Thank you.
With respect to diplomacy in Afghanistan, and as an instrument to resolve and overcome the obstacles we are dealing with, all of the key partners of Afghanistan could play a big role. We need to have an enhanced dialogue on security not only with Pakistan but with all of the other regional players, including India, Iran, the countries of Central Asia, Russia, China and others. We had this dialogue in a more structured fashion during the time of the Taliban regime, which was referred to as the group of "Six plus Two" which met primarily in Geneva, but which also included Afghanistan's six neighbours. We may need another type of format now, but we certainly do need this dialogue, particularly with Pakistan, but also with the other countries.
We also need to take a diplomatic approach to deal with the economic issues in the region. In the autumn of 2006, a conference was held in New Delhi regarding economic cooperation in Afghanistan. There were discussions about developing linkages in the energy and infrastructure construction sectors to commence the transportation systems of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, and there were also discussions about trade and conditions to promote investment in Afghanistan. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other players are very active in this sector, and you would probably be surprised to see just how much progress has been achieved. We've had difficulty explaining where progress has been achieved, but it has occurred.
To return very quickly to the question of timetables, we in the United Nations are of the view that Balkan-like timetables are probably appropriate in Afghanistan. No one wants to name an end-date or to be drawn on the question of how long this will take. We simply don't control the factors that are driving the insecurity. We are trying desperately to understand them better and to bring them under control. But let's look at the research that's been done. The RAND Corporation has a very exhaustive piece of research on all the insurgencies and counter-insurgencies fought since the Second World War. Their conclusion is that it takes 14 years to lose a counter-insurgency and 17 years to win one. That's on average.
Clearly, however, as James has said, the major challenge for us all today is to show resolve, to show will, and to demonstrate unity of effort. If we are rushing for the exits, if we are trying to cut things short, if we are flagging in our commitment to achieving the objectives set out in the Afghanistan Compact, we will be giving comfort to the enemies of this transition. And we will, quite frankly, be undermining the achievements and the effort that is under way today to bring stability to Afghanistan.
No one thinks that eradication of poppies alone will have any significant impact on the industry. There are eight pillars to the national counter-narcotics strategy, of which eradication is only one. Eradication can only be successful, if it can be successful at all, when the other seven are in play. That is simply not the case in southern Afghanistan right now. We in the United Nations will be vocal in arguing for a more comprehensive approach, when all the lanes are filled and all activities are taking place on the ground. It is, however, not a solution to simply dump this product onto the international pharmaceuticals market. If that legalization were to take place, you would see a spike. You would see Afghans cutting down their orchards, turning over new soil to cultivate opium, to meet the demands of both the legal market and the illegal market, which in this country, where the rule of law has not been established, would probably continue to experience astronomical growth.
With regard to Quetta, what is the forum for discussing these issues? Quite frankly, perhaps this should be a forum. Perhaps some of the regional players involved in Afghanistan's transition, involved in the security equation in Afghanistan, deserve to be part of your discussions. We are certainly very active in reaching out to various players in Pakistan as often as we can, and in trying to put these questions clearly and squarely before those who may have an opportunity to influence better outcomes. But there are some differences of opinion.
President Karzai says that Mullah Omar lives in Quetta or nearby. President Musharraf has said several times over the past six or eight months that Mullah Omar is happy and well and living just outside of Kandahar. We all have an interest in establishing what the facts of the matter are.
One of the tools we have available is UN Resolution 1267. But debate on this issue, candour on this issue, and clarification of the facts of the matter with regard to Taliban leadership structures are going to be required more, not less, in the months to come.
