Self-Represented Litigants Project. Welcome.

We have Ms. Laurie Pawlitza, who is a Partner at Torkin Manes LLP. Welcome.

We will go in that order in terms of testimony, so we will start with Professor Bala.

[Professor Nicholas Bala, Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Thank you. It's a pleasure and privilege to be here with you today.

As was mentioned, I am a law professor at Queen's University. I've been working on family justice issues for close to 40 years. I've written quite a few books and articles, and my work is cited by the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as by other courts.

I am a member of the board of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Ontario, which is an interdisciplinary organization, and they support many of the positions that I have, or I support them. I think their brief is going to be posted for you tomorrow.

As will be discussed or referred to, I have also been working with professors Rachel Birnbaum, Michael Saini, Francine Cyr and Karine Poitras on a series of papers around this new legislation and related topics.

Broadly, I and all those with whom I work support the direction of this legislation very much, and there is a great need for change. The legislation was enacted in 1986, and in fact many of the terms and ideas come from 1968. Canada is one of the last countries to bring about reform.

We have already seen reforms in a number of provinces. Many of the provisions of the act, such as imposing duties on parents to try to resolve conflict and so on are very important. The provisions around views of the child are again very important and reflect present practice. The provisions around family violence I think are very important, as are the provisions around relocation as well. I have written about many of these topics.

You have my brief. I would certainly be happy to answer questions. As you know, my time is limited, so I am just going to touch on a few points.

First of all, in regard to proposed subsection 16.1(6), family dispute resolution, the definition of that refers to negotiation, collaboration, mediation. I would submit to you—and I know many others would—that it should also refer to counselling, and perhaps parenting coordination. Certainly one of the things that courts should be able to do is refer or order the parents and child, if necessary, to go to counselling. Often that's the best way to resolve matters, and there is a large amount of research about the value of counselling—not for everybody, but it certainly should be an option.

Right now there is a division in case law. Some judges say that of course we can do this and others are saying, no, we can't, because there is no explicit provision; we can't send people to counselling in criminal court, so why should we be able to do it here? Therefore I would urge you to include counselling.

The second thing I would specifically say is that in proposed subsection 16.2(1) refers to “maximum parenting time”. I would urge you to change the title. The title is actually a relic there. The present legislation, as you know, reads “maximum contact” time. Now you've called it “maximum parenting time”, and those are very different concepts, and indeed the actual provision does not relate to the title. The title has been used by courts in previous cases, so I would urge you to change the title, perhaps saying what reflects the section, which is parenting time consistent with best interests. There may be other words, but “maximum parenting time” may be misinterpreted as equal parenting time, and I'm going to come to that. I think that's very problematic, so I would urge you to change that.

One more specific comment is about relocation. I think it's very welcome that the bill has a scheme for dealing with relocation cases. Largely, I support it. I know that my colleague Professor Thompson was here, and I endorse much of what he said.

One thing that wasn't said was in regard to one parent wanting to move and giving the other one written notice of moving. The way this is drafted right now, the parent who is not moving has to file an objection with the court. That means that you've begun a court proceeding right away, which is both difficult and expensive, and it may be unnecessary. While it could be useful in some cases, I would suggest that it would be sufficient to file a written objection, perhaps in a prescribed form, rather than actually having to go to court.

In my remaining time, I would just like to focus on an issue that I know you've been dealing with, which is the argument for a presumption of equal parenting time. I would urge you not to go in that direction. I know you've had some witnesses come and testify about that. I think their research is very problematic in many respects, and I can get into the details of that.

The work of professors Kruk and Fabricius does not reflect the majority of social scientists in North America, or really in the world.

Most people who have worked in the field and done research, including the people I've collaborated with, do not support equal parenting. They support shared parenting. They support the idea of equal parenting in appropriate cases. However, they're very concerned about the effect of a presumption of equal parenting.

I should say that although you've heard things suggesting it's being done around the world, there's only one jurisdiction in the world at this point that has a presumption of equal parenting, and that is Kentucky. Every other jurisdiction that's looked at this has resisted those kinds of words, and jurisdictions that have moved in that direction, like Australia, have actually come back. There are many concerns about it in terms of its effect on cases, and in particular the experience....

