Thank you.
I certainly want to echo the comments of Professor MacIntosh in almost everything that she has said.
By way of my background, I've been a lawyer for the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan for the past 23 years. I have responsibility for policy development, among other things. I was also part of the expert panel that presented the report from the Council of Canadian Academies on mature minors. It was quite a remarkable experience, because it gathered together a group of people who had divergent backgrounds in medicine, ethics, law and other backgrounds. The report is the consolidation of the wisdom of all of those people sitting around the table and talking about all of those things. Finally, I took part in developing the draft policy for the Federation of Medical Regulatory Authorities of Canada, as well as the actual policy of our college as it relates to medical assistance in dying. That is my background.
The first point that I'd like to make is that the Supreme Court of Canada in A.C. v. Manitoba recognized that the decisional capacity of an adolescent is not dependent upon age and that adolescents who have decisional capacity are entitled to make their own health care decisions. That includes circumstances in which the result of those decisions may cause death.
The second point I would make is that many of the individuals who access medical assistance in dying are individuals of quite advanced age, some of whom have somewhat diminished capacity, but still have the capacity to make their decisions. The result, I would suggest, is that it is quite anomalous that individuals of an advanced age and with somewhat diminished capacity are entitled to access medical assistance in dying—provided, as I say, that they do have the capacity to make those health care decisions—yet that is denied to individuals under the age of 18 who may well have more decisional capacity than some of the individuals who are currently accessing MAID.
The next point that I would make comes from the discussions and the information that was gathered by the Council of Canadian Academies group, of which I was a part. There is often a great deal of concern that adolescents tend not to be as concerned about the outcome of their decisions, that they are risk-taking and that their prefrontal lobes are not fully developed. Consequently, their capacity for executive functioning is somewhat diminished as compared with individuals who are somewhat older. The evidence of that is fairly compelling.
However, the evidence that has been gathered with respect to individuals who have life-threatening illnesses, and who have dealt with that for a considerable period of time, demonstrates that they are fully aware of the consequences of their health condition. They are very informed about their condition and are very thoughtful about the decisions they make.
Therefore, if medical assistance in dying for adolescents is to be allowed, and they have decision-making capacity, it means you will not be dealing with those individuals who are thoughtless, who are risk-taking and who are doing all of those things. Rather, you'll be dealing with individuals who have a quite sophisticated understanding of their health condition and are capable of sophisticated thought on how that health condition may progress.
A concept that was new to me at the discussion with the Council of Canadian Academies was the issue of relational economy. All of us are embedded in our relationships with our families and with others. The way of looking at the patient autonomy is not necessarily to look at it exclusively as individuals, but also with a recognition that decisions are made in the context of the relationships with those who are around the patient, namely, families. In the case of adolescents, that will very often be parents, or it may be other caregivers.
I suggest a couple of things. One is that the discussion around medical assistance in dying and whether it should be available to mature minors should not focus on whether it should be allowed, but rather that there should be additional safeguards for individuals who are required to undergo additional safeguards that are not required of adults. There are two things that might potentially be considered by Parliament in order to implement that.
The first is, again, the recognition of relational autonomy, a recognition that a decision to access medial assistance in dying affects those around you, whether you're an adult or an adolescent. It may be worth considering that parents at least be involved in the decision and are aware of the decisions being made. However, I suggest this does not require consent. One of the recognitions in the report from the Council of Canadian Academies is that, if parents are required to consent to the death of their child, they may feel very reluctant to be involved in the consent and may feel very guilty and unwilling to provide consent. That could deprive an adolescent of their full capacity and ability to end their intolerable suffering.
The second thing you might want to consider is what Parliament has done with respect to individuals whose death is not reasonably foreseeable. The requirement is that there be the involvement of somebody with expertise in the health condition, if the individuals doing the assessment do not have expertise in that health condition. Something similar to that might be considered when it comes to the potential of extending this to mature minors.
One concern identified is the availability of these kinds of services. It's somewhat inconsistent across Canada. For example, the requirement of a psychiatric consultation is probably relatively easily met in downtown Toronto. In rural Canada, I think, it is much less easily met.
Those are my opening comments. I'm looking forward to the opportunity to have a discussion with the members of this panel.
Thank you so much.