You said something that struck me. We talk sometimes about categories. I don't want to misquote you, but my interpretation of what you said is that there are broad categories. We don't want to foreclose any category of miscarriage of justice.
My view is that generally when we're looking at these things, there are principles that underlie them. One principle is that somebody should not be convicted for a crime they didn't commit. That's one tenet of the rule of law. It's a very basic one: If you didn't do it, you obviously shouldn't be punished. We were all taught that. Even in high school we would talk about this in my law 12 class. We talked about whether it's appropriate for 100 people to go free to prevent one innocent person from going to jail—or 1,000. At what threshold do we reach that?
My concern is that we don't want to foreclose the categories that could result in a miscarriage of justice. Really, aren't there just a couple of principles that underlie this? The main one.... Well, I shouldn't say it's the main one, because we heard divergent testimony on this, but it's that the person didn't commit the offence. That is the most basic miscarriage of justice. We're looking at the Truscott case, the Milgaard case and others. They didn't do it. DNA says they did not commit the offence. I think we can all agree that this is a classic miscarriage of justice.
You've talked about other things, like the fabrication of evidence. If evidence was fabricated.... I'm sorry; I'm just trying to formulate my thought here. If we're looking at the fabrication of evidence as it relates to a miscarriage of justice, how would this bill look at somebody who may be factually guilty—by that, I mean they committed the offence—but should not have been convicted based on the evidence? In your view, is that a miscarriage of justice?