I should say that although he didn't highlight it in his presentation to you, the article of Professor Fabricius—again, I think if you're going to look at social science research, you have to go back and look at the original study—points out that even in Arizona, which has a very weak form of an equal parenting approach, there's been an increase in litigation. I think there would be a widespread concern that if you go a presumption, it will increase the amount of litigation. It will expose women in particular, but also in some cases children, to unnecessary risk.

While there are many situations in which equal parenting time is appropriate, there are also many situations in which it's not appropriate. For example, there could be a situation—and there are many of these situations—of people having a child out of wedlock, or the child is born before they separate, and only one parent has lived with the child. When the child is two, the father comes along—often it's the father—and says, “Parliament said that I have a right to equal parenting time.” I think that would be highly problematic. It's exactly in those kinds of cases that I think it would be used.

I know that as a value, many Canadians—and you've heard about the public opinion polls—support the role of both parents in the lives of their children. If you want to, you can call that equal parenting, in the sense that they're both parents and they both have a role, for example, in naming the child, and they both should be involved, but to start with that presumption—particularly in the high-conflict cases, in which that presumption will make a difference—I think is highly problematic. It's not a coincidence that every other jurisdiction except Kentucky has rejected this.

We've had discussions, and in fact I can give you data. The vast majority of Canadian family lawyers, who I think are very much settlement-focused, are opposed to this kind of presumption. I know there are some lawyers who take a different view, but we did a study, and over 80% of family lawyers have a concern about a statutory presumption of equal time.

I could certainly go on, but my time is up, so thank you very much for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much, Professor.

We will now move to Maître Guindon.

[Julie Guindon, Lawyer, Mediator, Arbitrator and Parental Coordinator, Société professionnelle Julie I. Guindon, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, everyone.

I'll be continuing in French.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

I would ask everyone to put in their earpieces.

We'll start your time when everybody has them on.

[Julie Guindon]

Thank you.

[Iqra Khalid, Liberal, Mississauga—Erin Mills, ON]

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Now that everyone is ready, you may go ahead, Ms. Guindon.

[Julie Guindon]

It is a privilege to be here today to discuss certain elements of the bill.

Like my colleague Mr. Bala, I have worked in family law for a few years now and I've practised law for nearly 30 years.

My comments today will focus on dispute resolution, since that is the core of my practice. I am a parenting coordinator, mediator and arbitrator. I represent children, so I have some idea as to how things work and I have a sense of what goes on in families.

As Mr. Bala explained, the proposed amendments are very welcome. To some extent, they bring the act up to date with respect to parenting orders, contact orders and parenting responsibilities.

I think it's wonderful to begin moving away from the notion of custody and towards the idea of responsibility. When it comes to parents, sharing responsibility is what matters. Time is one thing, but responsibility is another. That is usually the focus when setting up a parenting plan.

The bill refers to responsibility, providing a guide that encourages parents to work together in a meaningful way on these issues. Parents tell their lawyers they want x or y and go into mediation with that mindset. That's fine, but numerous responsibilities flow from that, ones that are sometimes overlooked.

Proposed new section 16 of the Divorce Act seeks to put the best interests of the child at the centre of the process. That's a positive thing because it forces us to view the situation from the child's standpoint. The explanation often given by children is that, when their parents were together and fighting all the time, the parents would tell them everything would be better after the separation or divorce. Once the parents separate and divorce, though, the situation gets worse, leaving children to wonder why they separated or divorced in the first place given that it just made things much worse. Clearly, things can become adversarial.

Having factors that outline the best interests of the child helps us view the needs of the child in much more detail and move away from the powers of parents. When it comes to custody and rights of access, the problem always revolves around decision-making power. One party is given decision-making power, and the other ends up being much less involved in the child's life, often to the child's detriment.

