Thank you very much for the thoughtful question, Mr. Fortin. I appreciate the opportunity to engage with you on this because it is a really important issue.
The defence that you reference in paragraph 319(3)(b) has been really important in the court's consideration of the entire anti-hatred framework in section 319. In fact, this defence, and the other defences in subsection 319(3), have been pivotal in demonstrating to the courts that the legislation does strike the right balance and doesn't intrude too far on citizens' rights to freedom of opinion and expression. If this defence, or the other defences for truth, as examples, were removed, we would be concerned that could undermine the constitutionality of this regime and the careful balance that has been struck.
The concern, of course—which I understand and am sympathetic to—is that someone might misuse this defence, try to hide behind a religious veneer and use it as a smokescreen to promote hate. That would not be a “good faith” defence. That would actually be a misuse of both the defence and, frankly, of religion. Thankfully, that defence has been interpreted very carefully by the courts to preclude exactly that scenario. The courts have been very clear that this defence cannot be used to cloak hateful expression with impunity—the language they use is “as a Trojan Horse to carry the intended message of hate”—and there hasn't been a single case that the defence has been—