National Defence Committee on Oct. 6th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Good day everyone. Welcome to the 31st meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion passed by the Committee on Monday, February 23, 2009, we continue today our study of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

We'll go ahead with our study on Arctic sovereignty.

Today we have one witness, Franklyn Griffiths.

I want to thank you for being with us. You have the floor.

[Professor Franklyn Griffiths, As an Individual]

It's an honour to be here, and I thank you for the invitation.

I first went north as a labourer. I worked in Moose Factory, building a church school in the summer of 1953. A couple of summers after that, I was up at what was then called Great Whale on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, helping to build a mid-Canada radar line, which has since been dismantled. Those were my first tastes of the north. And they never went away; I've always had an affection and an interest in things northern.

I became engaged in Arctic policy, northern policy stuff, with the incursion of the U.S. supertanker Manhattan into our waters in 1969-70. That's where I really got turned on. By then I was teaching international politics at the University of Toronto. It was a violation of Canadian sovereignty that actually got me going on Arctic policy studies, and I've been interested ever since.

Now, however, I don't think quite the way I used to in 1969-70. I was previously what you might call a fire-breathing sovereigntist, an Arctic sovereigntist. There was no question in my mind that there was an urgent need for Canada to stand up—in this case, to the United States—and see to it that sovereignty over our waters, over the many passageways called the Northwest Passage, would be assured.

Since 1969-70, my views have slowly evolved. I've come to believe that we are not well served by trying to plan and base public policy in the north—that is, southern public policy in Canada for the north--on sovereignty matters. Sovereignty is not, to my way of thinking, a good foundation for us. It is a foundation that is unsteady. It comes and goes in cycles. And it is not something that makes for constancy in Canadian behaviour.

I am thinking in particular of the Polar 8 icebreaker, which we said we would buy in 1985. In 1985, the U.S. icebreaker, Polar Sea, came through the Northwest Passage without a by-your-leave. And I broke the news of that visit, that intrusion, in an op-ed piece in The Globe and Mail in the summer of 1985. I was still, in the summer of 1985, a strong, unqualified sovereigntist.

But the Polar 8 didn't come through. We couldn't hold to it. In fact, the Arctic sovereignty threat seemed to recede. The same was true of the fleet of Arctic-capable nuclear attack submarines we were going to buy a bit later. We were committed to this, but they never got through. It was impossible for the government of the day to sustain that project, and it languished.

Today, what is happening to the offshore patrol vessels? Where are they? I would say they are now in abeyance. They're awaiting a whole series of decisions to be made about shipbuilding. But my guess is that this is going to be another case where we commit on the basis of sovereignty and do not carry through. We can discuss this, but it seems to me that we have a problem. It's one of constancy and of finding a better basis.

One of the reasons the basis is not good is that we have, in my view, greatly exaggerated the threats to sovereignty this country faces. The reality in Canadian public life, or politics, is that there is an exaggerated worry about sovereignty. We even worry about Hans Island. And the media picks this up. The few of us who know about it worry about the Lincoln Sea and our differences—a minor one, in my view—with Denmark and Greenland. People know rather more about the Beaufort Sea and our dispute with the United States. There's the outer continental shelf, which is getting more and more attention, and we could talk about that, but there's the Northwest Passage especially, which remains quite a serious worry and concern, and it's an exaggerated one.

To my way of thinking, all these issues, but especially the Northwest Passage, see Canada in very good shape. We do not need to worry the way we do. We do not need to talk of asserting sovereignty. Asserting sovereignty, to my way of thinking, is like pushing on an open door. There's really nobody resisting us, to the extent we think we are being resisted.

Part of the reason for the worry and exaggerated concern is that I believe the media have been listening to those I would call “purveyors of polar peril”. Those people have got it wrong. But the media love a story, and maybe politicians like the story too. This is not a partisan statement. I think this is true of Liberals; this is true of Conservatives today. I think it is an interest in the story and in playing in some way on the Canadian identity. If you like, we could talk about identity politics and whether that is a good basis for defence, but there are also a whole lot of other public policies we might want to pursue.

I'm not going to talk much more, because I'd like to leave it with a brief opener.

The Chief of the Defence Staff said not long ago, at the end of August, that there is no conventional military threat to the Canadian Arctic. He said so, and I think he's totally right. There's no nuclear threat to the Canadian Arctic; there's no asymmetrical threat of any proportion to the Canadian Arctic.