Now I'd like to comment on the dispute resolution changes in proposed new section 7. I want to begin by saying that I am glad to see the courts encouraging parents to participate in a dispute resolution process. When the family unit breaks up, the financial resources are split between two households at least. It's very difficult at that point for each person to rebuild their financial capacity. The money goes to the lawyers, and so a lot less goes to the child. By encouraging this avenue, the courts will make people more receptive to dispute resolution.

Dispute resolution may not be appropriate for everyone, of course. It's said that, sometimes, it's better to wait until more suitable opportunities for mediation or negotiation arise. That may be true, but I can tell you that mediation often results in swift measures.

For instance, in the case of a parenting plan, it's important to start with a temporary plan. It could cover a period of a few months, three weeks or whatever is appropriate. After that, the parties come back together and review the plan. It's good for parents, and it's good for children because it lessens the feeling that they aren't being loyal to one parent or the other. They don't feel as though they absolutely have to say a certain thing, otherwise, they won't be welcome the next day. It can give the child greater flexibility in that regard.

On the whole, that's what I wanted to say. I see that the dispute resolution provisions don't really refer to parenting coordination. That may be something worth including. Since parenting coordination to some extent combines mediation and arbitration, I assume it would prove valuable in high conflict situations. I can tell you that parenting coordination is sought when the parties do not want to have to deal with an issue in court. It is commonly used in high conflict situations resulting from an order or a separation agreement.

That was my opening statement. If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much, Ms. Guindon.

We'll go to Mr. Harvie now.

[Robert Harvie, Lawyer, Advisory Board Member, Huckvale LLP, National Self-Represented Litigants Project, As an Individual]

Thank you for inviting me today. I'm awed, flattered, and humbled, particularly because of the other members of this panel.

I am a lawyer. I've been a lawyer in family law for 32 years. In the context of that practice, I've seen how family law impacts families in dysfunction and hurts children. As a result of that, I became involved as a mediator. I had training as a collaborative lawyer. I later became a bencher with the Law Society of Alberta. I was the chair of their access to justice committee for two terms, and I became involved with the self-represented litigants project through the University of Windsor and Dr. Julie Macfarlane.

The pain that I feel for my clients and that I see for children is real and is what motivates me to do things like being here today.

My comments, in general, are that my concern about Bill C-78 is that it doesn't fundamentally change the problem, which is that the way families matters get resolved is still seen through the spectrum of litigation. Litigation doesn't work for families in disputes. It's a terrible way for people to resolve problems.

We have a clear two-tiered system in which people with money and resources can abuse people who don't have those resources. The process itself is premised on an adversarial approach to resolution, whereby two parties who are already in dispute are actually encouraged to dispute more.

My fundamental concern is that Bill C-78, while having good intentions, laudable intentions, doesn't really make any fundamental change to the process. It's in that context that I've provided a brief to this committee.

I embrace the positives in Bill C-78. I think it's very helpful that we refer to “parenting” instead of “custody” and “access” and that we have stopped referring to children as “assets” or “property”. I think it's very positive that we have better support variation and enforcement provisions interprovincially in the new legislation. I think that expanding and focusing on what the considerations are for the best interests of children is helpful, particularly for self-represented litigants. I think having a more detailed examination of how domestic violence should impact parenting decisions is also helpful.

My concern is that they change the “what”, but they don't change the “how”. That's always been my concern as I've become more concerned with access to justice, and it's in that context that my recommendations are made. I'll just touch on them; I won't go into them in detail.

My first concern—and to some extent it mirrors Professor Bala's comments—relates to the presumptions inherent in the provisions relating to relocation of parents. I think requiring notice, if people are relocating and impacting the other parent's relationship, is good, but I think the extent to which we've created presumption in the legislation flies in the face of the case of Gordon v. Goertz, which I think was incredibly well reasoned by former Madam Justice McLachlin. She basically said that as soon as we create a presumption, we almost ask the court to start with a preference, and that avoids the necessity of looking in a nuanced way at what's truly in the best interest of the child.

Just as Professor Bala says, a presumption in favour of equal parenting will create a bias in favour of equal parenting. Creating a presumption in favour of a parent with the vast majority of time with children to be able to move creates a presumption. Likewise, a presumption against a move whereby parents would have equal access also potentially creates a bias and distracts the court from just looking at all the circumstances and asking what is really best for the child or children. I would strongly urge the committee to reconsider those presumptions in the legislation.

