That's a valid point. I think the criminal law doesn't accomplish that already. The example you gave of sexual assault, all offences, really, covers a broad range of behaviours. In the case of sexual assault, it's from an unwanted touch in public to a full-on egregious, serious, violent encounter. It's the same with aggravated assault. It could be a consensual fight, where a punch goes wrong and breaks a nose, or it could be cutting off fingers to achieve a nefarious end. We call it the same thing. It's recorded as the same thing. So it would be somewhat incongruous with how we deal with other offences to start being very specific here.
The thing about our common law system and criminal law specifically is that a general principle is applied to specific cases, taking into account the specific facts of the offence and the offender. It's a bottom-up approach, where you start with the general, and then get specific as you get into the facts and as you get toward the ultimate end. Inverting that pyramid and starting with specifics, and then applying them generally, could lead to problems.
If your point is taken, and this is the direction in which the committee and ultimately this bill progresses, the inconsistencies that you mentioned need to be addressed.
I just noticed another one for the first time. I don't know if I was up too late last night and my eyes got blurry, but I notice that the definition of torture in this bill is repeated infliction of pain and suffering. I don't think the word “repeated”—and I will check, because I don't want to say it if it's not true—is in the state-sponsored or state torture section. Those sorts of incongruities can be damaging and may be counterproductive to the very purpose of your bill.