I'm sorry. I'm not sure about the reference to “ordinary use”. I think that I have, though, acknowledged that gender expression is a broad term. It does have meaning in law. I believe I said that. It's used in other areas of law. I also referenced established rules of statutory interpretation—not just for “gender expression” but for terms like “practice” and other terms in the definition of conversion therapy in the bill—in terms of how courts will apply those principles to these terms, or that they will.
First and foremost, there's the narrow construction of criminal statutes or criminal legislation, and also the fact that legislation has to be interpreted purposively, which means consistent with its objectives. That's where my reference to “gender identity” came in, because the overall objective of the bill is to stop practices that are designed to change gender identity to cisgender. We know that those types of interventions often involve efforts to reduce or repress gender expression. As I explained at the beginning of my remarks, it's my understanding that at least one of the main intentions behind including this amendment is to address certain evidentiary issues that are of concern.
Thank you.