With respect to my second recommendation, consistent the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Canadian government adopted in 1991, we must and should inquire as to the wishes of the child. I think it's laudable that we've included that as a consideration, but we haven't provided any support as to how that occurs, and so we're inviting poorly trained lawyers and, with respect, poorly trained judges, and, clearly, self-represented litigants—who are a growing part of our experience—to put children in the position of picking which parent they like more.

After they've done that and a decision is made based on that information, that child then has to exist with the parent that they didn't prefer.

I think if we're going to invite children—and we have to invite children—to look at what their preferences and their feelings are, we need to provide some administration and some infrastructure to allow that to happen in a way that's consistent with the interests of the children. To not do that is to invite further abuse of the children in that regard.

With respect to encouraging non-judicial dispute resolution, again, I think the aims in the legislation are laudable, but there's no meat there. There's nothing there to compel people. There's nothing there to push people to actually do that, as opposed to engaging in a litigation process.

My experience is that most parties in divorce—maybe all parties in divorce—are in trauma, and they're not making the best decisions they can, so while it may make sense to encourage them and to require them to go through a consideration of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, with the greatest of respect, I would make that mandatory. I would say, “You have to go through some alternate form of resolution prior to proceeding through a litigation stream”, because otherwise it's a good intention with nothing more.

Finally, related to that, it's my experience that people going through a divorce are not making the best decisions as their highest selves. I think that when we have legislation that implies that they can make reasoned decisions without providing an infrastructure for them to get the counselling necessary to make them functional, you're not likely to create any real change. You're likely to have damaged people who continue to make damaged decisions, particularly against the interests of their children.

Fundamentally, my concern is that we have legislation created by lawyers for lawyers and judges. There's an adage that goes, “When you're a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” With the greatest of respect, we have laws that are created by lawyers, and to a lawyer, every problem looks like it needs a courtroom. My concern is that we need to do more to move people out of that.

I know that's difficult in a federal jurisdiction, because administration is provincial, but I would urge this committee to go a little bit farther towards creating infrastructure and process changes, not simply changes to the law.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We'll go to Ms. Pawlitza.

[Laurie Pawlitza, Partner, Torkin Manes LLP, As an Individual]

Thank you.

First of all, thank you so much for the invitation to be here. It strikes me that as members of the committee, you probably already know that lawyers really like to give their opinions. I'm going to say that I'm no exception, so here I am.

I thought I'd just deal with a couple of micro issues first, and those are issues of clarification and interpretation. I'm going to concentrate my remarks on things that I think others have perhaps not mentioned. Those relate specifically to the legal adviser and to family dispute resolution. I'm going to concentrate on those things. Then I have a broader issue and concern that I'm going to raise with you as well.

Just by way of some context for making these remarks, like Rob Harvie, I've been practising family law for 32 years, and we've both lived to tell the tale. It is an area of law that is challenging. I have also been quite involved with the Law Society of Ontario. I served as a bencher. The law societies, as most of you probably know, regulate the profession in each province and territory.

I was head of the Law Society of Ontario for two years, which governs, now, about 50,000 lawyers, and is the only jurisdiction in Canada to govern independent paralegals, who have scopes of practice that are circumscribed. That is why I want to first of all commend the work that's done on the definition of “legal adviser”. There is a significant access to justice issue in family law. Both Ontario and British Columbia are looking at the issue of whether properly trained and regulated independent paralegals, known by another name in British Columbia, may provide family law services in the future. It is very important to maintain the broader definition of “legal adviser” and not just limit it to lawyers.

With respect to another issue regarding the legal adviser, the legal adviser has particular requirements to fulfill certain duties under the new legislation, duties that are very broadly set out and are much more onerous than before. In that respect, I'd like to make two specific comments.