What we do have instead, and some would call these sovereignty threats, are what I would call policing threats. They don't require combat capability, but constabulary forces and abilities to police our waters, to know what's happening, to act in emergencies, to act for a search and rescue. In all of this there are things the military can do and that the Canadian Forces should be equipped to do. Basically the need for hardware is relatively slight, and to justify it on a sovereignty basis is not the best, in my view. Instead we should be thinking about policing what is ours, accepting no fear and no uncertainty. We should be confident.

In the long haul, it seems that we do have a sovereignty problem when it comes to the defence of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago by a stand-alone Canada whose sovereignty claim to the area is contested by virtually all, except perhaps the Russians. If it came to having to defending this claim and acting on it in a militarized Arctic 20 or 30 years from now, in a greatly ice-reduced Arctic, having to police these waters against any and all who come in--all submarines, nuclear included, and all surface vessels--I think we'd be hard put to do this. In fact, it would break the bank. It would eliminate a great many options that we might like to pursue in defence and foreign policy.

I think this is something we should try to head off, and for that I'll end by saying that we should pursue a strategy of stewardship in the region: to build confidence, to reduce the risks of our having to stand alone and defend the Arctic Archipelago in a worst case scenario down the road that is preventable.

Thank you, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you, Mr. Griffiths. I really appreciate your presentation.

Now I will give the floor to the vice-chair, Mr. Bryon Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Professor Griffiths, for being here. I remember you from when I was a student at the University of Toronto in the 1970s. You seem to have weathered the last number of years better than I, but maybe that's a hazard of the job.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

You look pretty good, sir.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

You wrote an article called “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: Time to Take Yes for an Answer on the Northwest Passage” One of the things that struck me in your Globe and Mail article in July is that you indicate we have no strategy for the Arctic in its entirety and we need to make one or follow others.

Can you elaborate on what elements you would see as part of that strategy, particularly since you talked of an issue that's very near and dear to this committee, and that is the impact of climate change on the Arctic?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Right.

There is a northern strategy, I should say right away and acknowledge that it's good as far as it goes. But it is basically a domestic or, shall I say, an internal northern Canadian strategy. It isn't very international. It doesn't have the strong pan-Arctic dimension that I think we should have. That is a strategy that would see us have an idea of our own, and then go for it for the future of the Arctic as a region. We tend to think of our own piece of the pie and not to go too far beyond that yet. I think, though, we'll have to take a position sooner or later and develop a strategy.

What should go in there? There are all kinds of things that should go in. There is the environment, of course. There is adaptation to climate change. There is shipping throughout the region. We could talk about the Northwest Passage and what might or might not happen there, but there is the possibility that as the ice recedes still further for there to be use of the Russian northern sea route, or there could well be shipping right across the pole from the Bering Strait through eastern Greenland to Europe or the North Atlantic. This would be done by specially dedicated ships. There are fisheries to manage and think about. As the waters warm and the ice recedes, new species are appearing in the Arctic Ocean and related waters. Those will have to be governed. There are effects of all these things upon indigenous people and other residents of the north. So there is quite a large agenda.

We could talk about this, but there is not a military or a national defence agenda. It is rather more on a stewardship or constabulary side of things, including, by the way, search and rescue. I think there will be an increasing need, which will be recognized by Canada and the other eight, to set up an emergency response capability. I'm sure that to do this it will require the support of the Canadian armed forces.

There is a whole set of things that need doing, and I think the word that sums it up is “stewardship”. You could work it out in some detail, but there is something else. Before we could actually begin to implement a strategy, I believe we have to create the will to cooperate in the region. The will is in short supply in the Arctic. It's in short supply because, like Canada, the other Arctic countries, but especially the Russians, are preoccupied with sovereignty and with possession. They are not yet looking outward as much as they might. And there is a need to build an outwardness in this country, but also in the other countries as well. The need here varies.

I think, though, there are interesting parallels between the Russian debate about the Arctic and the debate in Canada. Again, there are identity dimensions as the Russians approach the Arctic and as we do, which in the Russian case leads them to abrasive and threatening statements and maybe actions and moves as well, even though fundamentally the Russian position is one of support for the rule of law. This, I think, is perhaps somewhat the way Russians may read us in Canada, but there is a strategy in there somewhere.

