Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon. It is a privilege to appear today on behalf of Christian Legal Fellowship, CLF. Thank you for the opportunity to share our perspectives on Bill C-9.
CLF is a national association of over 750 legal professionals working with faith communities and other groups across Canada. CLF is also an NGO with special consultative status with the United Nations. It has intervened as a friend of the court in over 40 cases involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including in Whatcott, where the Supreme Court cited CLF's submission in its unanimous decision.
Let me start by affirming that CLF shares the government's desire to combat all acts that propagate and normalize hatred. We wish to ensure that initiatives like Bill C-9 are both effective and constitutionally sound. That requires a carefully tailored approach in defining exactly what is being criminalized and in what circumstances.
The Criminal Code, as you know, contains the most severe penalties in our legal system. The stakes are high in finding the right balance. It means the difference between someone's liberty and incarceration. In this context, when it comes to defining hateful expression, we need to ask some hard questions. When should someone be imprisoned, separated from their family and from society, and branded a criminal because of the words they speak or the views they express? What might we deprive our communities of? Whose voices might be silenced if we don't strike the right balance? What legitimate ideas might never be heard if people are afraid to speak up for fear of being prosecuted as hateful when they aren't hateful at all?
At the same time, how do we deal with the concerns we just heard about with the growing animus in our country, particularly that which is directed towards minority religious groups? How do we deal with the very real harms that flow from that animus? These are important questions that this committee is wrestling with, that this bill is wrestling with and that we all are wrestling with. It is absolutely crucial that we get this right.
It is often said that the law is a teacher. People will learn and look to laws like this one, especially when it comes to our public discourse. In fact, the Supreme Court recently recognized that allegations of hatred are often used in public discourse, and used in ways that well exceed their narrow meaning within the legal system. When it comes to the criminal law, we need to have a clear understanding of what we mean by hatred and why it is a legitimate subject for criminal intervention.
Hatred of people is evil. Public manifestations of that evil are appropriately addressed through the criminal law. Other aspects of hatred ought to be addressed through different avenues, such as educational, mental, spiritual and community supports. Criminal intervention is justified only when someone takes action, or what the Supreme Court has called “extreme manifestations” of hatred. It is important that we always recognize why that is. It's not because we find certain views offensive, as repugnant as we might find them. It's not because we object to what people think or feel. It's the mode and effect of expression, not the expression itself or the content of the expression itself, that the law must target. The Supreme Court has been very clear on that point.
The criminal law is concerned when someone takes action—action to mobilize others to deny a group's intrinsic dignity, or to treat them as lesser beings; action that effectively dehumanizes others; and action that is ultimately a rejection of a basic compact of our community life together. That is what should be targeted. Expressions that fall short of that threshold, offensive as they might be, should not be criminalized.
While there's a legitimate role for the criminal law in combatting hatred, the law must be carefully tailored to those goals. We have identified three primary concerns with Bill C-9 in this regard. I will just quickly summarize them, in conclusion.
First, there's the definition of hatred. The term hatred, in any context, is highly susceptible to subjective interpretation and must be defined more precisely than it is currently in the bill.
Second, the new and proposed motive offence requires clarification for a number of reasons, which we can get into. We suggest in our written brief that this offence should focus not on an accused's internal emotional motivations but on whether an accused commits an offence with the intent to incite hatred. Again, how we define hatred is a crucial issue here.
Finally, there should be explicit recognition of the freedom to discuss and criticize beliefs, opinions or practices in good faith. This clearly would communicate that disagreement is not detestation. That is also consistent with the defences contained in subsection 319(3), which should be also retained to help ensure that the legislation complies with the charter.
A clear line must be drawn between, on the one hand, expression that seeks to vilify groups and, on the other, expression that simply seeks to challenge ideas. Substantive amendments are needed in Bill C-9 to help achieve that demarcation and strengthen the government's efforts to combat hatred in line with the charter.
Thank you very much.