One is that it's not clear in the bill when the obligation of the legal adviser arises. It's really important, I think, if we are going to be obliged to ensure that the parties know what their obligations are, and we can rest reconciliation and other issues, that those things are done at the beginning and not when the parties are signing the divorce application. By then they have already reached an impasse with their spouse, and frankly, then it really is going to fall on deaf ears. I would strongly encourage you to make it clear when that obligation on the legal adviser arises.

The second thing that I'd like to suggest to you is that legal advisers ought to be subject to a sanction in the event that the court finds that there's been a breach. If they didn't advise their clients, then there should be some remedies for that, and lawyers and paralegals should know to take that obligation very seriously. They have an obligation now under section 9 of the act; in my experience, at least, it's honoured more in the breach than in the observance, so I strongly encourage you to consider some sanctions.

I'd like to touch on what I think is the most important portion of the bill, and that is the ability to order family dispute resolution. However, I have a couple of concerns with respect to that. Again, they're clarification issues, but I think they're worthwhile raising.

Because the definition of “family dispute resolution” is that it can be for any matter in dispute, but the only mention of it in the bill as to when a judge can make an order is under proposed subsection 16.1(6), which is the parenting section, it seems to me that there will clearly be, for parties who want to have a dispute, a dispute about whether or not that can be ordered for issues to resolve support. I strongly encourage that the legislation clarify that it can be ordered in any matter, not just in parenting matters.

The other thing that Professor Bala and Julie have already mentioned is the issue of adding the role of a parenting coordinator to the non-exhaustive list of things that can be in a family dispute resolution process. Once there is a parenting plan in place, it is very important for the mundane matters to be dealt with quickly and efficiently so that conflictual parents are not going back and forth to court indefinitely.

There is one much broader issue that I would like to raise: what happens before a court makes an order for family dispute resolution. There are three parts to this: one, the cost of those services; two, the issue of domestic violence and power imbalance; and three, if it does apply to all issues, including the financial issue, so that a judge can make that order with respect to the financial issues, we need to deal with the issue of financial disclosure being full and complete before people are sent off to mediation.

With respect to the issue of family dispute resolution, it is important for people who don't practise in the area to understand that this is mostly provided by private providers. Justice Bonkalo, the former chief justice of our provincial court, recently completed a study with respect to whether paralegals could provide some family law services. She cited in her report that 57% of all litigants in the Ontario courts were appearing on their own, without counsel, and when asked the reason, they said it's because they could not afford counsel. It is extremely important, before a judge makes an order, to clarify that services have to be available and they have to be available at either reasonable cost or no cost.

I appreciate that this is a shared jurisdictional issue between the provinces and the federal government, but in my view the centrepiece of this bill is the ability to order people to go to family dispute resolution. In the event that they can do that, we must make sure that the people who need it the most are in a position to access those services. Without some type of assurance with respect to that, the legislation will not have the effect that is intended.

I would add that there should be criteria for the judge, and frankly, for the lawyer as well, as to when a family dispute resolution order ought to be made. The criteria should include that anybody who is going to be ordered to go to family dispute resolution should be subjected, first, to domestic violence screening. Frankly, in my view, that is not something that is appropriate or a good use of a judge's time to do; it requires someone specialized. Again, we come down to who is going to do that and who is going to bear the cost. However, it is extremely important that people be properly screened before they're sent off to mediation.

The second issue is to consider what family resources are available to the litigants.

Lastly, I suggest that an order be made only after a judge is satisfied there has been sufficient financial disclosure to allow full and complete discussions with respect to support.

There is one last matter—because, of course, we always want to have one last thing. It is this: I urge the committee to consider how we're going to determine whether family dispute resolution is working and how we're going to determine when it works best. I can say, as someone who has been very involved for a number of years with trying to move ahead with family law reforms, that what we are sadly lacking is good research about which kinds of dispute resolutions work best, how the services are best delivered, at what stage they're best delivered, and the cost-benefit analysis.

Those things are always lacking when we're trying to make progress with family law reform. ln the event that we are able to track that information and that data, we will actually be able to move the system forward, as Rob suggests, in a much more efficient way.

I really encourage people to think about the partnership with the provincial government and what's necessary to do there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you so much.