I could go further, but--

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I notice in your writings you talk a lot about Arctic stewardship, even to the point of saying that should be part of the Prime Minister's job description, that really the stewardship has a different connotation from some of the wording we've heard lately around here, in terms of a collective responsibility. But you say we're a long way from that yet, to be able to execute.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

I think we are, as a country. And as a community in the Arctic among the other Arctic countries, it's still somewhat far off, because everyone is still concerned with possession and with what we have that might be taken away from us. There are these exaggerated fears that stand in the way. But it seems to me stewardship is where we should go. And I would call stewardship “locally informed governance”. It's a form of governing. And the Arctic Council, which Canada helped to set up--or led the way in, actually--should be a keystone of our strategy of Arctic governance that sees stronger cooperation and cuts the pathway off to this militarization and conflict of the Arctic, where, if it really went haywire, we would have a lot of defence spending and trouble. My thought is that it is foreseeable and avoidable, and we should be acting on it now.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you for that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

You will need your translation device because I will be talking in French.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Let me try. Will you speak slowly, sir?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Griffiths, I have here the text of an interview that you gave to the Department of Foreign Affairs in October 2007. In it, you raise some very interesting issues. You talk about global warming and the Arctic, the Canada-U.S. relationship relating to the Arctic and the planting of the Russian flag. I would like to discuss with you the two last subjects, specifically, the effectiveness of the Arctic Council and the creation of a marine council.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Could you repeat your question, please?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

The two last points are the most important: the effectiveness of the Arctic Council and the creation of a marine council. As concerns the effectiveness of the Arctic Council, you seem to cast doubt about the rule of consensus and say that perhaps it might be useful to replace it by the majority rule.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Yes. Merci.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I noted an inconsistency in your text, Mr. Griffiths. You said this:

On the whole, governments are jealous. They are jealous of their capacity to do as they wish, and they do not like to surrender, for instance, to a majority vote rule, which might replace consensus procedures in the Arctic Council.

You also add, later on, that the Council might accomplish more and that it would require the majority rule.

Could you tell me if you think that the Arctic Council might be more efficient under the majority rule than the consensus rule?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

I'm surprised I said that. I'd have to see what I said, because I'm a believer in the consensus approach. Maybe it was an absent-minded professor's moment, but I don't think I actually would have said that.

It has always seemed to me that the approach should be consensual, and if you want majority votes you're into an entirely different set-up. It's by consensus that the Arctic Council has been able to proceed to the extent it has. I favour a continuation of consensus. If the Arctic Council is to be strengthened and made more effective, it seems to me it should happen with the maintenance of consensus among the eight Arctic countries. But we should add non-Arctic countries to the table. We should bring France, Germany, and China to the table now, with full voices but not votes. In order to speed consensus, the votes would still be held by the eight, but we should hear from the others.

I think in due course the Chinese navy will be in the Arctic. You can see that coming. They are already doing the scientific research from the oceanography. This is the way some mariners start off. There's a need to include these people now and build a stronger, more efficacious Arctic Council, maintaining the consensus procedure.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I would like you to tell me more about the creation of a marine council.

I was responsible for Indian affairs and northern development during my first years of my political life in Ottawa. I know that a provision of the Nunavut Agreement refers to a marine council, but I do not think that it was ever implemented.

Do you think that the creation of that marine council might be beneficial? In your text, you say that it would bring new elements and that it might create a consensus among nations around this important issue.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Thank you very much. That's a great question.

Was Mary Simon the president of the Inuit Tapiriit?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

She still is. She came here last week.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

But was she speaking to you?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

She came here last week, yes.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

That's right; I saw a mention in the press that she was suggesting that there be some kind of forum where Inuit and the federal government could together manage the Arctic waters of Canada.

I think this is probably another way of talking about a marine council--that is, set up an authority or a forum or a place where southern Canadians, to put it more broadly, and northerners could get together and put their imaginations together, closely, but up north.

Again, I always think the local is important. The people who really know and live and have long experience with the north would be at the table talking. In this case, Inuit, who have land claims rights, would be at the table helping to shape a long-term Canadian policy on our own Arctic waters, which should lead to a larger view of where the Arctic region might go, what would suit us, what our vision for the future would be.

I think implicit in the land claims agreement for Nunavut is this marine council, which should be acted upon, in my view. Whether it's the exact provision in the land claim agreement, I'm not sure, because if you start to look at it, that's a fairly complex and Nunavut-specific body. We would need something rather more expansive and larger that would allow for the Inuvialuit in the western Arctic to be part of the picture, for instance. That means the GNWT has to be part of it, as well as Nunavut.

To me, there's a really interesting challenge there. I'm not sure who should take this up; maybe it's Mr. Strahl, the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, who should be doing this. But the time has come, I believe, for us to put our heads together, to put our imaginations together, to create an institution, a place, where these ideas can be shared. Again, we would come out of what I regard as a southern absorption with our own southern identity.

Maybe I'm being too critical here, but we tend down south to look at the north in terms of our own southern identity, as the “true north strong and free” and so on. Rather than looking at the north as it is, we think of the north as it's part of us as we'd like to be. There's a certain escape from reality here when you get into identity and identity politics. I think if we moved north it would be a big plus.

Thank you.