We will now move to questions. We will start with Mr. MacKenzie.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Actually, Mr. Saroya will ask one question first.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Saroya.

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses. I can see there's a ton of experience here.

I'll give you one example of somebody who came to see me a couple of months ago, and this was the case. Whenever something like this happens, it's always or usually the women who have been hurt the most. Most of the time, the men have the money and they buy the toys for the minor kids; they're always on their side. In many cases, the richer side doesn't come forward with disclosures on their financial situation. They hide the money. Sometimes mothers don't know the whole situation. When they run to the lawyer, they don't have the money, so they look for the cheapest lawyer they can find, who's no help either.

I'm giving you a true situation here of someone who came to see me. The minor kids were against the mother, and all that stuff. What can be done in a situation like this? Can any or all of you speak to this?

Thank you.

[Prof. Nicholas Bala]

I don't mind starting, because certainly you're right in identifying what we would call problems with access to justice, particularly access to family justice. There have been a number of reports written about it, and I have written articles with other people.

One thing is that it won't be one thing. It will actually be many different things. Some of the things we're trying now include increasing access to public legal education, and not just in English and French but in other languages as well. In Ontario we're talking about making use of paralegals for certain kinds of matters. Although it is controversial, I think it's a good move. It has to be very carefully monitored.

Another thing we're doing in Ontario right now, hopefully with the support of the law society, is encouraging what we're calling “limited scope” family legal services. Rather than hiring a lawyer for the entire family process, one would spend a couple of hours at a key point with a lawyer. There might also be lawyers at family court being paid by the hour, rather than being fully retained. That's another step in that direction. I think those kinds of things will certainly be moving us in the right direction, but justice will never be a low-cost undertaking. We have to think about that as well.

The other thing I would broadly say is that we've tried to simplify the law in certain areas. When you talk about financial matters and disclosure—you're exactly right that it's a big issue—the federal and provincial governments have simplified, for example, the child support guidelines and the spousal support advisory guidelines to help determine outcomes.

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Could I ask a follow-up question, please?

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

You guys have three more minutes.

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

How do you force the rich one, the husband or the wife or whoever it is, who keeps dragging things on, knowing that the other side doesn't have the money, to...? Can anything be done?

[Prof. Nicholas Bala]

Again, I've been privileged to write about this. One way is using what we're calling “cost sanctions”: a judge orders the person who's dragging the process out unreasonably or who is not accepting reasonable settlement offers to pay the legal fees of the other person. This is a bit of a moving target, but understanding around that kind of issue has certainly increased. I think we're seeing judges—more in some provinces than others, by the way, and certainly more in Ontario—make cost orders to incentivize people. For example, if you don't properly disclose, you will end up paying more at the end. If you drag this out, if you don't accept a reasonable settlement offer, that will increase the cost.

Many of these things I'm talking about are actually matters of provincial jurisdiction. They're very important. I think you've heard from all of us about the complexity. The federal-provincial overlap in jurisdiction here is significant.

I think the federal government does have a critical role. For example, I fully endorse the idea of research and public legal education. There are things the federal government can and should be spending its resources on that would help improve access to justice.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

What I hear from everybody—and we've heard from a number before—is the importance of mediation and how it can reduce the trauma and the costs and so on.

Who is responsible for training the mediators, and how do we judge the effectiveness of them?

[Prof. Nicholas Bala]

Again, there are others who are well qualified, but mediation is a provincial responsibility.

By the way, you're right in identifying that it is to some extent an unregulated profession in Canada. At the high end, we have some wonderful mediators. At the low end, we have people who have gone through divorce themselves, have a certain view of it and say, “Now I'm a family mediator. I am ready to mediate.” That's a big problem, and it is totally, I think, a matter of provincial responsibility.

In Ontario we have some mediation that is funded by the provincial government, and the provincial government requires that those mediators have certification from one of the professional organizations. There's the Ontario Association for Family Mediation and some other organizations that train and certify mediators as meeting certain minimum standards.

It's a very big issue, and I think you're right in identifying it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Thank you very much.

We will now go to the Liberal side and Mr. Fraser.